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Abstract
This thesis is composed of three chapters. Chapter 1 investigates the extent to which
firms evade taxes on corporate profits by misreporting their imports and exports. I in-
directly estimate evasion by studying the co-movements of tax rates and discrepancies
between reports by importers and exporters of the same trade flows. I find evidence of
significant evasion. To facilitate causal interpretation of the results, I develop a model
of the compliance problem of the firm and test several predictions linking firms’ eva-
sion motives to accounting rules, institutional features, and the interaction of the rates
of tariff and corporate income tax.
Chapter 2 focuses on innovation. We use methods from Natural Language Pro-
cessing to characterize the innovative content of patents. We develop several metrics
that compare inventions to existing and future innovations. The intuition guiding us
is that patents dissimilar to past inventions and similar to future ones may have an-
ticipated or started shifts in innovation topics. We find non-causal evidence that such
patents have higher citations and the firms owning them grow faster and are more
profitable relative to other firms. Analysis of trends suggests that innovative ideas
may have gotten harder to find over time in high-innovation fields.
Chapter 3 quantifies Value Added Tax (VAT) fraud eliminated by a reform of the
European Union VAT rules preventing traders from exploiting a weakness of the sys-
tem that allowed them to collect VAT without remitting it to the tax authorities. The
targeted fraud schemes involve cross-border transactions and result in firms misre-
porting their transactions, which in turn affects trade statistics. Based on 54 reform
episodes, I find that fraud worth up to EUR 1.6 billion annually is removed thanks to
the reform. Although large in absolute terms, this only represents a tiny fraction of
total VAT revenues in the European Union.
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Chapter 1
Corporate Tax Evasion: Evidence
From International Trade
1.1 Introduction
Revenues from taxation of corporations’ profits represent a sizeable share of overall
tax revenues, ranging from around 9% in OECD countries to 15% in Africa, Latin
America and the Caribbean.1 In recent years, growing concerns that significant
amounts of corporate income tax are evaded, in part fuelled by large fiscal deficits
following the Great Recession and instances of document leaks exposing firms’
schemes aiming at dodging tax authorities, have led to considerable policy attention
(Slemrod, 2016).2 Yet the scale and the determinants of corporate tax evasion remain
elusive due to its illegal and secretive nature.
I provide novel evidence of corporate income tax evasion in the form of an elas-
ticity of evasion with respect to the statutory tax rate by exploiting an empirical strat-
egy used in the literature on tariff evasion in international trade. In trade statistics,
each trade flow is reported twice: once by the exporter as an export, and once by the
importer as an import. The difference between these reported figures (reported ex-
ports minus reported imports) is defined as a reporting gap.3 When the incentive to
(mis-)report the trade flow changes for one side but remains constant for the trading
partner, the reporting gap changes as a result. Fisman and Wei (2004) originally used
1Source: OECD.Stat, Global Revenue Statistics Data Set. The numbers are for year 2016.
2See, for instance, the CumEx-Files, LuxLeaks and the Paradise Papers. The Panama Papers were
mostly about individuals rather than corporations.
3Other studies reviewed later in this section have also named it trade gap, or missing trade. The UN
Comtrade unit refers to it as bilateral asymmetries.
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this idea to study tariff evasion. Higher tariffs on imports may induce importers to
lower the value of their reported imports to evade tariffs, resulting in a change in the
reporting gap.
This paper extends this logic to corporate income tax (CIT) evasion. In the case of
CIT, as the tax rate increases in a given country, a firm may want to under-report its
exports (which are a component of sales) to lower its taxable profits. The same firm
may also want to misrepresent its imports (which are a component of costs), though
whether it wishes to overstate or understate is theoretically ambiguous, as I discuss be-
low. Insofar as the trading partner’s incentives remain unchanged and in the absence
of confounding factors, the reporting gaps would react to changes in the CIT rate, re-
vealing evasion. This paper estimates how reporting gaps react to tax rate changes
and discusses the assumptions under which the gaps’ response to these changes can
be interpreted as evidence of tax evasion.
To guide the interpretation of the results, I present a model of the compliance prob-
lem of the firm. The firm acquires imported inputs and sells its products abroad, and
must decide on how much of each to report to the tax authorities for the purpose of
tariff and CIT taxation. Reported imports and profits constitute the tax bases for tar-
iffs and CIT, respectively. Misreporting entails a risk, modelled in reduced form as a
cost function that captures the expected cost of evasion. Deviations of the reported
amounts from the true values of sales and purchases increase the cost, as do large dis-
crepancies between reported sales and reported purchases. The latter captures the fact
that a firm which reports excessively low sales and high costs may appear suspicious
to the authorities. The need for consistency in the firm’s accounts effectively binds the
levels of optimal reported sales and purchases to each other through the cost function.
The reporting gap in the model is constructed by considering two firms, located in dif-
ferent countries and subject to different levels of tax, trading one good that constitutes
exports for one firm and imports for the other.
The model delivers testable predictions regarding how firms react in terms of their
reported (foreign) sales and purchases to changes in the CIT and tariff rates they are
subject to. First, a rise in tariffs induces the importing firm to under-report imports,
which increases the reporting gap. Second, an increase in the CIT rate in the export-
ing country induces the exporting firm to under-report exports, leading to a decrease
in the reporting gap. Third, the extent of misreporting in response to changes in CIT
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and tariff rates decreases when the taxman’s vigilance is higher. Lastly, following an
increase in the CIT rate in the importing country, whether the firm under- or over-
reports will depend on two countervailing forces: on one hand, over-reporting im-
ports would directly lower taxable profits, which is desirable for evasion purposes.
On the other hand, doing so would result in the simultaneous report of low sales and
high costs, thereby creating a discrepancy in the firm’s accounts and increasing the
likelihood of being audited. Over-reporting imports in response to an increase in the
CIT rate is more likely to be optimal when (i) tariffs are high, because tariff payments
are CIT-deductible and over-reporting imports lowers taxable profits through both
the reported cost of purchases and the tariff liability; (ii) costs are fully CIT-deductible
and therefore lower taxable profits one-to-one; (iii) the attention of tax authorities to
discrepancies in terms of reported sales and purchases is low, making inconsistencies
in the income statement of the firm less likely to trigger an audit. This ambiguity of
the importer’s behaviour offers interesting testable predictions which I fully exploit
empirically.
I collect data on dyadic international trade flows between countries at a highly
disaggregated product level for two separate samples: the first is an annual panel of
around 63 million observations spanning 195 countries over the years 1988-2017. The
second is a monthly panel dataset for EU countries containing 125 million observa-
tions over the same period.4 The trade data is complemented with data on tariffs (over
14 million tariff changes) and corporate income tax rates (close to 500 tax changes),
along with other macroeconomic and product-specific variables. The analysis of CIT
evasion mostly focuses on OECD countries (268 tax changes).
The identification approach to estimating evasion primarily relies on panel regres-
sions of the reporting gaps on the different tax rates, controlling for an extensive set of
fixed effects. My identification strategy exploits within product-country pair variation.
This choice is justified by the multitude of factors that influence the gaps, including
measurement errors and cross-country differences in the way trade statistics are com-
piled, which increase the risk of omitted variable bias (UNSD, 2019b).
I provide novel evidence of corporate tax evasion in the form of an elasticity of
4Note that the use of aggregated trade flows as opposed to firm- or transaction-level data will pose
a number of identification challenges. However, if transaction-level data across countries were available
— which is not the case to the best of my knowledge — evasion via trade misreporting would arguably
be less prevalent as tax authorities would be able to systematically cross-check each transaction based on
that data.
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evasion with respect to the statutory tax rate. First, the reporting gaps decrease by
0.15% to 0.3% upon a one percentage point increase in the tax rate in the exporting
country, which is consistent with the prediction that exporters under-report exports.
Put differently, the elasticity of the reporting gaps with respect to the net-of-tax rate
faced by the exporter is 0.1. Furthermore, there is no systematic relationship between
reporting gaps and the CIT rate in the importing country in the baseline estimates. A
tentative calculation of evasion levels via these channels suggests losses in revenues for
governments representing around 16% of actual corporate income tax revenues in the
OECD.5 This is broadly in line with estimates of non-compliance based on compliance
gaps metrics that many countries compute nowadays (Keen and Slemrod, 2017).6
However, the apparent absence of co-movement between reporting gaps and the
CIT rate in the importing country masks richer results. First, this relationship is pos-
itive when tariffs are low and becomes negative for higher levels of tariffs. This is
consistent with the model that predicts stronger incentives to over-report imports in
response to a CIT rate increase when tariffs are high, since tariff payments are CIT-
deductible. Second, within-EU trade is an environment with no tariffs and where
detection of inconsistencies in the firms’ income statements is facilitated by the way
in which Value Added Tax (VAT) returns and trade statistics are collected, which
the model predicts should induce importers to under-report in response to an in-
crease in the CIT rate. Empirically, the relationship between gaps and CIT in the
importing country is positive when focusing solely on within-EU trade (consistent
with importers under-reporting) and negative otherwise (consistent with importers
over-reporting). Third, the association between the importer’s CIT and the reporting
gaps is positive for capital goods, which are typically not fully cost-deductible. This
suggests under-reporting by importers, as predicted by the model.
5Given the data underlying the analysis, misreporting can only be measured for international trans-
actions and consequently, these estimates do not reflect total evasion. Furthermore, the calculation of
evasion levels presents several challenges and a discussion thereof is provided.
6Current estimates of taxpayers’ non-compliance by tax authorities usually take the form of compli-
ance gaps that compare the amount of tax due by law and that actually collected, and generally rely on
two strategies: top-down and bottom-up approaches (European Commission, 2018a). The top-down
approach estimates the potential tax base and revenues based on macroeconomic aggregates mostly
from national accounts. The difference between potential and actual revenues gives an estimate of non-
compliance but cannot differentiate between evasion and legal avoidance. The bottom-up approach
relies on the outcomes from audits of individual firms, which are used to infer non-compliance and its
cost at the population level. The implementation of these methods is fraught with difficulties, notably
because estimating the theoretical CIT base from macroeconomic aggregates is complex (Ueda, 2018),
and because audits are expensive and inferring economy-wide non-compliance is difficult when audits
are not random, but assigned based on risk for instance (IRS, 2016). For a critique of the use of tax
compliance gaps, see Gemmell and Hasseldine (2014).
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To shed further light on these key findings, I extend the analysis in several ways.
First, the negative relationship between exporters’ CIT and the gaps, interpreted
as exports under-reporting, decreases in magnitude when governments implement
evasion-curbing policies. Second, I observe similar yet more pronounced patterns
between reporting gaps and tax rates in trade in services, a notoriously fertile ground
for evasion and avoidance purposes (Tørsløv et al., 2018). Third, the estimates are
robust to controlling for simultaneous changes to the corporate income tax base,
which was broadened significantly over the sample period in many OECD countries
(Kawano and Slemrod, 2016). Last, data at the monthly and quarterly frequencies
is used to explore dynamic effects that are consistent with the evasion narrative
given above. In an event study framework, the reporting gaps are shown to react
around the dates at which taxes change in a similar fashion as found based on yearly
data. Furthermore, I uncover evidence that reported exports that appear to accrue to
December are postponed to the subsequent tax year. I interpret this as evidence of
inter-temporal profit-shifting by firms, and provide evidence that this pattern may be
related to tax evasion.
This study also finds strong evidence of tariff evasion, echoing past studies on the
topic. A one percentage point increase in the tariff rate is associated with an increase
in the reporting gaps of 0.16%, reflecting a decrease in reported imports relative to
reported exports. This semi-elasticity is in line with existing estimates, which range
from 0.1% to 4.6% (Fisman and Wei, 2004; Mishra et al., 2008; Javorcik and Narciso,
2008; Stoyanov, 2012; Javorcik and Narciso, 2017). This pattern is more prominent the
lower the income and the higher the corruption levels of the importing country. I find
evasion to be higher for differentiated products for which no reference price is readily
available, and to also take place through misclassification, as previously found in the
literature (Javorcik and Narciso, 2008; Fisman and Wei, 2004). My results suggest that
over the last 10 years, an estimated upper-bound of 44 billion US dollars worth of im-
port duties was evaded annually across the countries in the sample — this represents
2.5% of trade subject to tariffs and about 32% of actual revenues from import duties in
a subset of less-developed countries for which data on customs revenues is available.
Relation to the literature This paper contributes to three strands of the literature:
first, it relates to studies that use reporting gaps to estimate tariff evasion. The idea to
compare values of the same trade flow reported independently by the importing and
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exporting countries originates in the seminal work by Fisman and Wei (2004). Using
data on trade between China and Hong Kong, the authors found evidence of tariff
evasion by investigating the effect of changes in tariff rates on the reporting gaps in a
cross-section of products. This method was later applied in the same spirit to study
tariff evasion in different countries and times. To alleviate concerns of endogeneity of
tariffs (i.e. the risk that border authorities may set tariffs based on the evasion motives
of the importers), several papers have exploited quasi-experimental setups based on
trade agreements that exogenously changed tariff levels (Mishra et al., 2008; Javor-
cik and Narciso, 2008; Stoyanov, 2012). Evidence in other studies generally support
the strong and robust positive association between tariffs and evasion as measured
via reporting gaps (see, amongst others, Javorcik and Narciso, 2017; Kellenberg and
Levinson, 2019; Levin and Widell, 2014; Ferrantino et al., 2012; Farhad et al., 2018;
Demir and Javorcik, 2020). My paper contributes to this strand of the literature in two
ways thanks to the extensive coverage of the data. First, it arguably allows to better
isolate the evasion component of the reporting gaps by controlling for numerous fixed
effects, reducing the risk of endogeneity and omitted variable bias. Second, the extent
of evasion can be related to countries’ characteristics: low income, high corruption
countries experience more tariff evasion.7 To the extent of my knowledge, this is the
first paper to use data on the reporting gaps at such a large scale.
Second, this paper contributes to the literature on CIT evasion and avoidance by
providing an alternative and complementary strategy for estimating evasion. Besides
the methods used by tax authorities described in footnote 6, academic studies have
interpreted bunching of declared revenues at kinks in the tax schedule or the tax base
as evidence of evasion (Best et al., 2015; Kleven and Waseem, 2013; Chetty et al., 2011;
Saez, 2010), as well as used survey and audit data to study evasion, notably in relation
to corruption (Alm et al., 2016; DeBacker et al., 2015; Joulfaian, 2000). Besides evasion,
7Previous literature has shown a strong yet complex link between tariff evasion and corruption. Fo-
cusing on the relation between exporters and border authorities, Dutt and Traca (2010) show that corrup-
tion impedes trade as corrupt officers extract bribes from exporters to clear the cargo through customs,
yet that it may enhance trade when tariffs are high and corrupt officers allow the exporter to evade
tariffs against a bribe. Sequeira (2016) explains the low trade elasticities with respect to tariffs in a quasi-
experimental set up in Southern Africa by providing direct evidence on how bribes allow importers to
evade tariffs, rendering them less reactive to changes in tariff rates. Both Yang (2008) and Javorcik and
Narciso (2017) suggest that suppressing one evading method — namely misreporting prices — leads to
the use of alternative ways to avoid paying customs duties, such as misclassifying or quantity misreport-
ing. Not directly related to tariff evasion, Fisman and Wei (2009) show that corruption in the exporting
country is correlated with the reporting gap in the markets of art and antique goods, suggesting illicit
trafficking of goods undeclared in the exporting country, yet declared in the importing country where
their value depends on the ability of the owner to prove their authenticity.
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profit-shifting, a form of legal avoidance, has received much attention in the recent
literature: multinational firms shift their profits to low-CIT or tax haven countries
to reduce their tax liability, resulting in significant revenue losses for governments
(Bilicka, 2019; Tørsløv et al., 2018; Dowd et al., 2017). This research also indirectly
relates to the use of third-party reporting as of way of minimizing evasion. Kleven et
al. (2011) show that in the context of individual taxes, evasion is more prevalent for
self-reported income not subject to third-party reporting.8 In the case of international
trade, transactions with foreign entities are not directly and systematically subject to
third-party reporting — as could be the case domestically if transactions are subject to
Value Added Tax, for instance — and may thus be more fertile ground for evasion.
Third, this paper relates to the literature concerned with optimal corporate income
tax policy, and more specifically to the estimation of the elasticity of taxable income
with respect to marginal tax rates (for a review of this literature, see Saez et al., 2012).9
This study provides an estimate of the elasticity of evasion with respect to the statu-
tory tax in the context of corporate income taxation, which relates to the elasticity of
taxable income (ETI). One notable difference between the two resides in the fact that
ETIs encompass all behavioural responses to changes in the tax rate that lower the tax
burden (reduction in effort, organisational reorganization, evasion, legal avoidance,
etc.), whereas the elasticity in this paper only reflects evasion. This paper comple-
ments existing estimates of the elasticity of taxable corporate income, of which there
are significantly fewer in the literature than in the case of personal income taxation
(Devereux et al., 2014; Dwenger and Steiner, 2012; Gruber and Rauh, 2007).
Structure of the paper Section 1.2 presents a model of the compliance problem of
the firm. Details of the data are given in section 1.3. Section 1.4 lays out the empirical
strategy used to uncover tax evasion in the context of international trade. The results
on tariff and corporate income tax evasion can be found in sections 1.5 and 1.6, respec-
tively. Section 1.7 concludes. The main tables and figures can be found at the end of
text, after the conclusion. Additional tables and figures, respectively referenced with
prefixes 1.A and 1.B, can be found in appendices of the same name.
8Carrillo et al. (2017) and Slemrod et al. (2017) show that in the context of corporate taxation, even
when taxable revenues are subject to third-party scrutiny, reporting taxpayers may adjust other margins
(costs) such that taxable profits remains stable.
9Optimal policy is complex due to the multiplicity of the instruments available — e.g. tax base, statu-
tory rates, enforcement level (Keen and Slemrod, 2017; Almunia and Lopez-Rodriguez, 2018) — and of
the objectives to be achieved — changing tax policy not only affects tax revenues, but may also impact
economic allocation and efficiency (Best et al., 2015; Dwenger and Steiner, 2014).
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1.2 Model
An illustrative model is developed to show the mechanisms through which changes
in tariffs and corporate income tax rates impact the reporting gaps. Some elements
of the model are inspired by Ferrantino, Liu and Wang (2012). From the outset, this
model should only be taken as a way to obtain testable predictions used to guide the
empirical investigation in sections 1.5 and 1.6.
1.2.1 Compliance problem of the firm
Consider a firm that produces a final good using intermediate good in the production.
Denote its sales F and its purchases M, both are exogenous. Given the focus on inter-
national trade, assume that all purchases are imported from abroad and are subject to
tariff t ≥ 0, and that all sales are exported.10 Profits in this economy are taxed at rate
τ ∈ [0, 1]. Profits after tax in the absence of evasion are given by:
pino evasion = (F−M)− tM− τ max {0, [F−M(1+ t)φ]} , (1.1)
where φ ∈ (0, 1] denotes the fraction of costs that are CIT-deductible. The first element
of this expression is simply sales minus costs, the second is the tariff payment, and the
last is the corporate income tax payment. The firm can evade both tariffs and corporate
income taxes by misreporting the values of its sales and purchases. This entails a cost,
as detected evasion is punished. Denoting Fr and Mr the reported amounts, the firm
faces the following compliance optimization problem:
max
{Fr ,Mr}
(F−M)− tMr − τ max {0, [Fr −Mr(1+ t)φ]} − bC(Fr, Mr,ω), (1.2)
where C(·) is a twice continuously differentiable function that represents the expected
cost of evasion, ω is a vector of parameters not containing the tax rates, and b is a scal-
10The assumption that all purchases are imported and all sales exported is convenient for illustrative
purposes, yet obviously unrealistic. In particular, it is possible that the extent to which firms misreport
in relation to taxes may differ between domestic and international transactions. Even though this does
not change the predictions of the model, CIT evasion revealed through international trade may not be
representative of total evasion in the economy. These considerations will be further discussed in section
1.5.3. It is possible to modify the model to encompass domestic sales and purchases. Whether the pre-
dictions change or not depends on whether firms are allowed to evade taxes by misreporting domestic
transactions. If they are, a stance must be taken on whether it is easier, harder or equally hard to evade
on domestic transactions. If it is equally risky to misreport domestic and international transactions, the
model does not admit a unique solution. Further discussions of this issue can be found in appendix
1.C.3.
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ing factor capturing how effective authorities are at detecting evasion. The expected
cost depends on the reported amounts of sales and purchases. Appendix 1.C.1 con-
tains a discussion of how the results change if the cost function is allowed to depend
on the tax rates themselves, which can result in counter-intuitive results.11 From this
expression, it is clear that the tax base for tariffs is reported imports (Mr), and the tax
base for CIT is reported profits. The objects of interest are how optimal reported pur-
chases and sales that solve (1.2), denoted M?r and F
?
r , react to changes in the tax rates
t and τ. Let Ck denote the derivative of C(·) with respect to its kth argument, and Ckj
the second derivative of C(·) with respect to its kth and jth arguments.
Proposition 1. Under the following conditions on the Jacobian of C(·) at the optimal solution
(F?r , M
?
r ):
sign(C1) =sign(−τ), (1.3)
sign(C2) =sign(τ(1+ t)φ− t), (1.4)
and on the Hessian of C(·), denoted HC:
C11, C22 > 0, C12 = C21 ≤ 0, det (HC) > 0, (1.5)
the following comparative statics are signed as follows:
∂M?r
∂t
< 0,
∂(F?r −M?r (1+ t)φ)
∂τ
< 0, (1.6)
sign
(
∂M?r
∂τ
)
= sign (C21 + (1+ t)φC11) , (1.7)
sign
(
∂F?r
∂τ
)
= sign (−(1+ t)φC12 − C22) . (1.8)
Furthermore, the magnitudes of
∂F?r
∂k
and
∂M?r
∂k
for k = t, τ decrease as b increases.
Proposition 1 — proof in appendix 1.C.1 — lays out conditions on the generic cost
function such that an interior solution exists, and that allow to sign the comparative
statics of interest. The conditions on the Jacobian ensure an interior solution, basically
guaranteeing a solution where marginal benefits of misreporting (the right-hand sides
of (1.3) and (1.4)) equal marginal costs (the left-hand sides). From these equations, it
is clear that sales will be under-reported, and purchases can either be over- or under-
reported depending on relative levels of CIT and tariffs: high tariffs induce the firm to
under-report imports, whereas high CIT taxes induce over-reporting to reduce taxable
profits, ceteris paribus.
11For example Yitzhaki (1974), commenting on Allingham and Sandmo (1972), shows that if tax rate
increases, evasion may decreases when the penalty is based on the amounts of evaded tax.
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Conditions in (1.5) are sufficient for C(·) to be convex. The elements on the diago-
nal of the Hessian are positive, which implies that the marginal costs of misreporting
are increasing. The off-diagonal elements of the Hessian are weakly negative. If equal
to zero, the marginal cost of misreporting sales only depends on the level of reported
sales (and not on the level of reported purchases) and conversely for reported pur-
chases. If negative, the reported level in one dimension affects the marginal cost of
misreporting in the other dimension. More specifically, C12 < 0 binds the reported
levels of sales and purchases to each other through the cost function in the following
intuitive way. A firm reporting excessively high purchases and low sales looks sus-
picious to the tax authorities.12 Therefore, reporting low purchases leaves more room
to report low sales without looking suspicious. Similarly, reporting high sales leaves
more leeway to report high purchases.13 Last, the determinant of the Hessian must
be positive, such that the interdependence between reported sales and purchases does
not overpower the basic shape of the marginal costs.
Under the conditions in proposition 1, optimal reported purchases decrease as the
tariff rate increases, and reported taxable profits decrease as the CIT rate increases —
see (1.6). These two effects reflect the desire of the firm to lower the reported tax base
when the rate increases, for both tariffs and CIT. Remains the question: how does the
firm manipulate F?r and M
?
r to lower taxable profits? In principle, the firm could either:
(i) lower reported sales and inflate reported costs; (ii) simultaneously lower reported
sales and reported costs (but by less); or (iii) simultaneously inflate reported sales and
reported costs (but by more). In all cases, reported profits decrease.
Assumption 1. −(1+ t)φC12 − C22 < 0.
Assumption 1 rules out case (iii) above. Intuitively, it is easier to imagine a firm
under-reporting its sales and purchases, e.g. by hiding part of its business, rather
12In the context of taxation of corporate profits of Nicaraguan firms in 2011-2012, Carrillo et al. (2017)
show that in response to notifications of discrepancies in self-reported income by tax authorities to firms,
firms that react to the notification do so by declaring more revenues, yet simultaneously increase reported
costs. Slemrod et al. (2017) find a very similar pattern in the case of small-business tax compliance, when
the US Internal Revenue Service gained access to credit-card information on electronic sales as a source
of third-party reporting. Naritomi (2019) finds similar patterns in the case of VAT in Brazil.
13To give a detailed explanation, consider how the marginal cost of under-reporting sales (C1) changes
as the level of reported purchases increases. First, notice that the marginal benefit or misreporting sales is
−τ, so the firm under-reports sales to save on CIT. The cost increases as it does so, since C1 < 0. The more
it under-reports, the higher the marginal cost as C11 > 0. Because C12 < 0, the marginal cost of under-
reporting sales increases when reported purchases are higher as reporting low sales looks suspicious in
that case. A similar intuition can be given when the firm over-reports purchases (C2 > 0). Since C22 > 0,
the marginal cost of over-reporting purchases increases the more the firm over-reports. Because C21 < 0,
the higher reported sales are, the more room it leaves for the firm to over-report purchases, since high
reported sales make reporting large amounts of purchases less suspicious.
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than creating imaginary sales and purchases for the purpose of evasion. Under this
assumption, optimal reported sales decrease in response to an increase in the CIT rate
(τ). The last comparative statics of interest is that of reported costs with respect to
τ. Lowering reported taxable profits can be achieved by lowering reported sales and
inflating costs. As explained above, this urge is counteracted by the fact that high
reported costs and low reported sales will appear suspicious to the taxman. This could
lead the firm to lower reported sales and purchases simultaneously (whilst ensuring
that reported profits decrease overall). In that case, one can think of the firm reporting
in such a fashion as to appear smaller than it actually is. This happens when
(1+ t)φC11 < −C21. (1.9)
This condition is more likely to hold when tariffs are low because import duties are
deductible from the CIT bill and high tariffs therefore encourage over-reporting im-
ports as both the cost of materials and tariff payments lower taxable profits. Condition
(1.9) is also more likely to hold when purchases cannot be fully deducted from taxable
profits (i.e. low φ), which renders over-reporting less effective at lowering reported
taxable profits, and for high values of |C21|, which bind the levels of F?r and M?r more
tightly to each other. In that case, an increase in τ induces the firm to under-report
purchases (M?r ) in tandem with the decrease in reported sales (F
?
r ).
14 The analysis
above is repeated in appendix 1.C.4 with an explicit illustrative and more intuitive
cost function that admits closed-form solutions.
1.2.2 Implications for the reporting gaps
The previous section detailed the problem of a generic firm in a given country. To
link the evasion behaviour of the firm above to the reporting gaps, consider two such
firms: an importer (I) and an exporter (E) located in different countries. All variables
above are indexed by the superscript k ∈ {I, E} to indicate to which side they refer.
Each firm solves the problem above, facing corporate tax rates and tariffs (τk, tk). Fur-
thermore, consider the case where the good exported is used as intermediate input in
the production of the importer, i.e. FE = MI . The reporting gap for the flow between
14The last term in (1.9) is C11, which cannot be too large for the condition to hold. This is because for
reported purchases to react negatively to τ, reported sales must decrease enough, which will not be the
case if C11 is very large (because the marginal cost of under-reporting sales would increase too rapidly
as the firm under-reports more).
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these two firms is thus:
Reporting gap = log(FE?r )− log(MI?r ). (1.10)
The difference in logs is not central to the predictions — i.e. a simple difference would
leave the predictions unchanged — but corresponds to the measure of the gaps that
will be used in the empirical section. From proposition 1, the main testable predictions
from the model immediately follow.
Testable predictions. The reporting gap responds to changes in the tax rates in the following
way:
1. Upon an increase in the tariff rate in the importing country (tI), reported imports (MI?r )
decrease, which leads to an increase in the reporting gap.
2. Upon an increase in the corporate income tax rate in the exporting country (τE), reported
exports (FE?r ) decrease, which leads to a decrease in the reporting gap.
3. When condition (1.9) holds, an increase in the corporate income tax rate in the importing
country (τ I) induces the importer to lower reported imports (MI?r ), which leads to an
increase in the reporting gap; and conversely when the reverse of (1.9) holds. Condition
(1.9) is more likely to hold when:
(a) Tariffs are low (t is low);
(b) Costs are not fully CIT-deductible (φ is low);
(c) Tax authorities closely monitor inconsistencies in income statements (|C12| is
high).
4. The reactions of the reporting gap to changes in CIT and tariffs are dampened when the
authorities are better at detecting evasion (b is large).
The main takeaway from this section is that the reaction of the reporting gap with
respect to the CIT rate faced by the importer is not obvious. It can increase or decrease
depending on parameter values. This will be particularly relevant for (i) trade within
the European Union, where tariffs are zero and I will argue that |C12| is particularly
high, making it more likely that reported imports decrease in response to an increase
in the corporate income tax rate; and (ii) capital goods for which φ is typically smaller
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than for other goods, since capital purchases must be accounted as assets and depre-
ciated gradually over time.
1.3 Data
This section provides details on the data, as well as descriptive statistics of the main
variables. There are two samples. The first one is a panel of 195 countries over 1988-
2017 at a yearly frequency. The second one is panel limited to trade between countries
of the European Union over 1988-2017, at a monthly frequency. These will be referred
to as world sample and within-EU sample, respectively.
1.3.1 Sample definition
World sample The world sample consists of a panel of 195 countries over the years
1988 to 2017. The unit of observation is a product at the Harmonized System (HS) 6-
digit level for an importer-exporter pair — an (i, e, p) triplet — for which the reporting
gap is observed over time. The sample is strongly unbalanced, as more countries and
products enter the sample over time. Even conditional on being observed once, an
(i, e, p) triplet may disappear and reappear over time. I re-estimate all regressions on
a more balanced sample for robustness.
Within-EU sample The within-EU sample consists of all EU member states over the
period 1988-2017. The sample expands as more countries joined the EU, from 12 in
1988 to 28 in 2017. Similarly to the world sample, (i, e, p) triplets may be missing
for some time periods before re-entering the sample. Unlike in the world sample,
observations are observed monthly.
The within-EU sample is used for an event study, which relies on accurate mea-
surement of the time at which a new corporate income tax rate becomes binding for
firms. The fiscal year coincides with the calendar year in every EU country except the
UK, where the fiscal years starts in April. However, firms in most countries are not
legally forced to choose the fiscal year as their financial year for accounting proposes
(e.g. firms may choose September as their year-end month). The relevant tax rate that
applies to a firm whose accounting year does not coincides with the fiscal year varies
across countries.15 Given that only aggregate data is available, it effectively renders
15For instance in Germany, the tax rate to be applied is that which is valid on the date at which the
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impossible dating the moment at which new tax rates become binding when account-
ing periods vary across firms within a country. In an effort to address this issue, firm
level data from Bureau Van Dijk’s (BVD) Amadeus is used to compute the fraction
of firms whose accounting period coincides with the fiscal year in their country of
incorporation. The results can be found in figure 1.B.5: even though in some coun-
tries a significant number of firms do not choose December as their year-end month,
these firms are not economically important when measured in terms of total assets (or
revenues).16
1.3.2 Trade data and reporting gaps
Trade statistics come from the United Nation Comtrade database and Eurostat.
1.3.2.1 World trade data
UN Comtrade gathers international trade statistics from national authorities and
makes them centrally available (UNSD, 2017). For each country pair and product,
Comtrade provides the trade flow type (imports or exports), the trade value and the
quantity traded. Trade flows are available at the 6-digit level of the Harmonized Sys-
tem (HS), that comprises about 5,300 products. Flows are reported gross. Comtrade
also provides information on re-imports — “goods imported in the same state as
previously exported” — and re-exports — “exports of foreign goods in the same state
as previously imported” (UNSD, 2019a). To be counted as re-imports or re-exports,
the goods cannot have been processed during their time abroad.
Collection of trade statistics by Comtrade Trade values are converted into current
US dollars by Comtrade when the original data is in another currency. Trade values
are generally checked for major inconsistencies (e.g. negative values, totals very far
from official aggregate statistics), and classified into normalized commodity codes —
the Harmonized System — when national data items are otherwise classified. Imports
are generally recorded with more accuracy than exports, as they are subject to tariffs
and thus subject to more scrutiny by customs.
accounting year of the firm ends. In the UK, if a tax change occurs during the accounting year of a firm,
that firm must apply both the old and the new rates in proportion of the overlaps between the accounting
period and the two fiscal years that it spans (source here, last accessed 18/05/2020).
16The only exception is the UK, where only 20% of (asset-weighted) firms have their year-end in March.
All results in the event-study are also estimated dropping the UK from the sample for robustness.
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Data on quantities may be of less good quality. There are more missing values than
in the case of trade values — which are usually the relevant metrics for the calculation
of duties. Furthermore, quantities are reported in different units (e.g. tons, units, me-
ters). When quantities are expressed in non-standard units (as defined by the World
Customs Organization), Comtrade converts them into standard units. When quanti-
ties are not available, Comtrade estimates them when possible “using the reporter’s
reported weighted unit value within the same 6-digit commodity flow or median stan-
dard unit value of all reporters for the same 6-digit commodity flow the previous year,
after elimination of outliers” (see p.11 of UNSD, 2017). Those two facts seem to sug-
gest that quantities may be more prone to suffer from measurement errors than trade
values and will therefore receive less weight when interpreting regression results.
1.3.2.2 EU trade data
EU data on international trade comes from Eurostat and is available since 1988 at a
monthly frequency. For every importer-exporter pair, Eurostat provides the value and
the quantity traded at the product level. The trade flows are highly disaggregated,
down to the 8-digit level of the Combined Nomenclature (CN) — the coding system
used in the EU to classify traded goods.17 There are circa 10,000 products at the 8-digit
level. All flows are reported gross. The analysis will focus on flows aggregated to
the HS 6-digit level to reduce noise in the reporting gaps, and because of computing
power limitations. For the same reasons, data will be aggregated to the quarterly
frequency in some cases.
Collection of trade statistics in the EU Since the creation of the Single Market in
1993, goods traded between EU members do not have to clear customs, the tradi-
tional source of trade statistics. Trade data is directly provided by traders, who report
detailed information on their transactions to their national authorities via a system
called Intrastat. Member States then forward the data to Eurostat, which compiles
trade statistics for the whole bloc. Intrastat is closely tied to the VAT system. The for-
mats of Intrastat declarations and VAT returns are similar, as both require traders to
report their total intra-EU imports and exports. This allows authorities to check for
the accuracy of Intrastat declarations. Although Intrastat declarations are not payoff-
17The six first digits of the CN coincide with the Harmonized System (HS), the nomenclature devel-
oped by the World Customs Organization and used in other trade databases, such as UN Comtrade.
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relevant for firms — in the sense that no tax is based on them — firms have a strong
incentive to be accurate as discrepancies may be investigated and fined.18
In order to reduce the administrative burden on small and medium-sized busi-
nesses, firms whose yearly imports or exports are below certain thresholds are ex-
empted from filling Intrastat declarations. These thresholds are set independently by
each country and can change every year, with effect on January 1st. They are currently
set such that at least 97% of total dispatches and 93% of total arrivals are covered by In-
trastat.19 In the past, coverage requirements were higher, implying lower thresholds.
The coverage requirements were significantly lowered in 2004.20 Figure 1.B.3 displays
the average and medium thresholds over time across EU members. Figures 1.B.1 and
1.B.2 plot the time series of the thresholds by country for imports and exports, re-
spectively.21 A remarkable number of firms are exempted from Intrastat declarations:
in 2017, an average of 12.6% and 20.2% of VAT-registered traders were providers of
statistical information for imports and exports, respectively (Eurostat, 2017).22 This
suggests that international trade is highly skewed towards large firms.23 The remain-
ing 3% of exports and 7% of imports are estimated by the national authorities based
on the VAT returns of the firms falling below the reporting thresholds. The within-EU
sample excludes these estimates and only contains trade reported by firms above the
Intrastat thresholds. The implications for the reporting gaps and for the estimation of
evasion will be discussed in section 1.3.2.4. I control for the levels of the thresholds in
all regressions based on the within-EU sample.
1.3.2.3 Constructing the reporting gaps
The reporting gaps are constructed using mirror statistics, i.e. information on the same
gross flow that is reported twice: once by the importer (as an import) and once by the
exporter (as an export).24 The gaps are computed in terms of value and quantities.
18See here for the UK, sections 7 and 8 (last accessed 18/05/2020).
19EC regulation No 222/2009, art. 6(a), and Eurostat (2016, section 6.2.4).
20EC regulation No 638/2004, art. 10(3). This law replaced Council Regulation (EEC) No 3330/91 and
specified a coverage of 97% for both imports and exports.
21The data on thresholds was manually collected from a variety of sources, and can be found online at
the following Github repository.
22See table 1.A.1 for a breakdown by country.
23If tax evasion were more prevalent among smaller firms — which seems likely as larger firms are
audited regularly and may prefer legal tax avoidance over outright evasion — the fact that large firms
are responsible for most of the trade volume implies that estimates of evasion based on aggregated trade
flows is probably a lower-bound for evasion among smaller firms.
24Net flows (e.g. net imports are imports minus exports) for a given product and country pair should
be the mirror image of each other, since net imports of a country corresponds to net exports of the partner
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Formally:
X gaplogiept = log(exports X
e
ipt)− log(imports Xiept), (1.11)
where X ∈ {value, quantity}, i denotes the importer, e denotes the exporter, p the
product and t time. Superscripts denote who reports the trade flow and subscripts
designate the trade partner. This convention is used throughout the paper. As an
illustrative example, the value of exports of uncooked pasta, not stuffed or otherwise pre-
pared (HS 190211) from Germany to France as reported by Germany, is compared to
the value of imports of that same good as reported by France. The difference in logs
is the measure commonly used in the literature.25 If the gap is small, this measure
approximates the difference between exports and imports as a fraction of the value of
imports. For robustness, I also consider an alternative measure of the gaps that does
not omit zeros:
X gaprobustiept =
(exports Xeipt − imports Xiept)
1
2 (exports X
e
ipt + imports X
i
ept)
∈ [−2, 2]. (1.12)
Flows where one side is zero will appear as a 2 or -2. Both in Comtrade and Eurostat,
missing values indicate that the data is unavailable and not necessarily that trade did
not take place. For this reason, observations where one side of the reporting gap is
unavailable are removed from the sample. In order to minimize the risk of data errors,
the bottom and top percentiles by importer in terms of the reporting gaps are removed
from the sample.26
1.3.2.4 Known sources of bilateral asymmetries
Bilateral asymmetries — i.e. reporting gaps — are a known feature of trade statistics.
There are many potential causes to it, which are often discussed among users of official
statistics (see, e.g. Markhonko, 2014; UN, 2019). Most of these factors are not related
to evasion motives (Braml and Felbermayr, 2019).
First, the statistical valuation of imports and exports differ: imports are reported
CIF (including Cost of Insurance and Freight) and exports FOB (free on board, net
of carriage costs), i.e. the reporting gap includes the cost of freight and insurance.
country.
25See references in the introduction.
26Similar to Javorcik and Narciso (2017), for example. As a robustness check, the results will also be
computed without removing outliers.
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Second, there may be differences in partner country attributions: in general, recom-
mendations by the UN Statistical Commission regarding partner attribution stipulates
that for imports, the country of origin must be recorded, whereas for exports, the last
known destination country should be recorded. The application of these principles
can be challenging, e.g. in the case of exports when the immediate destination coun-
try is only a step in the transit of the goods towards their final destination.27 Particular
attention must therefore be paid to re-imports and re-exports. The partner country is
the country of origin when accounting for imports. Therefore in the case of re-imports,
it appears as if a country imports from the country of origin, and not from the consign-
ment country — i.e. the country from which the goods physically come from in that
transaction. However, this trade flow will be counted as an export in the exporting
country, creating a discrepancy (see Liu, 2013, footnote 1). In this paper, the gross
flows are used — i.e. including re-imports and re-exports.28 Third, differences in the
trade system used by the reporting countries may result in asymmetries. Some coun-
tries apply the general trade system, in which the statistical territory coincides with
the economic territory, i.e. it includes warehouses, free zones and free circulation ar-
eas. Other countries use the special trade system, wherein customs warehouses and
other free zones are excluded from the statistical territory. Lastly, misclassification
across product categories (more relevant for very fine trade statistics), differences in
the exchange rate used by each side and time lags between the moment imports and
exports are recorded by the respective countries may all result in asymmetries.
Sources specific to the EU For within-EU trade, some of the sources above are less
relevant as trade statistics collection is largely determined by rules applicable to all
EU states. The trade system for intra-EU trade is close to the general trade system and
is common to all Member States (Eurostat, 2016, p.15). Similarly, the rules that must
be followed to determine the partner country are identical for all EU countries. There
are however other sources of discrepancies specific to intra-EU trade. First, since the
data is reported monthly, it is more likely that a given transaction may be recorded
in different time periods by each side. Second, as explained in section 1.3.2.2, the
27A possible solution to this problem being discussed by the UN is the use of country of consignment
— i.e. the immediate country from which imports arrive and to which exports are dispatched — as
opposed to the use of origin/final destinations (UN, 2011).
28This choice is made because data on re-imports and re-exports is missing for most observations
(more than 94% of the observations). Using either the gross flows, or the flows net of re-imports and
re-exports yields almost identical results. The correlation between the reporting gaps constructed using
each definition of trade flows is around .98.
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TABLE 1.1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE MAIN VARIABLES
World sample
N Mean Std Min 25% 50% 75% Max
Value gap, in log 91,245,036 0.03 1.82 -9.65 -0.81 -0.01 0.87 8.02
Quantity gap, in log 79,023,322 0.01 2.18 -11.47 -1.00 0.00 1.03 11.92
Value gap, robust 91,245,041 0.01 1.10 -2.00 -0.77 -0.01 0.82 2.00
Quantity gap, robust 80,350,339 0.01 1.20 -2.00 -0.94 0.00 0.97 2.00
Tariff rate importer 64,312,349 4.35 10.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.00 3,000.00
Within-EU sample
N Mean Std Min 25% 50% 75% Max
Value gap, in log 145,249,500 0.05 1.55 -5.85 -0.53 0.02 0.69 6.68
Quantity gap, in log 122,463,910 0.04 1.62 -6.26 -0.62 0.00 0.73 6.40
Value gap, robust 145,517,228 0.05 0.98 -1.99 -0.52 0.02 0.67 2.00
Quantity gap, robust 139,944,998 0.03 1.18 -2.00 -0.76 0.00 0.86 2.00
Note: descriptive statistics for the main measures of the reporting gaps, and of tariffs. Data from the
world and within-EU samples.
existence of Intrastat thresholds will results in asymmetries, e.g. if one firm is above
the relevant reporting threshold and the partner firm is not.
1.3.2.5 Descriptive Statistics
Reporting gaps in the world sample The world sample contains circa 93 million ob-
servations for which the reporting gaps are available, 60 million of which are matched
to tariffs. The number of observations per year increases over time (see figure 1.B.6).
Trade flows for which the reporting gaps can be constructed represent circa 77% of
yearly world trade on average over the period 1993-2017.29 Table 1.1 reports descrip-
tive statistics of the main variables, and figure 1.B.7 displays the histograms of the
reporting gaps. The mean gap (in log) varies between 0.01 and 0.03 depending on
the measure (value or quantity), which approximately represents between 1 to 3% of
the value of the underlying trade flow. Striking is the existence of very large gaps,
and the symmetry of the gaps in general: there are roughly as many positive gaps (re-
ported exports exceed reported imports) as negative gaps. This confirms that evasion
is most likely not the main driver of these asymmetries. In aggregate, the total report-
ing gap, defined as the difference between the sum of reported imports and exports
(across products and country pairs) and calculated as in expression (1.12), fluctuates
over time and represents between -2% and 2% of aggregate trade — see figure 1.B.9.30
29In years 1988-1993, the coverage is much poorer, 18% on average.
30Aggregate trade only includes flows for which information by both importers and exporters is avail-
able. The reporting gap is larger and more volatile in the early years of the sample.
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Reporting gaps in the within-EU sample Basic descriptive statistics of the report-
ing gaps in the within-EU sample can be found in table 1.1, and their histograms are
displayed in figure 1.B.8. The gaps are similarly distributed as in the world sample,
but are less noisy (smaller standard deviations) and have less mass in the tails (less ex-
treme values), which may reflect the higher degree of harmonization of trade statistics
collection and processing across EU states. The reporting gaps are lower in December
and higher in January on average — see figure 1.B.10. This would be consistent with
firms manipulating their accounts in an effort to lower current profits in December —
the year-end for most firms — by pushing some of their exports (sales) made in the
current year to the next year and possibly also bringing forward some of their imports
(costs) that accrue to the coming year to the current year. This hypothesis will be fur-
ther discussed in section 1.5.5. This cyclical property is also visible in the time series
of the mean and median reporting gaps, as shown in figure 1.B.11.
1.3.3 Tariffs
Data on ad valorem tariff rates — i.e. expressed in percent of the dutiable trade value
— come from the UNCTAD TRAINS database, accessed via the World integrated
Trade Solutions (WITS) website. For a given importer-product-year observation, there
may be one general non-discriminatory rate — called the Most Favoured Nation tar-
iff (MFN) for WTO countries — and one or several preferential rates stemming from
trade agreements. I follow the WITS instructions and take the lowest rate as the ef-
fectively applied tariff. There are no tariffs on trade within the EU. The analysis is
restricted to tariffs expressed ad valorem and excludes non-tariff barriers to trade.31
Descriptive statistics In the world sample, the average tariff is 4.35% — 2.2% if
weighted by trade value. More than half of the observations have zero tariff due to
the many trade agreements and the EU. Some tariffs are in excess of 100%, reflecting
trade punishments or other political agendas. The most extreme example is the tariff
imposed on alcoholic beverages by Egypt, which reaches 3000%. Figure 1.B.15 shows
the histograms of tariff rates, of the number of tariff changes per product-country
pair triplet, and of the values of tariff changes. As already mentioned, tariffs are zero
for most observations. For many (i, e, p) triplets, there was no change in tariffs over
31Studying non-tariff measures (such as quotas, labelling restrictions, etc.) requires computing an ad
valorem equivalent, which is usually estimated from the trade data directly (see, e.g. Kee and Nicita,
2016).
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the sample period. The variation in tariffs within country pair-product groups comes
from those groups for which at lease one tariff change took place. Most changes were
of sizes between -10% and 10%, and tariffs decreases are relatively more frequent than
increases. There are about 14 million tariff changes in the sample.
1.3.4 corporate income tax rates
Data on corporate income tax rates comes from the OECD tax database, comple-
mented by data from KPMG since 2003 for non-OECD countries. The variable of
interest is the central government corporate income tax rate — by opposition to sub-
central/regional taxes that exist in many countries. Sub-central taxes are not taken
into account in the main analysis, because they only affect a subset of firms in a coun-
try and it is difficult to assign trade flows to regions within a country. When several
tax brackets exist, the top marginal rate is used.32
The OECD provides data on both the central CIT and the combined CIT — which
takes into account representative sub-central/regional taxes in that country.33 KMPG
only provides a measure of the combined CIT. The combined CIT will be used to ex-
tend the sample beyond OECD countries as a way of checking the robustness of the
results. When measures of the combined CIT are available from both KPMG and the
OECD, the OECD data is preferred although both measures are very highly correlated.
Corporate taxes in the EU The rules governing corporate taxation are set at the na-
tional level and can be different for each EU member. Two main elements underlie
corporate taxes: the tax rate and the tax base. At present, neither of them is harmo-
nized at the EU level, although there has been recent attempts at elaborating EU-wide
rules — none of which have been implemented at the time of writing.34
In order to carry out the event study analysis, the exact dates at which tax changes
take place are necessary. Each tax change was manually dated in order to ensure
accuracy.35 The event date is defined as the latest of the date at which the new tax rate
32As of 2018, 19 out of the 28 EU states have a flat corporate income tax rate. See table 1.A.2. Further-
more, since international trade is skewed towards large firms, the top tax bracket is likely to be the one
binding for many firms from which trade originates.
33The exact definition of the sub-central taxes varies across countries, and can be a combination of
several separate taxes (OECD, 2019).
34In October 2016, the European Commission proposed the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base
(CCCTB), a single set of rules to calculate the taxable profits of firms operating across borders within the
EU. It aims at implementing it from January 2020 and thus does not impact the current study. Source
here (last accessed 18/05/2020).
35Sources for the dates of tax change are mainly national laws, as well as the EY Worldwide Corporate
35
TABLE 1.2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES
N Mean Std Min 50% Max N min. N max.
CIT, OECD 967 28.17 8.90 8.50 28.00 56.00 23 36
Combined CIT, World 2,290 26.02 10.99 0.00 28.00 60.10 21 170
CIT, EU 596 27.73 9.65 9.00 28.00 56.00 12 28
Note: Descriptive statistics of the main corporate income tax measures. The first line refers to the central
CIT for OECD countries, the second line to the combined CIT the the world sample and the third line to
the within-EU sample. The columns N minimum and N maximum refer to the minimum and maximum
number of countries for which data is available across years.
TABLE 1.3: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES CHANGES
N Mean Std Min 50% Max N > 0 N < 0 Mean > 0 Mean < 0
∆ CIT, OECD 268 -2.21 4.05 -25.00 -2.00 10.00 53 215 2.51 -3.37
∆ Comb. CIT, World 497 -1.99 5.20 -40.00 -1.33 25.00 122 375 2.89 -3.57
∆ CIT, EU 152 -1.93 3.48 -16.20 -2.00 10.00 27 125 2.86 -2.96
Note: Descriptive statistics of the tax changes for the main corporate income tax measures. The first line
refers to the central CIT for OECD countries, the second line to the combined CIT the the world sample
and the third line to the within-EU sample. The last four columns indicate the number of negative and
positive tax changes, and their respective means.
became binding and the date at which firms became aware of it. For example, if the
new tax rate is enacted by law on March 23rd but becomes binding retroactively from
January 1st of the same year, the event date is March 23rd. An illustrative diagram can
be found in figure 1.B.4.
1.3.4.1 Descriptive statistics
Summary statistics of the corporate income tax rates and changes thereof can be found
in tables 1.2 and 1.3, respectively. Histograms of the CIT values, changes and number
of changes per country can be found in figure 1.B.12 for the OECD, world and within-
EU samples. The coverage of the data generally increases over time. For the OECD
and within-EU samples, this is due to countries joining these groups over time. In
the case of the combined CIT, this is mainly because the KPMG data is only available
since 2003. There were 268 tax changes in the OECD sample, 497 in the world sample
(using the combined CIT) and 152 in the within-EU sample. The majority of the tax
changes are negative, reflecting the general downward trend in corporate income tax
rates across the world and in developed countries in particular. Note that for the
analysis of CIT evasion, variation in the CIT rate is the relevant dimension.36
Tax Guide (published yearly in January). The OECD tax database provides the rate applicable as of
January 1st of a given year but does not specify the dates of tax changes. This data is available upon
request.
36The 60 million observations of trade flows may be misleading as these are not independently and
identically distributed. CIT rates vary at the country level over time and thus at a higher level than that
of observations.
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1.3.5 Other data
GDP figures are from the World Bank. A country-level corruption index is provided
by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). Rauch (1999) provides a measure
of the extent of differentiation of products. Rauch’s differentiation index classifies
products into three categories: goods traded on an organized exchange (denoted w in
his nomenclature), reference-priced goods (r) and differentiated products (n). Data on
changes to the corporate tax base in OECD countries was kindly provided by Kawano
and Slemrod (2016).
1.4 Empirical framework
This section details the identification assumptions and the regression equations that
I estimate in the data. The general strategy consists in regressing reporting gaps on
the different tax rates, and interpreting movements in the gaps associated with tax
changes as evidence of evasion. The world sample — which contains yearly data —
is mainly used to estimate panel regressions with extensive fixed effects. I investigate
both tariff and corporate tax evasion. The within-EU sample — available at a monthly
frequency — is used in an event-study setting to examine how gaps change around
a precisely dated corporate income tax rate change, and to investigate profits shifting
across years.
1.4.1 Decomposing the reporting gaps
Evasion is not the only, nor the main component of the reporting gaps.37 Specifically,
measurement errors due to differences in data treatment across countries and in sta-
tistical valuation of imports and exports (CIF versus FOB, respectively) may account
for a significant fraction of the gaps. For illustration purposes, suppose that all these
factors are proportional to the true trade value:
Value gapiept = log(true trade value
e
ipt × exporter’s evasioneipt ×measurement erroreipt)
− log(true trade valueiept × importer’s evasioniept ×measurement erroriept
× (1+ freight costiept)).
37See section 1.3.2.4 above for more details.
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Denoting the log of measurement errors as ξ, freight cost as F and realizing that the
true trade value is identical irrespective of who reports it, the gap can be rewritten as
Value gapiept = log
(
exporter evasioneipt
importer evasioniept
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gap due to evasion
+ ξeipt − ξ iept − log(1+ Fiept)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡χeipt
, (1.13)
where χeipt regroups the components of the gap that do not pertain to evasion. The
challenges of using the reporting gaps to identify evasion become apparent in this
expression. Not controlling for the determinants of χeipt in the regression would result
in an omitted variable bias, unless χeipt is uncorrelated with the CIT and tariff rates.
Identification thus relies on fixed effects and controls to account for the components
of χeipt that may be correlated with the tax rates.
1.4.2 Regression equations
The main empirical strategy consists in regressing the reporting gaps on statutory
tariff and corporate income tax rates.
1.4.2.1 Panel regressions
An individual observation in the panel is defined as an importer-exporter-product
triplet, which is observed over time.
Tariff evasion In order to detect tariff evasion, the following regression is estimated:
Yiept = α tariffiept + FEiep + FEiet + eiept, (1.14)
where the dependent variable — Yiept — is a measure of the reporting gaps as intro-
duced in section 1.3.2.3. The parameter of interest is α, which is expected to be positive
as a higher tariff is predicted to increase the gaps through lower reported imports by
the importer (cf. testable prediction 1 in the model section). Note the very stringent
set of fixed effects (denoted as FE above). Importer-exporter-product fixed effects are
included, ensuring that only variation within groups is used. Furthermore, importer-
exporter-time fixed effects absorb country pair-specific time variation.38 This is the
38Each individual dimension composing a fixed effect is subsumed by the combined fixed effect. E.g.
the iet fixed effect is equivalent to including the following set of fixed effects: i, e, t, et, it, ei, eit.
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strictest specification. Other specifications will be tested with less stringent fixed ef-
fects and more country- or product-specific controls.
Corporate tax evasion To investigate corporate tax evasion, a similar regression is
estimated:
Yiept = α tariffiept + β
imptaxit + βexptaxet + FEt + FEiep + δit + δet + γ controlseit + eiept.
(1.15)
The coefficients of interest are βimp and βexp, which capture how the reporting gaps
vary in relation to the corporate income tax rates. The model predicts that an increase
in the corporate income tax rate of the exporter results in a decrease in the reporting
gaps through lower reported exports — cf. prediction 2 — so βexp is predicted to be
negative. The sign of βimp depends on whether condition (1.9) of the model holds,
which will be indirectly tested in section 1.5.2. Note that in addition to fixed effects,
country-specific time trends are added as additional controls. Results with and with-
out these trends will be reported.
Identification of CIT evasion is more challenging since the country pair-time fixed
effects are dropped from the regression to allow for the inclusion of the corporate
income tax rates, which vary at the country level over time. Controls include country
memberships to the WTO and the EU, measures of corruption and real GDP for each
country (total and per capita).39 Alternatively, separate regressions are estimated for
the importer and the exporter sides separately, wherein the tax rate of one side only is
included as regressor (together with controls), and a country-time fixed effect can be
added to control for confounding factors in the partner country. For instance, to study
corporate tax evasion by the exporter, the following regression is estimated:
Yiept = α tariffiept + β
exptaxet + FEiep + FEit + δet + γ controlseit + eiept, (1.16)
where importer-time fixed effects are included. An analogous equation can be speci-
fied to estimate tax evasion by importers:
Yiept = α tariffiept + β
imptaxit + FEiep + FEet + δit + γ controlseit + eiept. (1.17)
39I also check that the results hold controlling for GDP growth and its lag.
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All the regressions above are also estimated using the log of the net-of-tax rate, log(1−
tax), a measure commonly used in the literature (see, e.g. Fuest et al., 2018).
1.4.2.2 Event Study in the within-EU sample
Since the removal of the country-time fixed effects in equation (1.15) may pose an
identification problem, an event study framework is proposed. Intuitively, one looks
at how the reporting gaps react to a change in the corporate income tax rates in the
time periods — months or quarters in this case — neighbouring the tax change. Focus-
ing on the within-EU sample has two advantages: first, data is available at a monthly
frequency, which allows to study the effects of a tax change on impact; second, within-
EU trade is not subject to tariffs, which allows the study of changes in the corporate in-
come tax rate exclusively — tariffs cannot change coincidentally with corporate taxes.
Denoting Tnc as the date of the nth corporate tax change in country c, the dummy
Djct = 1[t = T
n
c + j]: indicates that country c experiences a tax change j periods away.
The main regression is as follows:
Yckpt =
ω
∑
j=ω
βsidej D
j
cttax ratect + γ controlsct + FEckp + FEkpt + FEckp f + eckpt (1.18)
where the country in which the tax changes is denoted as c and the partner country
for a given bilateral trade flow is denoted as k. The subscript f ∈ {m, q} denotes
the frequency of the data, either months or quarters. When studying tax changes
in the importing country, c = i and k = e, and conversely when focusing on tax
changes in the exporting country. The exponent on β j indicates which side is studied,
i.e. side = {importer if c = i, exporter if c = e}. Focusing on one side at a time allows
the inclusion of a country-time fixed effect for the partner country.
The coefficients of interest are the sequence of β j. Importantly, this specification
allows to check for parallel pre-trends: the β js for the periods leading to a tax change
(i.e. when j is negative) must not be significantly different from zero. If this were the
case, it would indicate that the treated country — i.e. that which experiences a tax
change — is on a different trend before the tax change takes place.40
40For papers using a similar setup in other contexts, see Fuest et al. (2018); Sua´rez Serrato and Zidar
(2016); Drechsler et al. (2017). For recent studies on the assumptions and data requirements needed to
run an event study, see Schmidheiny and Siegloch (2019); Abraham and Sun (2018); Borusyak and Jaravel
(2017).
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1.4.3 Threats to identification
There are two main threats to properly identifying the effects of changes in tax and
tariff rates on the reporting gaps in the panel regressions.
Reverse causality If tariffs and/or corporate taxes were set in response to the level
of evasion, the regressions above would suffer from endogeneity. It is in principle pos-
sible that tariffs are set taking evasion risks into account. For instance, tariffs could be
lower for products on which duties are known to be easily and often evaded. The in-
clusion of importer-exporter-product fixed effects should neutralize this worry, unless
evasion becomes apparent over time for a given importer-exporter-product observa-
tion, and tariffs are changed accordingly. Second, most countries in the sample are
part of the WTO, wherein tariffs cannot be freely set by individual countries, but are
the fruit of multilateral negotiations — as is the case for any trade agreement. This
limits the freedom a country may have to set tariffs in response to evasion observed
domestically.
Reverse causality seems unlikely in the case of corporate taxes. First, the rate of
taxation is set in complex political negotiations, usually in the yearly budget laws. The
rate is often changed to meet the needs of governments and in response to macroeco-
nomic shocks to revenues or expenses — often correlated to GDP levels that I control
for in regressions. Anecdotally, I have never seen tax evasion as a reason for a tax
change whilst reading through the laws amending the tax rates. Tørsløv et al. (2018)
note that the marked downward trend in CIT rates in OECD countries appears to be
driven by tax competition between countries striving to attract capital and profits from
abroad. In both the cases of tariffs and corporate taxes, my estimates of evasion would
be biased downwards if rates were lowered in response to high evasion levels.
Omitted variable bias Any variable correlated with both taxes and the reporting
gap will result in an omitted variable bias (OVB) unless it is included in the regression.
Using the terminology introduced in section 1.4.1, the components of χeipt must either
be controlled for or uncorrelated with taxes.
Freight and insurance costs are unlikely to be systematically related to tariffs or
taxes. Furthermore, controlling for country pair, product and year fixed effects is ar-
guable sufficient to account for trade costs, which may be related to the distance be-
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tween countries, characteristics of the product, or the cost of fuel. As a robustness
check, the correlation between tax rates and CIF-FOB margins is explored for a subset
of products where data on the latter is available.41
Measurement errors — in a broad sense, including methodological differences in
data collection and treatment — could be related to tariffs and corporate taxes. Re-
garding tariffs, it is known that imports are generally more accurately recorded as they
form the tax base for custom duties (Javorcik and Narciso, 2017, p. 63). If a higher tar-
iff warranted more attention from customs and thus more accurate recording, evasion
would be lower for these products (i.e. the estimated effect of tariffs on evasion would
be a lower bound). Country-time fixed effects account for any changes in data collec-
tion methods at the country level. When studying corporate tax evasion, country-time
fixed effects have to be dropped for the country in which taxes change. If measure-
ment errors change together with the tax rates, there will be an OVB. The event study
intends to alleviate this concern.42 Furthermore, a series of model predictions will be
tested to lend credibility to a causal interpretation of the results.
Changes in the tax base Changes in the tax rate are sometimes accompanied by
changes in the tax base, which may impact the appetite for evasion. The tax base
definition can change at the same time as the rate of tax. (Kawano and Slemrod, 2016)
document that the tax base definition in more likely to change when the rate is also
changed in OECD countries. See also Serrato and Zidar (2018) on the link between
CIT revenues, rate and base. Several sources suggest that in the OECD, the general
decrease in CIT rates was accompanied by a broadening of the tax base (Clausing,
2007; Becker and Fuest, 2011).43 If both rate and base change simultaneously, it is
difficult to attribute the estimated change in evasion to the rate alone. As a robustness
check, changes in the tax base are controlled for in a subset of the OECD sample where
the data is available. The results can be found in section 1.5.4.
The next two sections detail the results of the paper, starting with estimates of
corporate income tax evasion, and then discussing the evidence of tariff evasion. In
41Miao and Fortanier (2017) provide a review of the literature attempting to measure CIF-FOB margins,
and a new measure thereof. One approach is to use explicit data on insurance and freight costs. Another
approach uses bilateral asymmetries — i.e. the reporting gaps — as a proxy for the CIF-FOR margin.
They collect explicit CIF-FOB margins data where available, estimate a gravity-type equation to predict
them, and use that estimated model to infer the margins for countries and products where the explicit
data is not available.
42Country-specific time trends are also included in some specifications of the panel regression.
43Despite the decline in CIT rates, the importance of CIT revenues relative to total tax revenues re-
mained constant at around 8-10% on average in the OECD since the early 1990s.
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general, the relation between tax rates and reporting gaps must not be considered as
causal with certainty. In the following sections, multiple empirical exercises exploit-
ing heterogeneity in the link between gaps and taxes in an effort to facilitate causal
interpretation of the results.
1.5 Corporate Income Tax evasion
In this section, the results of the investigation of corporate tax evasion are detailed.
First, the focus is on testing the basic predictions of the model, i.e. how do the report-
ing gaps react to changes in the CIT rates of the importing and the exporting countries.
Second, model-motivated predictions from section 1.2 based on interactions between
different factors are tested empirically to refine the analysis and buttress causal in-
terpretation. Third, additional robustness checks are performed, namely controlling
for changes in the tax base, and replicating the baseline results using data on trade in
services. Last, seasonality features of the reporting gaps at a monthly frequency are
linked to evasion motives, and reactions to tax changes are studied in an event study
framework.
1.5.1 Baseline results
OECD sample The importer-exporter-year fixed effects must be dropped from the
regression to allow corporate income tax rates as regressors. Identification is there-
fore more challenging and the risk of OVB increases. Coefficients should be inter-
preted as correlations at this stage. Table 1.4 reports how the reporting gaps change
when the corporate income tax in the importing and exporting countries change —
corresponding to regression equation (1.15). In these regressions, both the importer’s
and the exporter’s tax rates are included simultaneously, which restricts the sample to
within-OECD trade as data on the CIT rate must be available for both countries. All
regressions include the set of controls listed in section 1.4. Columns (1) and (2) are
estimated without country-specific time trends, whereas columns (3) and (4) include
these. As a reminder, the model predicts a negative effect of the CIT rate faced by
exporters on the reporting gaps — as exporters under-report exports when the CIT
increases, cf. prediction 2 — whereas the effect of the CIT rate faced by importers has
an ambiguous effect and depends on whether condition 1.9 holds. The results suggest
that reporting gaps do not change when the corporate income tax rate in the importing
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TABLE 1.4: CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES AND REPORTING GAPS: BOTH SIDES
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Value gap, log Quantity gap, log Value gap, log Quantity gap, log
CIT Exporter -0.00205*** -0.00140 -0.00115 -0.00230**
(-2.94) (-1.56) (-1.63) (-2.49)
CIT Importer 0.000839 0.000783 0.000302 -0.000543
(1.08) (0.88) (0.37) (-0.57)
Tariff -0.000970 -0.00312*** -0.000933* -0.00210**
(-1.37) (-3.00) (-1.85) (-2.20)
Importer-exporter-product FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Importer-specific time trend X X
Exporter-specific time trend X X
Controls X X X X
Adjusted R2 0.319 0.314 0.321 0.316
Within R2 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
Observations 27,002,571 23,706,919 27,002,571 23,706,919
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. t-stats shown in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the
country pair level. Data: OECD countries. CIT refers to the central CIT.
country changes. On the exporter’s side, a one percentage point increase in the CIT
rate is associated with a decrease in the gap of 0.1% to 0.2%, consistent with exporters
under-reporting exports to lower their taxable profits.
Investigating CIT evasion on each side separately — i.e. estimating regressions
(1.16) and (1.17) — presents two distinct advantages. First, it allows to use a larger
sample as the partner countries do not need be in the OECD.44 Second, it permits the
inclusion of partner-time fixed effects that control for any partner-specific variation in
the reporting gaps over time. This includes the corporate income tax rate in the part-
ner country. The drawback is that the samples for each side slightly differ. Table 1.5
details the results. The negative association between the gaps and the exporter’s CIT
is confirmed. There is still no discernible relation between the gaps and the importer’s
CIT. The results remain largely unchanged if country-specific time trends are excluded
from the regressions (cf. table 1.A.4), for aggregated trade at the HS 2-digit level (cf.
table 1.A.5), and for regressions in first differences (cf. table 1.A.6).45 Furthermore, the
results remain qualitatively unchanged when the regressions are estimated (i) using a
more balanced sample (cf. table 1.A.7); (ii) using the alternative measure of the gaps
in expression (1.12) (cf. table 1.A.8); (iii) using the log of net-of-tax rate instead of the
tax rate itself as regressor, although the interpretation of the coefficients change, which
44In terms of terminology, the partner country refers to the country on the other side of the reporting
gap, i.e. where CIT evasion is not being scrutinized in a given regression.
45Note that trade can only be aggregated in terms of value, as the quantity units vary across products
(e.g. tons and meters cannot be added)
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TABLE 1.5: CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES AND REPORTING GAPS: EACH SIDE SEPARATELY
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Value gap, log Quantity gap, log Value gap, log Quantity gap, log
CIT Exporter -0.00150*** -0.00232***
(-3.62) (-4.16)
CIT Importer 0.000582 -0.000348
(0.92) (-0.51)
Tariff 0.000963*** -0.00135*** -0.000650 -0.00107
(4.10) (-3.19) (-1.59) (-1.61)
Importer-export-product FE X X X X
Importer-year FE X X
Exporter-year FE X X
Exporter-specific time trend X X
Importer-specific time trend X X
Controls X X X X
Adjusted R2 0.326 0.322 0.335 0.329
Within R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 44,623,145 38,666,718 33,866,668 29,732,923
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. t-stats shown in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the
country pair level. Data: OECD countries. CIT refers to the central CIT.
makes quantitative comparisons to the baseline results difficult (cf table 1.A.9).46 The
estimated elasticity of reported sales with respect to the net-of-tax rate is 0.1. This elas-
ticity is easier to compare to other studies than the baseline semi-elasticity. Devereux
et al. (2014) find an elasticity of taxable income with respect to the marginal tax rate of
0.14 to 0.18 for firms with profits around £300,000 in the UK. Gruber and Rauh (2007)
estimate this elasticity to be 0.2 for US public companies, based on accounting data.
These objects are different since the elasticity of taxable income also captures changes
in real economic activity due to the tax change, whereas only evasion is meant to be
captured in the present study.
World sample Using the combined CIT allows for a larger sample, with up to 170
countries. The disadvantage is that the combined CIT includes regional taxes than
may not affect all traders. All the regressions presented above are re-estimated using
this larger sample. The main results remain largely unchanged and can be found in
table 1.A.10 and 1.A.11 (with and without country-specific time trends, respectively).
Note however that OECD countries account for a significant part of the observations
in the world sample, so non-OECD countries may have limited impact on the results,
perhaps contributing to the stability of the regression coefficients.
46To balance the sample, observations appearing in less that 80% of the periods since their first appear-
ance in the panel are dropped.
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TABLE 1.6: INTERACTION OF CORPORATE TAX AND TARIFFS RATES
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Value gap, log Quantity gap, log Value gap, log Quantity gap, log
CIT Importer 0.000853 0.000115 0.000951 0.00102
(1.34) (0.17) (1.58) (1.48)
Tariff 0.00483*** 0.00805*** 0.00784*** 0.0105***
(3.14) (3.58) (4.59) (4.76)
CIT Importer × Tariff -0.000187*** -0.000311*** -0.000291*** -0.000438***
(-3.47) (-3.68) (-5.04) (-5.29)
Importer-exporter-product FE X X X X
Exporter-year FE X X X X
Importer-specific time trend X X
Controls X X X X
Adjusted R2 0.335 0.329 0.334 0.328
Within R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 33,866,668 29,732,923 33,866,668 29,732,923
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. t-stats shown in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the
country pair level. Data: OECD countries. CIT refers to the central CIT. Columns (1) and (2) include an
importer-specific time trend, whereas columns (3) and (4) do not.
Summary Higher corporate income taxes in the exporting country are associated
with lower reporting gaps, consistent with prediction 2: exporters lower their re-
ported exports to reduce taxable profits. However, there does not seem to be strong
co-movements between gaps and CIT rate in the importing country. However, the
model does not deliver a clear-cut prediction regarding this relationship, which de-
pends on whether equation (1.9) holds or not, i.e. whether importers find it optimal
to over- or under-report imports upon an increase in the CIT rate. The next section
focuses on exploring the correlations between gaps and importers’ CIT rate under dif-
ferent scenarios in which condition (1.9) is more or less likely to hold.
1.5.2 Further tests of model-motivated predictions
In order to facilitate causal interpretation of the results above, a series of non-trivial
predictions from the model are tested in this section. They mostly rely on variation
across products or countries in dimensions that make condition (1.9) more or less
likely to hold — i.e. that make the importer under- or over-report imports when the
CIT rate changes.
Interaction between tariffs and CIT As seen in the model, importers have different
incentives when it comes to evading tariffs or corporate income tax. On the one hand,
imports should be under-reported to avoid tariffs. On the other hand, imports could
be over-reported to lower taxable profits and evade CIT. Furthermore, the level of each
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tax affects the incentives to evade the other tax. For instance, high tariffs increase the
incentive to over-report imports, as each dollar over-reported lowers taxable profits
by a factor of φ(1 + t). This is captured in condition (1.9): high tariffs make it less
likely to hold and make the firm more likely to over-report imports. Seen from an-
other angle, a high CIT rate lowers the incentive to evade tariffs by under-reporting
imports, as savings from tariff evasion increase profits that are heavily taxed. To test
this hypothesis, regression (1.17) is estimated adding an interaction between the CIT
rate in the importing country and tariffs. The results can be found in table 1.6. The
interaction term has the expected sign: higher tariffs result in a more negative associa-
tion between the importer’s CIT and the reporting gaps. Put differently, a higher CIT
rate lowers the incentive to evade tariffs. The coefficient on the CIT is positive (but not
significant) also consistent with condition (1.9) holding when tariffs are zero. The fact
that this interaction — which is predicted by the model — finds support in the data is
one step towards a more causal interpretation of the results.
Within-EU trade Within-EU trade offers an environment in which there are no tar-
iffs, which mitigates concerns of interactions between incentives to evade tariffs and
corporate taxes — see above. Furthermore, as explained in section 1.3.2.2, there are
no customs within the EU, which effectively removes one way tax authorities can
check for fraud. However, since trade statistics are gathered via VAT returns and In-
trastat declarations, the taxman has access to reports of imports and exports on the
same form, which arguably makes detection of inconsistencies between imports and
exports of a given firm more likely.47 This institutional feature is interpreted as a high
value of |C12| in the cost function. Combined with zero tariffs, condition (1.9) is more
likely to hold, i.e. importers more likely to under-report imports upon an increase in
their CIT rate.
The results restricting the sample to within-EU trade can be found in table 1.7 —
and in table 1.A.12 for regressions without country-specific time trends. The relevant
Intrastat thresholds in each country and the standard VAT rate are added to the regres-
sions as controls in all regressions based on within-EU trade flows. The reporting gaps
are negatively associated with the CIT rate in the exporting country, consistent with
model prediction 2 and with previous findings. Furthermore and unlike in the full
47For instance, the HMRC in the UK uses a computer program that mines data across a variety of
sources and looks for discrepancies. See here (last accessed 02/08/2019).
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TABLE 1.7: CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES AND REPORTING GAPS: WITHIN-EU TRADE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Value gap, log Quantity gap, log Value gap, log Quantity gap, log
CIT Exporter -0.00289*** -0.00387***
(-4.63) (-4.63)
Log(Intrastat threshold), Exporter -0.0380*** -0.0459***
(-4.79) (-4.60)
Standard VAT rate, Exporter 0.00226 0.00390
(1.00) (1.43)
CIT Importer 0.00269*** 0.00401***
(3.16) (4.81)
Log(Intrastat threshold), Importer 0.0866*** 0.0925***
(9.54) (9.80)
Standard VAT rate, Importer -0.000434 -0.000829
(-0.16) (-0.29)
Importer-export-product FE X X X X
Importer-year FE X X
Exporter-year FE X X
Exporter-specific time trend X X
Importer-specific time trend X X
Controls X X X X
Adjusted R2 0.319 0.310 0.321 0.310
Within R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 16,899,957 15,167,030 15,891,282 14,271,876
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. t-stats shown in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the
country pair level. Data: EU countries. CIT refers to the central CIT.
OECD sample, the gaps are positively associated with the CIT rate in the importing
country, consistent with model prediction 3 when condition (1.9) holds. This suggests
that importers under-report the value of their imports when the CIT rate increases. In
the context of the model, this happens as firms under-report their sales and their costs
simultaneously in order to avoid large discrepancies in their reported gross margins,
which would increase the likelihood of being caught. This result suggests a behaviour
similar to that found by Carrillo et al. (2017) and Slemrod et al. (2017), where both sales
and costs are adjusted together in the same direction when misreported revenues are
more likely to be discovered by tax authorities.48
48Note that changes in the Intrastat reporting thresholds are expected to affect the reporting gaps. An
increase in a threshold means that less firms are subject to reporting for statistical purposes. Specifically,
an increase in the imports thresholds should therefore result in lower imports and higher gaps, and
an increase in the exports thresholds should imply lower exports and lower gaps. This is confirmed
by the data. In the specifications with time trends, VAT rates do not affect the reporting gaps. This is
contrary to findings by Gradeva (2014) and Frunza (2016) in studies of VAT fraud. These studies relate
the VAT rate to the reporting gaps in order to find evidence of the Missing Trader Intra-Community
(MTIC) fraud scheme. This scheme basically consists in importing goods — on which VAT is not payable
at the border, since there are no customs, but at the time when the firm files its VAT return — selling
them to a domestic purchaser and charging VAT on that sale, and disappearing with the VAT amount
charged before having paid VAT on the imports. European Commission (2018b) reports estimates of VAT
revenue losses ranging from EUR 20 to EUR 100 billion a year from MTIC fraud. Note that in tables 1.7
and 1.A.12, the regressions are estimated on all products, including products that are subject to reduced
VAT rates — typically a small subset of all products. Finally, I also estimate the regressions dropping all
products susceptible to be subject to the Domestic Reverse Charge Mechanism (see Bussy, 2020) and the
results remain stable.
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A natural question following the results above is: in response to an increase in the
CIT rate, do importers over-report imports if one excludes within-EU trade from the
sample (where importers clearly under-report imports)? Regression (1.17) is estimated
using the whole OECD sample, augmented with an interaction of the CIT rate in the
importing country and a dummy indicating that both countries are EU members (i.e.
indicating within-EU trade). The results are displayed in table 1.A.13: the reporting
gap react negatively to an increase in the CIT rate for trade flows that are not between
EU members, and positively for within-EU trade. In other words, the absence of rela-
tionship between reporting gaps and importers’ CIT found in the baseline results (cf.
table 1.5) masked the fact that within the EU importers appear to under-report, and in
the rest of the sample importers seem to over-report (in response to an increase in the
CIT rate).
Capital and accounting rules Not all goods can immediately be accounted as costs
against tax by firms. Specifically, capital goods must generally be first accounted as
assets, and then gradually turned into costs over the lifetime of the good according to
a depreciation schedule (Devereux et al., 2002). Depreciation allowances are one of the
tools that can be used by tax authorities to modify the tax base and the generosity of
the tax system (Kawano and Slemrod, 2016; Becker and Fuest, 2011). Even if ultimately
the whole value can be depreciated — which is not always the case — spreading the
process over years results in a net present value of allowances inferior to the original
value of the good. In the model, this is captured in reduced form by parameter φ.
When it comes to optimal reporting, the model predicts that importers are less likely
to over-report imports (in response to a CIT rate increase) when φ is low, i.e. when
the value cannot be fully accounted as costs upon purchase, as captured by condition
(1.9).
A comparison of how the gaps react to changes in the CIT rate in the importing
country for capital goods relative to all other goods is provided. This is done by in-
teracting the tax rate with a dummy indicating whether the product is a capital good
in regression (1.17).49 The results can be found in table 1.8. Strikingly, capital goods
appear to be under-reported by importers as the CIT rate increases, as expected given
the above arguments. Reported imports of other goods appear not to react to changes
49The classification of products into different goods categories is provided by WITS and can be found
here (last accessed 16/10/2019).
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TABLE 1.8: CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES AND REPORTING GAPS: CAPITAL GOODS
(1) (2)
Value gap, log Quantity gap, log
CIT Importer 0.000217 -0.000875
(0.34) (-1.17)
Capital goods × CIT Importer 0.00153*** 0.00272**
(3.39) (2.01)
Importer-export-product FE X X
Importer-year FE
Exporter-year FE X X
Exporter-specific time trend
Importer-specific time trend X X
Controls X X
Adjusted R2 0.335 0.329
Within R2 0.000 0.000
Observations 33,866,668 29,732,923
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. t-stats shown in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the
country pair level. Data: OECD countries. CIT refers to the central CIT. Note that the dummy indicating
a capital good cannot be included in the regression, as it would be absorbed by the product fixed effect.
in the CIT, as previously found in the OECD sample.
Fight against evasion The extent of evasion is likely to be lower when governments
actively fight against it. This is the argument that will be explored here. The first
question to address is: how should the estimated effects of CIT rates on the report-
ing gaps be affected by a crackdown on evasion? From the model, higher effort to
fight evasion can be interpreted as a higher value of parameter b in front of the cost
function, as well as a higher value of |C12|. If these two parameters change simulta-
neously, the ultimate effects on the relationships between gaps and tax rates can be
ambiguous. First, consider the exporters’ incentives. Increases in |C12| and b both
induce exporters to under-report exports to a lesser extent since (i) a higher value of
b scales up the evasion cost and (ii) a higher value of |C12| implies less deviations in
terms of reported gross margin, which forces the exporter to under-report less in order
to minimize deviations in that dimension. Therefore, a higher fight intensity against
evasion unambiguously leads the exporter to under-report less: βexp is expected to be
less negative. Second, consider the importers’ incentives. A higher value of |C12| will
make reported imports more aligned with reported exports, which leads importers to
over-report less — and can even lead them to switch from over-reporting to under-
reporting imports (condition (1.9) is more likely to hold for high values of |C12|). This
would imply a higher value of βimp. However, an increase in b induces importers to
lower the extent to which they misreport in either direction: they under-report less if
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they under-report, and they over-report less if they over-report. Therefore, the effect
of b on optimal reported imports depends on whether condition (1.9) holds or not.
If it does and importers under-report, the effects of b and C12 counteract each other,
yielding ambiguous predictions regarding the effects of evasion-reducing policies on
βimp.
In order to test the mechanisms presented above, a measure of governments’ effort
to curb corporate income tax evasion is obtained from Kawano and Slemrod (2016).
They document changes to the tax base in OECD countries between 1980 and 2004
along twelve dimensions, one of which consists in policies that target evasion or
avoidance by companies.50 Specifically, they provide a variable that can take values
-1, 0 or 1 for each of the twelve dimensions, 1 meaning that a change in that dimen-
sion that widens the tax base has occurred, and -1 that a change that shrinks the tax
base has occurred. These variables are available annually for all countries in the sam-
ple. Focusing for now solely on policy changes targeting tax evasion, the cumulative
changes over time in that dimension in each country is used as a proxy for the level
of fight against evasion. Descriptive statistics of this variable can be found in table
1.A.15. Some countries have implemented many policies against corporate income
tax evasion, such as the UK, Australia and Italy, with up to 12 such instances.
Evidence that evasion appears less prevalent when governments make an active
effort to curb it is provided by including an interaction of the cumulative change in
evasion crackdown as defined above and the tax rates in regressions (1.16) and (1.17).
The results can be found in table 1.9. Columns (1) and (3) do not include the interaction
term, whilst columns (2) and (4) do. Consistent with model the predictions discussed
above, the association between gaps and CIT rate in the exporting country is less neg-
ative when governments fight harder against evasion. There is no discernible effect
on the importer side, which mirrors the ambiguity of the model predictions discussed
above.
1.5.3 Evasion amounts
The estimated reaction of reporting gaps to changes in CIT rates is interpreted as ev-
idence of evasion. However, international trade is only used as a lens through which
evasion is detected. Estimating the levels of CIT evasion is thus more complicated than
50A list of these dimensions can be found in table 1.A.14.
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TABLE 1.9: CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES AND REPORTING GAPS: CRACKDOWN ON EVASION
Dep. variable: Value gap, log
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CIT Exporter -0.000987** -0.00455***
(-2.06) (-4.77)
Cum. ∆ Ev. fight, Exp. -0.0393***
(-6.55)
CIT Exporter × Cum. ∆ Ev. fight, Exp. 0.000874***
(5.69)
CIT Importer 0.00176** 0.00190
(2.23) (1.33)
Cum. ∆ Ev. fight, Imp. 0.0164*
(1.95)
CIT Importer × Cum. ∆ Ev. fight, Imp. -0.000133
(-0.62)
Importer-export-product FE X X X X
Importer-year FE X X
Exporter-year FE X X
Exporter-specific time trend X X
Importer-specific time trend X X
Controls X X X X
Adjusted R2 0.391 0.391 0.409 0.409
Within R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 13,441,475 13,441,475 10,502,506 10,502,506
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. t-stats shown in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the
country pair level. Data: OECD countries, 1988-2005. CIT refers to the central CIT. The variable Cum. ∆
Ev. fight refers to the cumulative change in policies aiming at curbing CIT evasion as defined by Kawano
and Slemrod (2016).
in the case of tariffs, where the tax base is trade itself. Specifically, it is not clear that
the extent to which firms manipulate their reported exports and imports and their do-
mestic sales and purchases is the same. For instance, it could be easier to manipulate
transactions that involve non-domestic firms if it is harder for the tax authorities to
obtain information on foreign firms that are not directly in their jurisdiction, which
seems a plausible assumption. A tentative figure of the amounts evaded for a country
c in year t could be calculated as follows:
CIT evadedct = −
[
FDct e
D
F + F
A
ct e
A
F + M
D
cte
D
M + M
A
cte
A
M
]
×CITct (1.19)
where FDct is domestic sales, F
A
ct denotes exports, M
D
ct is intermediate consumption from
domestic sources and MAct denotes imports (A stands for abroad and D for domestic). e
j
k
is the semi-elasticity of reported amounts with respect to the CIT rate, for k ∈ {F, M}
and j ∈ {D, A}. From the estimation of equations (1.16) and (1.17), eAF = βˆexp and
eAM = βˆ
imp. However, the values of eDk , i.e. the semi-elasticities of reported sales and
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purchases for domestic transactions, are unknown. For the purpose of estimating the
amount of CIT evasion, basing the calculations solely on imports and exports is likely
to give biased estimates as the volumes of these flows do not reflect those of total
purchases and sales. Consider the extreme example where a country imports all its
intermediate goods and does not export at all: depending on the values of βˆexp and
βˆimp, negative estimates of evasion amounts could arise. More generally, countries
with large trade imbalances will significantly weight on the resulting estimated CIT
evasion amounts. A tentative estimate of evasion levels stemming from misrepresent-
ing international trade only, which should be taken with extreme caution, is calculated
by taking the average across countries of each elements of expression (1.19) and set-
ting eDk for k ∈ {F, M} to zero.51 Taking the average across countries reduces the issue
of imbalances since trade is more balanced at the OECD level. The result is a time
series of average evasion for the OECD as a whole. On average, evasion calculated
in this way represents around 16% of actual corporate income tax revenues. This esti-
mate is in the same ballpark as estimates of CIT evasion from tax gap calculations and
random audits in different countries, which approximately range from 9% to 30% (Eu-
ropean Commission, 2018a). Yet, it represents solely evasion and not legal avoidance,
as opposed to some measures of the tax gap. This estimate also suffers from the fact
that evasion is assumed to be constant at every level of CIT rates, which is unlikely to
be true.
1.5.4 Additional Robustness checks
1.5.4.1 Changes in the tax base
One well known phenomenon in the literature on corporate income tax is that in many
high-income countries, changes in the statutory tax rate are often accompanied by
changes in the tax base (Kawano and Slemrod, 2016; Becker and Fuest, 2011; Devereux
et al., 2002). This may be an issue for identification if changes in the tax base modify
firms’ incentives to evade. For example, if the tax rate decreases and the tax base
widens simultaneously — a pattern that seems prevalent among OECD countries —
one would predict evasion to lessen as a result of the decrease in the CIT rate, but
51Setting eDF = e
D
M = 0 does not necessarily mean that the resulting evasion level estimates are lower-
bounds for the overall evasion levels (i.e. that include evasion from misreported domestic transactions)
if firms were to misreport in such a way that under-reporting international trade is compensated by
over-reporting domestic transactions, or vice-versa. Although it is not intuitive to imagine such a case, it
cannot be categorically excluded.
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perhaps to increase as a result of the widening of the tax base.52 Using the data by
Kawano and Slemrod (2016) on changes in the corporate income tax base introduced
in section 1.5.2, a measure of cumulative changes in the tax base is calculated as the
cumulative sum of changes across all dimensions on which the authors provide data.
Table 1.A.14 contains a list of the dimensions and summary statistics of the cumulative
changes in the tax base can be found in table 1.A.15. The UK is the country that most
widened its tax base (mostly through policies to curb evasion), whereas Luxembourg
shrank its base most markedly (through investment credit and generous depreciation
allowances).
This measure is added as an additional control in regressions (1.16) and (1.17).
Of interest is whether the coefficients on the CIT rates remain stable after control-
ling for changes in the tax base. Table 1.10 contains the results for OECD countries
over years 1988-2005. Columns (1) and (3) display the results without controlling for
changes in the tax base, whereas regressions in columns (2) and (4) do control for base
changes. The coefficients are very stable, although the coefficient on the importer’s
CIT is slightly smaller once changes in the tax base are controlled for. Although this
robustness check can only be performed on a subset of the data, the results suggest
that omitting changes in the tax base definition does not result in a substantial bias.
Note that changes in the tax base themselves could also impacts the reporting gaps in
principle. It is however difficult to interpret these coefficients since this measure is a
composite of changes in 12 distinct dimensions of the tax base.
One could also use measures of effective average tax rates (Devereux and Griffith,
1998, 2003) instead of statutory rates in regressions. Effective average tax rates (EATR)
are synthetic measures of the tax payment of a firm on an investment that yields a
positive return based on the comparison of the net present values of the investment
in the presence and absence of tax. EATR take into account depreciation, source of
financing and country-specific tax features affecting the final tax bill. The advantage
is that EATR may be more representative of the tax payment faced by firms, yet the
complexity of the calculations and of the underlying assumptions render interpreta-
tion of regression coefficients challenging. I estimate the baseline regressions using
EATR from Spengel et al. (2019) for European Member States for years 1998-2017.53
52If this were true, omitting to control for changes in the tax base would result in underestimating
evasion, since a decrease in the rate lowers evasion, yet not as much when the base simultaneously
widens.
53Specifically, I use the overall mean of the EATR at the corporate level. Data availability defines the
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TABLE 1.10: CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES AND REPORTING GAPS: CHANGES IN TAX BASE
Dep. variable: Value gap, in log
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CIT Exporter -0.000987** -0.00100**
(-2.06) (-2.02)
Cum. ∆ base, Exp. -0.000209
(-0.10)
CIT Importer 0.00176** 0.00168**
(2.23) (2.15)
Cum. ∆ base, Imp. -0.00364**
(-2.11)
Importer-export-product FE X X X X
Importer-year FE X X
Exporter-year FE X X
Exporter-specific time trend X X
Importer-specific time trend X X
Controls X X X X
Adjusted R2 0.391 0.391 0.409 0.409
Within R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 13,441,475 13,441,475 10,502,506 10,502,506
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. t-stats shown in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the
country pair level. Data: OECD countries, 1988-2005. CIT refers to the central CIT. The variable Cum. ∆
base refers to the cumulative change in the tax base as defined by Kawano and Slemrod (2016).
The magnitudes of the coefficients double relative to regressions with the statutory
CIT rate, as can be seen by comparing columns (1)-(2), and (3)-(4) in table 1.A.16. Since
the difference between EATR and statutory rates could stem from so many factors, it
is difficult to confidently explain this difference.
1.5.4.2 Trade in services
Trade in services is generally less important than trade in goods, accounting for only
14% of GDP on average in 2018 (both among OECD countries and in the world)
against around 45% for trade in goods.54 It appears however to be a fertile ground for
evasion and tax avoidance for two main reasons. First, it does not involve a physical
movement of merchandise across borders. Second, services are differentiated goods
for which reference prices are generally not readily available.55 For instance, it has
been documented in the literature that trade in services is used by multinational firms
for shifting profits to low-tax countries (Hebous and Johannesen, 2015; Tørsløv et al.,
2018). Trade in services also appears to be used for money laundering purposes for
sub-sample.
54Source: World Bank series TG.VAL.TOTL.GD.ZS and BG.GSR.NFSV.GD.ZS.
55This insight was gained speaking to compliance professionals in trade finance. Transactions involv-
ing goods and services associated with the goods (e.g. maintenance or repair services) are also consid-
ered as risky from a compliance point of view since determining what a reasonable price for the bundle
is difficult.
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TABLE 1.11: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: TRADE IN SERVICES
N Mean Std Min 25% 50% 75% Max
Value gap, in log 195,946 0.02 1.68 -11.69 -0.83 0.01 0.86 12.21
Value gap, robust 195,947 0.01 1.06 -2.00 -0.78 0.01 0.81 2.00
Note: descriptive statistics of the reporting gaps in terms of value in the services trade data.
the same reasons (Sullivan and Smith, 2012). Given the observations above, it is pos-
sible that CIT evasion may also be detectable in services trade flows, and it may be of
higher magnitude than in the case of trade of physical goods.
Data Data on international trade in services is of lesser quality relative to data on
trade in goods, mainly due to the intangible nature of services and the fact that tariffs
levied on trade in goods induces countries to keep accurate records for tax collection
purposes (Francois and Pindyuk, 2013). Comtrade collects data on trade in services
from national statistical agencies. The data comes from Balance of Payment statistics
and trade flows are classified according to the Extended Balance of Payments Ser-
vices Classifications (EBOPS), a coarse classification involving 12 main categories and
several finer aggregation levels - down to about 60 categories (UNSD, 2002, pp. 30-
32). Given the difficulty of gathering accurate partner-specific data on trade flows of
services, the data is often missing, and is skewed towards the main partners of each
reporting country. Furthermore, there is suggestive evidence that some countries may
use bilateral statistics (i.e. the reports of the partner country) to infer trade flows for
the production of their own data, which is a serious issue in the present case since
the bilateral asymmetry is precisely the dependent variable in regressions.56 As in
the case of trade in goods, bilateral asymmetries in services’ trade flows are known
and discussed among data providers.57 The causes are generally similar to these that
apply to trade in goods as listed in section 1.3.2.4.
The data is available over the years 2000-2017 for 43 countries — mostly high-
income. The main analysis is restricted to OECD and EU countries. The sample
is unbalanced, with many observations only observable since 2004 and up to 2016.
Summary statistics and histograms of the reporting gaps — computed using the same
formulas as the main analysis — can be found in table 1.11 and figure 1.B.14, respec-
tively. The descriptive statistics of the gaps are very similar to that in the case of trade
56UNSD (2019a), section on Bilateral Trade Asymmetries in Trade in Services. The world bank also pro-
vides a database on trade in services where missing flows are explicitly estimated using bilateral statistics
(WB Trade In Services Database).
57See for instance reports by Comtrade, the UK ONS and the BEA (last accessed 09/09/2019).
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in goods. However, the histograms reveal much fatter tails — especially in the robust
measure of the gaps — consistent with lower-quality data. Considering the quality
challenges presented by the data, the results in this section ought to be taken with
caution. One advantage however is that the data collection processes for services and
goods differ markedly. Finding similar results to those in section 1.5.1 would partially
alleviate concerns that measurement errors inherent to merchandise trade data bias
the estimates.
Results Regressions (1.15), (1.16) and (1.17) are estimated using services trade data.
The results when including the CIT rates of both sides in the regression can be found in
table 1.12. The results are qualitatively almost identical to the goods trade benchmark:
an increase in the CIT of the exporter is associated with lower gaps. An increase in
the CIT of the importer does not seem to impact the gaps in the OECD sample, yet
is positively associated with the gaps in the within-EU sample. Quantitatively, the
coefficients are larger — up to one order of magnitude larger in some cases. This
could be because of the quality of the data, or because evading using services is much
easier. The same regressions are estimated focusing on one side at a time and the
results can be found in table 1.A.17. As in the case of trade in goods, these regressions
are considered more robust as they maximize the number of observations and allow
to control for partner-year fixed effects. The results are very similar, although the
magnitudes of the coefficients are somewhat smaller. The results remain unchanged
using the alternative definition of the reporting gaps and estimating the regressions
on a more balanced sample. However, including partner-specific time trends renders
all coefficients statistically insignificant. This is perhaps due to the short time horizon
and the fact that relatively few tax changes take place during that time.
Despite the data challenges, these results are comforting. First, all coefficients are
qualitatively similar to these estimated based on trade in goods. Second, the magni-
tudes are larger, consistent with the notion that services are relatively easier to misre-
port and manipulate for fraudulent purposes.
1.5.5 Dynamics at the monthly frequency
This section is based on the within-EU trade sample, available at a monthly frequency.
First, a striking pattern of seasonality of the reporting gaps is reported, which suggests
that profits are shifted from a year to the next. Tentative evidence is provided suggest-
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TABLE 1.12: CIT AND REPORTING GAPS: TRADE IN SERVICES (BOTH SIDES)
Dep. variable: Value gap
OECD sample
(1) (2) (3)
All flows 1-digit 2-digit
CIT Exporter -0.0141*** -0.0117** -0.0161***
(-3.16) (-2.53) (-2.79)
CIT Importer 0.00627 0.00750* 0.00500
(1.50) (1.68) (0.87)
Adjusted R2 0.582 0.529 0.610
Within R2 0.004 0.004 0.005
Observations 95,654 30,342 29,526
within-EU sample
CIT Exporter -0.0188*** -0.0171*** -0.0203***
(-3.95) (-3.33) (-3.54)
CIT Importer 0.00839* 0.00979* 0.00792
(1.82) (1.96) (1.37)
Adjusted R2 0.608 0.567 0.632
Within R2 0.004 0.004 0.005
Observations 102,612 29,634 33,023
Year FE X X X
Importer-exporter-product FE X X X
Controls X X X
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. t-stats shown in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the
country pair level. Data: OECD and EU countries. CIT refers to the central CIT. The columns refer
to different levels of aggregation: (1) all flows; (2) 1-digit flows (12 categories); (3) 2-digit flows (32
categories). The within-EU sample is larger due to countries in the EU yet not members of the OECD.
ing that this pattern may be related to tax evasion motives. Second, the tax changes
are studied in an event study framework, which allows to check how the reporting
gaps behave around the time at which tax rates change.
1.5.5.1 Shifting across years
A stark property of the reporting gaps observed at a monthly frequency is that the
mean gap is much lower in December than in the other months, and much higher in
January (cf. figure 1.B.10).58 This pattern means that in December, the difference be-
tween reported exports and imports is smaller relative to other months, and the other
way around in January. Interestingly, the mean gap over the months of December and
January together is close to that in the other months. It is not obvious that the business
cycle or holiday periods can explain this pattern as it is unclear why a firm would re-
58This is also very noticeable in the time series of the mean gap in figure 1.B.11.
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FIGURE 1.1: DECEMBER-JANUARY GAP DIFFERENCE: SEPARATE REPORTS
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Note: Panel (a) displays the mean of reports by importers and exporters of total trade between them in a
given period (month in a year), by month. Panel (b) displays the same, but the months from February to
November are bunched together.
port its imports, but not its exports in December, and conversely in January. A possible
explanation is that firms postpone the reporting of their sales to the next year or bring
their future imports forward — although it seems more difficult — or both, effectively
shifting profits to the next year.59 Is this pattern related to tax optimization? If the tax
schedule is progressive for instance, there is a possible benefit from lowering profits in
the current year — if the firm can be taxed at a lower bracket by doing so. Even in the
case of a flat tax rate, paying taxes in the future is preferable from a net present value
perspective or for liquidity reasons. If that is so, this pattern (a small, perhaps neg-
ative gap followed by a large gap) should be more pronounced: (i) in the months in
which a significant fraction of the firms have their financial year-end; (ii) in countries
that have a progressive tax schedule; (iii) in the months immediately surrounding a
tax decrease — and conversely in case of a tax increase.
First, it would be ideal to understand whether exports reports are delayed, or im-
ports reports are brought forward. The latter seems less likely, as future imports are
not yet realized. While it is difficult to disentangle these effects, an attempt is made
by comparing the value of the reports by importers and exporters (of the same trade
flow) in December and January, relative to each other and to the other months — that
are less or not subject to shifting. The results are shown in figure 1.1. The means of
59A priori, one could also imagine that firms may want to bring sales from the next year forward to
the current year and postpone their costs to the next year to increase their profits and thus the perfor-
mance of the firm in the current year. This could be especially true for listed firms. This is however
inconsistent with the observed pattern. Furthermore, there seems to be no relationship between the
December-January difference in gaps and the importance of listed firms in a given sector, as depicted in
figure 1.B.13.
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FIGURE 1.2: TIME DIFFERENCE IN GAPS VERSUS YEAR-END MONTH OF ACCOUNTS
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Note: Scatter plots of mean difference in the reporting gaps between two consecutive months (e.g. be-
tween December and January) in a country, against the fraction of firms that have their financial year-end
in the earlier month (e.g. December). Each dot represents a country-month pair. Gaps and fractions of
firms are matched on the exporting country, but the results are unchanged if the importing country is
used. Panel (a) does not impose any restrictions on the data, whereas panel (b) only shows data where
the fraction of firms is higher than 5%. The account closing date is taken from BVD Amadeus in year
2015.
total trade at the country-pair level in a given period are displayed for each month, as
reported by the importer and the exporter. From panel (a), it seems that trade volumes
are lower in December and January than in the other months — except August, when
trade significantly slows down. The levels of reported imports are almost identical
in December and January, yet reported exports are higher in January than they are in
December. This would suggest that exports are shifted from one year to the next.
Suggestive evidence for conjecture (i) is provided using data from Amadeus. The
fraction of firms having their financial year-end in each months in each country is
calculated and plotted against the mean first difference of the reporting gaps in the
subsequent month. For instance, the fraction of firms ending their financial year in
December in Germany is plotted against the mean difference in gaps between Decem-
ber and January the next year in Germany. The result can be found in figure 1.2. The
relation between the two is positive: when more firms have their financial year-end in
a given month, the difference in gaps between that month and the following is higher,
consistent with the hypothesis that firms delay profits at that crucial time.60
If point (ii) is true, one should see a higher difference between the December and
January gaps in exporting countries where the tax schedule is progressive. It is how-
60The exception seems to be the UK in December-January: although few firms end their financial year
then — probably because the fiscal year runs from April to March — the difference in gaps is very large.
It is however even larger between March and April, which is not the case in other countries.
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FIGURE 1.3: DECEMBER-JANUARY GAP DIFFERENCE AND TAX RATES
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Note: Panel (a): Mean and median December-January difference in gaps, for exporters that have a flat
and a progressive tax schedule. The countries with a progressive tax as of 2018 are listed in table 1.A.2.
Reporting gaps are net of product and importer-year fixed effects (exporter fixed effects cannot be in-
cluded as they would absorb the differences in tax schedules, which are exporter-specific). Panel (b):
Mean and median December-January difference in gaps in exporting countries where: (i) there was no
tax change, (ii) there was a positive tax change, (iii) there was a negative tax change. Reporting gaps are
net of importer-exporter-product and importer-year fixed effects.
ever not obvious this effect will be detectable, as the firms responsible for most of in-
ternational trade are large firms, whose taxable profits are more likely to be large and
therefore significantly past the threshold of the highest tax bracket. Comparing the
mean differences in gaps of exporting countries that have a progressive tax schedule
versus not suggests that there is less shifting in flat-tax countries relative to countries
that have a progressive rate, in line with the hypothesis — see panel (a) of figure 1.3.61
Conjecture (iii) stipulates that if a firm knows that it will face a higher tax rate
the following year, the December-January difference in the gaps should be less pro-
nounced, as less profits should be shifted from the current year to the next. In order
to tentatively support this claim, the mean and median difference in gaps between
December and January is taken for exporting countries and years when there is no
tax change and is compared to episodes of tax increase and decrease. The results are
displayed panel (b) of figure 1.3.62 As expected, the differences in gaps are smaller
when there is a positive tax change, consistent with firms wishing to shift exports less
when the tax rate increases (i.e. firms shift profits to a lesser extent when the tax rate
increases in the following year). However, the gap difference is also slightly lower
when a negative tax change takes place, which is inconsistent with the conjecture. It is
61Countries’ tax regime (flat versus progressive) is as of 2018. This exercise does not take into account
countries that switched regimes over time and should therefore be taken with the necessary prudence.
62In panel (b) of this figure, the gaps are net of importer-exporter-product and importer-year fixed
effects. The patterns are similar if the raw gaps are used.
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FIGURE 1.4: MONTHLY REPORTING GAPS AND CIT CHANGE
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Note: Estimates of β j from regression equation (1.18), for tax change in the importing country (i.e. c = i,
depicted in orange) and in the exporting country (i.e. c = e, depicted in blue). The sample is the within-
EU sample. Data at a monthly frequency.
however reassuring to see that when exporters face a tax increase, the shift in profits
seems significantly smaller — the difference in gaps is more than 40% smaller in these
instances.
In summary, it appears that some exports that accrue to December may be shifted
to the next calendar year. It is not possible to say with certainty that this shifting is
related to tax purposes, but it may. First, this shifting seems more prevalent in months
when more firms have their financial year-end. Second, it appears to be less prevalent
when taxes increase in the following year, and when the tax rate schedule is flat.
1.5.5.2 Event study
The event study intends to refine the identification of corporate tax evasion by looking
at a narrowly defined window around precisely dated tax changes using data at a
monthly frequency. This arguably reduces the likelihood of the results being driven
by an omitted variable. However, virtually all tax changes take place on January 1st,
which is not an innocuous date: many legal and administrative changes take place at
the start of the year. The estimated coefficients may be capturing these changes if they
affect the reporting gaps. Furthermore, it is not clear that firms will immediately adjust
their reported sales and purchases already in January since profits of the whole year
are taxed once — although it is possible that firms adjust gradually to avoid detection
by authorities via their VAT returns.
Estimates of regression (1.18) are provided, using monthly data and quarterly
data. Quarterly data is less noisy and the estimates are more stable. It also allows
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FIGURE 1.5: QUARTERLY REPORTING GAPS AND CIT CHANGE
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Note: Estimates of β j from regression equation (1.18), for tax change in the importing country (i.e. c = i,
depicted in orange) and in the exporting country (i.e. c = e, depicted in blue). The sample is the within-
EU sample. Data at the quarterly frequency.
the study the dynamic effects over longer periods, which is computationally difficult
using monthly data — including lags and leads in equation (1.18) is very expensive.
All regressions control for the standard VAT rate and the Intrastat reporting thresholds
(cf. section 1.3.2.2) as well as real GDP. The model and previous results using annual
data suggest that the estimated βexpj should be negative after the tax change — as ex-
porters lower their reported exports when the tax rate increases. The series of βimpj
could either be positive or negative, but previous analysis on within-EU trade using
yearly data suggests they should be positive. Figures 1.4 and 1.5 depict the coefficients
β j around tax changes in the importing and exporting countries at the monthly and
quarterly frequencies, respectively. In figure 1.4, the horizon is 6 months at either side
of the tax change, whereas in figure 1.5, the window spans 1 year (4 quarters) before
the change, and 2 years (8 quarters) after the change.
Some patterns emerge from the figures. First, at the monthly frequency not all
coefficients are insignificant before the event date, which may be indicative of dif-
ferential pre-trends. This however disappears when using quarterly data. Second,
the dynamic effects following tax changes have the expected sign in all specifications.
Third, the estimates βˆexpj are smaller in magnitude than βˆ
imp
j , which suggests that firms
under-report costs more that they do sales, which is at odds with previous results and
counter-intuitive as it could result in an increase in taxable profits (only if purchases
are large enough relative to sales). Last, it appears that the coefficients on CIT are
much larger than in the yearly regressions. In the yearly sample, the estimated semi-
elasticities of the reporting gaps with respect to the CIT range from 0.27% to 0.29% in
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magnitude (see table 1.7), whereas they range from 0.02% to 0.12% in the event study.
This is a large difference which may stem from differences in the data on gaps or per-
haps because firms do not adjust completely their behaviour within the time window
considered in the event study. Overall, this exercise is interesting for two reasons:
first, it suggests that the parallel pre-trend assumption seems to hold. Second, the
gaps react in the expected way shortly after the tax rate change.
1.6 Tariff evasion
This section details evidence of tariff evasion. First, I first present the baseline result
and put it in relation to existing estimates from the literature. Second, tariff evasion
is shown to be more important for differentiated products, in high-corruption and
lower-income countries, and appears to be constant over time. Evasion also occurs
through product misclassification. These results largely echo previous findings and
add new insights, leveraging the extensive data coverage.
Baseline result Table 1.A.18 reports the effects of tariffs on the reporting gaps, as
defined earlier in the paper. The dependent variables are the reporting gaps in log
in terms of value and quantities, and the coefficient of interest is that on the tariff the
importer faces, α in equation (1.14). Every regression includes the most restrictive set
of fixed effects (FE): importer-exporter-product and importer-exporter-year. Starting
from column (1), a 1 percentage point increase in the tariff rate is associated with an
increase in the value gap by 0.16%. This is consistent with the model prediction that
importers under-report imports as the tariff rate increases — cf. prediction 1. Column
(2) suggests that evasion is mostly taking place through manipulation of prices as op-
posed to quantities. The within R-squared is close to zero, indicating that changes in
tariffs do not explain much of the variation in the gaps overall, consistent with the
prior that the reporting gaps are subject to considerable measurement errors. Decom-
posing the effect further, it appears that as the tariff increases, both reported imports
and exports decrease — as one would expect, a higher tariff has a real negative effect
on trade — yet reported imports decreases by more than its counterpart reported by
the exporter, see columns (1) and (2) of table 1.A.22. The effect of tariffs on the report-
ing gaps is almost linear: the coefficient on tariff squared is negative and significant,
yet tiny in magnitude — see table 1.A.23. The baseline semi-elasticity of 0.16% is in
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line with — yet below what — other studies using the same method have generally
found — see table 1.A.24. It is however difficult to compare results across studies, as
each focused on distinct countries in specific episodes. The finding that tariff evasion
does not appear to take place through quantities manipulation is puzzling, since most
countries in the sample are part of the WTO and are thus bound to use the same valu-
ation method to assess the dutiable value of imports, which has been shown to make
price manipulation more difficult (Javorcik and Narciso, 2017).63 In this sample, eva-
sion levels are almost identical whether the importing country is in the WTO or not,
as reported in table 1.A.25.
Including such a battery of fixed effects in the regressions may be unnecessarily
absorbing much of the variation in the data. Whether it is indeed the correct strategy
cannot be said for certain, as dropping fixed effects leaves room for potential omitted
variable biases. However, the distributions of the reporting gaps suggest that OVB
might be a concern and warrants the use of fixed effects. Indirect evidence that these
fixed effects are relevant is provided in table 1.A.26. The coefficient on tariff decreases
markedly as more fixed effects are added progressively. The largest decrease in the
estimated α takes place as importer-exporter-product fixed effects are included.64
Differentiated products A differentiated product is defined as a good for which no
organized market nor reference price exist. They are in principle harder to value,
which may leave room for traders to misreport the unit value of the good they trade
(Fisman and Wei, 2009; Javorcik and Narciso, 2008). Tariff evasion is typically found
to be higher for differentiated products in the literature (Javorcik and Narciso, 2008).
In this sample, this finding only holds true when a subset of the fixed effects are in-
cluded. The first two columns of table 1.A.19 refer to regressions where the importer-
exporter-product fixed effect is replaced by product a fixed effect only. In those spec-
ifications: (i) evasion is higher for differentiated products; (ii) evasion takes place
through quantities mis-reporting when products are not differentiated, and mostly
through prices when they are. Those results echo those of Javorcik and Narciso (2008),
with the difference that evasion through quantities mis-reporting seems to exist for
63The implementation of the WTO Customs Valuation Agreement (CVA) has been shown to displace
evasion from price manipulation to quantities manipulation in the case of differentiated products. More
details on the CVA are given in appendix 1.D.
64In the case of regressions of gaps in terms of quantities, the signs even switch sign in some instances.
Generally, the data on quantities seems of lesser quality, as suggested in section 1.3. The regression
coefficients are also generally less precisely estimated and less stable across specifications.
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non-differentiated products in this sample.65 However, these effects disappear once
(i, e, p) fixed effects are included in the regression.
Corruption The model predicts that lower efficiency of the tax authorities should re-
sult in more evasion, and therefore a stronger reaction of the reporting gaps to changes
in tax rates — cf. prediction 4. In the case of tariffs, customs are the relevant author-
ities, and lower quality customs should result in higher evasion. Two measures of
customs efficiency are provided by the World Bank, but they only exist since 2007. A
corruption index by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), is used as a proxy.66
Equation (1.14) is estimated, including an interaction of tariff and a dummy indicating
whether the importing country has high corruption levels.67 Alternatively, a dummy
indicating that both the importing and exporting countries have high levels of corrup-
tion is used in the regressions. The results can be found in table 1.A.20. Tariff evasion
is higher when the importing country has high corruption, and also when both trading
partners are countries with high corruption levels. These results are consistent with
model prediction 4, if one interprets corruption levels as a proxy for model parameter
b in the cost function.
Misclassification Another type of misreporting studied in the literature is misclas-
sification across product categories (see, e.g. Fisman and Wei, 2004; Javorcik and Nar-
ciso, 2008). The intuition is as follows: if the tariffs levied on a similar product de-
creases, a trader may be tempted to misclassify its trade as that product with a lower
tariff. Reported imports of the correct product decrease and the reporting gap of that
product increases. This suggests a negative relationship between tariffs on similar
products and the reporting gaps. Regression (1.14) is augmented with the average
tariff of other products within the same 4- or 5-digit product group.68 Table 1.A.21
65Javorcik and Narciso (2008) do not find evidence of evasion through quantities mis-reporting in their
sample, which covers trade between Germany and 10 Eastern European countries during 1992–2003. The
liberal classification of Rauch (1999) is used in this study, but the results remain unchanged when using
the conservative version of the classification.
66The two measures are: Efficiency of customs clearance process (series LP.LPI.CUST.XQ) and Burden of
customs procedure, WEF (series IQ.WEF.CUST.XQ). These measures and the corruption index are highly
correlated (correlation coefficients of 0.8 and 0.75 across countries over 2007-2017, respectively).
67The corruption index ranges from 0 to 6, where 0 is the highest level of corruption. The high corrup-
tion dummy takes on value 1 if the index is below 3, which is the median value of the index in the world
sample.
68The average tariff is calculated as a weighted average of the tariffs of all other products within the
same 4- or 5-digit product group, using the value of trade — as measured by the reported exports — as
weights. Formally: t¯−p = ∑
k∈P\{p}
tkθk, where P denotes the set of products within the product group and
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displays the results. The coefficients on tariffs on similar products are negative, con-
sistent with product misclassification. This phenomenon appears to be happening
through quantities, consistent with the intuitive idea that whole transactions are mis-
classified.69
Evasion over time and across income levels By interacting tariffs with indicators of
5-year time periods as well as income levels, it is possible to investigate whether tariff
evasion has changed over time, and whether it is more prevalent in less-developed
countries. Figure 1.B.16 displays these estimates.70 The reaction of reporting gaps to
tariffs is very stable over time apart for the period 1988-1993, possibly due to the poor
quality and coverage of the sample in these early years. Tariff evasion seems more
prevalent in low income countries. The coefficient on tariffs is even negative in high
income countries, which does not align with model predictions. It is puzzling and
somewhat worrisome that the coefficient is significantly negative.
Estimated amounts of evasion The estimated reaction of reporting gaps to changes
in tariffs is interpreted as evidence of evasion. Based on the estimates above, a tenta-
tive figure of the amounts evaded for a country i in year t can be calculated as follows:
Amount evadedit =∑
p
Trade flowipt × tariffipt × αˆG, (1.20)
where αˆG is the estimated coefficient on tariff for importer in income group
G ∈ {L, LM, UM}, i.e. low (L), lower-middle (LM) and upper-middle (UM) income
groups. The negative estimated α in high income countries is interpreted as evidence
that no tariff evasion takes place in these countries. Expression (1.20) implicitly
assumes that the marginal evasion is constant over time — which is supported by
figure 1.B.16, panel (a) — and for any value of the tariff within income group G. An-
other more subtle assumption implicitly made is that imports are under-reported and
not misclassified as another product upon an increase in tariffs. If misclassification
occurs — as evidenced above — evasion amounts as calculated in (1.20) will be an
θk = exportsk/ ∑
j∈P\{p}
exportsj is the ratio of the value of trade of product k over total trade of products
within the group other than product p, as measured by the reported exports. This is the measure used in
other studies (Fisman and Wei, 2004; Javorcik and Narciso, 2008).
69Misclassification through prices would imply manipulating prices across trade flows of similar prod-
ucts, which is less intuitive and could only happen when a transaction is composed of at least two similar
goods, and the importer manipulates the prices on the invoice.
70The underlying regression results can be found in tables 1.A.27 and 1.A.28.
67
upper bound for the true levels of evasion and should therefore be treated as such.
Imports are used to measure the trade flow.71 Globally, evasion amounts (at most) to
an average of 44 Billion US dollars (USD) annually over the last 10 years, as depicted
in figure 1.B.17. This represents about 2.5% of the flows subject to tariffs. To give
context to the estimated amount of evasion, it can be expressed as percentage of actual
import duties revenues.72 This data is not consistently available for every country
over the sample period. To avoid composition changes over time, this measure is
only computed for 19 countries over the years 2002-2016 for which import duties
revenues are consistently available.73 These are mostly less-developed countries
where tariff levels are generally higher and tariff revenues more important relative to
higher-income countries. On average, tariff evasion represents around 32% of actual
revenues in these countries, a substantial amount.74
1.7 Conclusion
I provide novel evidence of corporate income tax evasion employing a method origi-
nally used to estimate tariff evasion. Evasion strategies of the firm are motivated in an
illustrative model that delivers predictions which are intuitive, yet non-trivial. Upon
an increase in the corporate income tax rate, firms under-report exports to lower their
taxable profits and may wish to under- or over-report imports depending on insti-
tutional features, the level of tariffs and the extent to which costs are tax-deductible.
Empirical identification of evasion relies on how the discrepancies between reports
by exporters and importers of the same trade flow react to changes in the statutory
corporate income tax rates faced by importers and exporters. The data supports each
model prediction, lending strength to a causal interpretation of the results. Evasion
is lower when firms are subject to stricter anti-evasion policies. Monthly and quar-
71The drawback of using imports is that imports and tariffs are related through evasion. Since higher
tariffs imply evasion and thus lower imports, using imports to measure the trade flow will under-
estimate the amounts evaded. An alternative is to use the average of the components of the reporting
gaps. This is however only possible for trade flows where both sides of the gap are available, which only
represents about 77% of world trade.
72The data on Customs and other import duties (ID: GC.TAX.IMPT.CN) comes from the World Bank.
73The countries in the sub-sample are: Argentina, Bangladesh, Armenia, Brazil, Costa Rica, El
Salvador, Georgia, Guatemala, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Mauritius, Moldova, Morocco, Namibia,
Nicaragua, Peru, South Africa and Uruguay.
74This figure is 37% based on all observations for which data is available — dropping Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Slovak Republic, Estonia and Cape Verde for which the data on imports duties revenues is
very poor (very large jumps and negative values). Note however that the data on import duties revenues
is not available for every country and for every year. In particular, it is unavailable for many high-income
countries.
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terly data is used to provide further evidence of evasion by studying the response
of trade discrepancies to tax changes around the date at which rates change in an
event study framework. Patterns suggesting that firms shift profits across years are
unveiled, along with evidence that these may be related to tax evasion motives.
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Appendix 1.A Additional tables
TABLE 1.A.1: PROVIDERS OF STATISTICAL INFORMATION AND VAT-REGISTERED TRADERS IN 2017
Intra-EU Imports Intra-EU Exports
PSIs VAT-reg. PSI as % PSIs VAT-reg. PSI as %
of VAR-reg. of VAR-reg.
Belgium 8,360 267,839 3.1 8,322 63,110 13.2
Bulgaria 7,026 37,692 18.6 5,883 16,916 34.8
Czech Republic 11,134 104,009 10.7 8,879 54,861 16.2
Denmark 5,745 43,369 13.2 4,501 16,430 27.4
Germany 42,334 547,615 7.7 42,605 224,995 18.9
Estonia 3,883 19,173 20.3 3,192 10,616 30.1
Ireland 5,145 48,310 10.6 2,249 12,037 18.7
Greece 7,290 67,141 10.9 4,431 24,622 18.0
Spain 17,700 318,290 5.6 21,500 146,098 14.7
France 42,552 434,416 9.8 25,190 144,289 17.5
Croatia 5,372 199,666 2.7 3,325 65,218 5.1
Italy 78,000 353,000 22.1 70,000 161,000 43.5
Cyprus 2,151 12,457 17.3 357 2,869 12.4
Latvia 4,531 25,337 17.9 3,567 10,446 34.1
Lithuania 4,495 24,101 18.7 3,629 12,683 28.6
Luxembourg 3,400 19,000 17.9 1,400 5,500 25.5
Hungary 6,700 78,900 8.5 5,800 38,400 15.1
Malta 2,911 8,892 32.7 255 2,698 9.5
Netherlands 13,000 279,000 4.7 12,000 112,000 10.7
Austria 10,004 148,780 6.7 5,990 36,196 16.5
Poland 11,481 114,511 10.0 12,062 84,851 14.2
Portugal 11,011 113,739 9.7 7,460 30,339 24.6
Romania 14,838 76,514 19.4 5,700 18,705 30.5
Slovenia 6,949 34,761 20.0 3,450 25,906 13.3
Slovakia 10,898 78,509 13.9 4,657 25,269 18.4
Finland 5,200 74,700 7.0 2,380 14,190 16.8
Sweden 7,567 115,070 6.6 5,984 30,523 19.6
United Kingdom 10,288 155,435 6.6 21,018 115,152 18.3
Average 12.6 20.2
Note: Number of Providers of Statistical Information (PSI) and VAT-registered traders by EU country in
2017. Source: table 1 in Eurostat (2017).
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TABLE 1.A.2: FISCAL INFORMATION FOR EU COUNTRIES
Country Fiscal year Firms can choose differentaccounting year
Tax rate structure
(main tax, as of 2018)
Austria calendar year yes flat
Belgium calendar year yes 2 brackets
Bulgaria calendar year no flat
Croatia calendar year yes, but must apply 2 rates (one for smallfirms)
Cyprus calendar year unsure, but seems no flata
Czech Republic calendar year yes, must notify flat
Denmark calendar year yes, if justified by specialcircumstances flat
Estonia calendar year (tax due everymonth) yes flat
Finland calendar year yes flat
France calendar year yes several brackets
Germany calendar year yes, subject to authorizationby the tax authority flat
Greece calendar year yes flat
Hungary calendar year yes flatb
Ireland calendar year yes flat, butindustry-dependent
Italy calendar year yes flatc
Latvia calendar year yes flat
Lithuania calendar year yes, subject to permission flat, reduced rate forsmall firms
Luxembourg calendar year yes several brackets
Malta calendar year yes, subject to approval flat
Netherlands calendar year seems not 2 brackets
Poland calendar year usually calendar 2 brackets
Portugal calendar year yes complex
Romania calendar year yes flat
Slovak Republic calendar year yes flat
Slovenia calendar year yes flat
Spain calendar year yes
flat, but different
rates apply to certain
types of firms.
Sweden calendar year yes flat
United Kingdom April 1st - March 31st yes flat
aThe tax regime is flat, but the change that took place in 2005 was the removal of a 5% surtax that only
affected firms with profits in excess of £1 million.
bThere were two tax rates (a lower one for firms with low profits) until 01/01/2017.
cThe main corporate tax rate as of 2003 (IRES) is flat. In the earlier years of the sample, other taxes
applied, for which a variety of deductions existed.
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TABLE 1.A.3: AVERAGE NUMBER OF FIRMS PER YEAR IN AMADEUS SAMPLE
Country N firms
AT 148,095
BE 419,345
BG 320,010
CY 1,126
CZ 184,544
DE 469,822
DK 254,311
EE 124,572
ES 772,505
FI 172,104
FR 702,746
GB 2,715,271
GR 23,268
HR 105,928
HU 430,139
IE 146,347
IT 938,301
LT 11,745
LU 23,186
LV 112,481
MT 15,275
NL 711,566
PL 165,809
PT 350,281
RO 665,036
SE 441,207
SI 70,720
SK 172,671
Note: The sample is Amadeus, years 2015-2017. Sample restricted to firms for which total assets is non-
missing.
TABLE 1.A.4: CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES AND REPORTING GAPS: EACH SIDE SEPARATELY WITH-
OUT TIME TRENDS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Value gap, log Quantity gap, log Value gap, log Quantity gap, log
CIT Exporter -0.00225*** -0.00156***
(-5.13) (-2.90)
CIT Importer 0.000626 0.000505
(1.03) (0.74)
Tariff 0.000998*** -0.00125*** -0.000804 -0.00242***
(4.31) (-2.99) (-1.53) (-3.03)
Importer-export-product FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Importer-year FE X X
Exporter-year FE X X
Exporter-specific time trend
Importer-specific time trend
Controls X X X X
Adjusted R2 0.325 0.321 0.334 0.328
Within R2 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
Observations 44,623,145 38,666,718 33,866,668 29,732,923
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. t-stats shown in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the
country pair level. Data: OECD countries. CIT refers to the central CIT.
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TABLE 1.A.5: CIT AND REPORTING GAPS: AGGREGATED TRADE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Value gap, log Value gap, log Value gap, log Value gap, log
CIT Exporter -0.00165*** -0.00147***
(-3.52) (-3.00)
CIT Importer 0.0000690 0.00206***
(0.13) (3.66)
Mean tariff 0.000872*** 0.000670*** 0.000836*** 0.000879***
(3.66) (2.76) (3.53) (3.75)
Importer-exporter-product FE X X X X
Importer-year FE X X
Exporter-year FE X X
Exporter-specific time trend X
Importer-specific time trend X
Controls X X X X
Adjusted R2 0.331 0.327 0.334 0.334
Within R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 3,610,495 3,025,275 3,610,495 3,025,275
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. t-stats shown in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the
country pair level. Data: OECD countries. Trade flows are aggregated to the HS 2-digit level. Columns
(1) and (2) include country-specific time trends, whereas columns (3) and (4) do not. Quantities cannot
be aggregated, as the measurement unit may differ across goods within an HS2 group.
TABLE 1.A.6: CIT AND REPORTING GAPS: FIRST DIFFERENCE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
D.Value gap, log D.Quantity gap, log D.Value gap, log D.Quantity gap, log
D.CIT Exporter -0.000998*** 0.000147
(-3.79) (0.36)
D.CIT Importer 0.0000609 -0.00174**
(0.13) (-2.40)
D.Tariff 0.000357** 0.000416 0.000546** 0.00468***
(2.52) (1.38) (2.39) (3.39)
Importer-export-product FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Importer-year FE X X
Exporter-year FE X X
Controls X X X X
Adjusted R2 -0.042 -0.037 -0.039 -0.043
Within R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 31,665,970 26,843,676 25,564,871 21,946,794
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. t-stats shown in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the
country pair level. Data: OECD countries. The operator D.x means that variable x is first-differenced,
i.e. D.xj,t = xj,t − xj,t−1.
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TABLE 1.A.7: CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES AND REPORTING GAPS: EACH SIDE SEPARATELY, BAL-
ANCED SAMPLE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Value gap, log Quantity gap, log Value gap, log Quantity gap, log
CIT Exporter -0.00148*** -0.00177***
(-3.51) (-3.13)
CIT Importer 0.000731 -0.000221
(1.07) (-0.30)
Tariff 0.000627** -0.00183*** -0.000833* -0.00134*
(2.43) (-3.83) (-1.83) (-1.75)
Importer-export-product FE X X X X
Importer-year FE X X
Exporter-year FE X X
Exporter-specific time trend X X
Importer-specific time trend X X
Controls X X X X
Adjusted R2 0.346 0.334 0.357 0.342
Within R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 27,824,414 24,336,456 22,370,058 19,736,823
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. t-stats shown in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the
country pair level. Data: OECD countries, more balanced panel where observations appear at least 80%
of the periods after they first enter the sample. CIT refers to the central CIT.
TABLE 1.A.8: CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES AND REPORTING GAPS: EACH SIDE SEPARATELY, ALTER-
NATIVE GAP MEASURE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Value gap, log Quantity gap, log Value gap, log Quantity gap, log
CIT Exporter -0.00105*** -0.00168***
(-4.01) (-5.23)
CIT Importer 0.000581 0.000611
(1.38) (1.44)
Tariff 0.000680*** -0.000538** -0.000269 -0.000542
(4.74) (-2.48) (-1.02) (-1.49)
Importer-export-product FE X X X X
Importer-year FE X X
Exporter-year FE X X
Exporter-specific time trend X X
Importer-specific time trend X X
Controls X X X X
Adjusted R2 0.327 0.325 0.339 0.335
Within R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 44,623,148 39,218,517 33,866,670 30,118,072
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. t-stats shown in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the
country pair level. Data: OECD countries. CIT refers to the central CIT. The reporting gaps are measured
using expressions (1.12).
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TABLE 1.A.9: CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES AND REPORTING GAPS: EACH SIDE SEPARATELY, NET-OF-
TAX RATE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Value gap, log Quantity gap, log Value gap, log Quantity gap, log
CIT Exporter, log(net-of-tax rate) 0.103*** 0.166***
(3.79) (4.52)
CIT Importer, log(net-of-tax rate) -0.0582 -0.00623
(-1.40) (-0.14)
Tariff 0.000964*** -0.00135*** -0.000651 -0.00108
(4.10) (-3.19) (-1.59) (-1.62)
Importer-export-product FE X X X X
Importer-year FE X X
Exporter-year FE X X
Exporter-specific time trend X X
Importer-specific time trend X X
Controls X X X X
Adjusted R2 0.326 0.322 0.335 0.329
Within R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 44,623,145 38,666,718 33,866,668 29,732,923
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. t-stats shown in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the
country pair level. Data: OECD countries. CIT refers to the central CIT. CIT rates are specified as log(1−
CIT) in the regressions, i.e. as log of the net-of-tax rate.
TABLE 1.A.10: CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES AND REPORTING GAPS: WORLD SAMPLE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Value gap, log Quantity gap, log Value gap, log Quantity gap, log
CIT Exporter -0.00139*** -0.00270***
(-3.33) (-4.98)
CIT Importer 0.000427 -0.000363
(0.75) (-0.55)
Tariff 0.000972*** -0.000941*** 0.000012 -0.00051
(4.37) (-2.61) (0.04) (-1.28)
Importer-export-product FE X X X X
Importer-year FE X X
Exporter-year FE X X
Exporter-specific time trend X X
Importer-specific time trend X X
Controls X X X X
Adjusted R2 0.345 0.339 0.353 0.346
Within R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 55,100,143 47,906,134 49,167,239 42,841,531
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. t-stats shown in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the
country pair level. Data: world sample. CIT refers to the combined CIT.
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TABLE 1.A.11: CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES AND REPORTING GAPS: WORLD SAMPLE WITHOUT TIME
TRENDS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Value gap, log Quantity gap, log Value gap, log Quantity gap, log
CIT Exporter -0.00185*** 0.000392
(-3.70) (0.56)
CIT Importer 0.000963* 0.000444
(1.70) (0.59)
Tariff 0.000996*** -0.000672* 0.000614* -0.000962**
(4.29) (-1.83) (1.76) (-1.97)
Importer-export-product FE X X X X
Importer-year FE X X
Exporter-year FE X X
Exporter-specific time trend
Importer-specific time trend
Controls X X X X
Adjusted R2 0.344 0.338 0.352 0.345
Within R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 55,100,143 47,906,134 49,167,239 42,841,531
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. t-stats shown in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the
country pair level. Data: world sample. CIT refers to the combined CIT.
TABLE 1.A.12: CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES AND REPORTING GAPS: WITHIN-EU TRADE WITHOUT
TIME TRENDS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Value gap, log Quantity gap, log Value gap, log Quantity gap, log
CIT Exporter -0.00221*** -0.00125*
(-4.00) (-1.91)
Log(Intrastat threshold), Exporter -0.0146 -0.0207
(-1.41) (-1.60)
Standard VAT rate, Exporter 0.00965*** 0.00854***
(3.53) (2.73)
CIT Importer 0.00282*** 0.00239***
(4.14) (3.10)
Log(Intrastat threshold), Importer 0.0388*** 0.0443***
(4.15) (4.37)
Standard VAT rate, Importer -0.00878*** -0.00962***
(-3.37) (-2.94)
Importer-export-product FE X X X X
Importer-year FE X X
Exporter-year FE X X
Exporter-specific time trend
Importer-specific time trend
Controls X X X X
Adjusted R2 0.316 0.309 0.317 0.308
Within R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 16,899,957 15,167,030 15,891,282 14,271,876
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. t-stats shown in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the
country pair level. Data: OECD countries. CIT refers to the central CIT.
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TABLE 1.A.13: CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES AND REPORTING GAPS: WITHIN-EU TRADE VERSUS NOT
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Value gap, log Quantity gap, log Value gap, log Quantity gap, log
Within-EU=1 -0.0765* -0.0674 -0.0737 -0.0362
(-1.68) (-1.25) (-1.42) (-0.58)
CIT Importer -0.00193** -0.00278*** -0.00218** -0.00160
(-2.33) (-2.75) (-2.28) (-1.28)
Within-EU=1 × CIT Importer 0.00447*** 0.00425*** 0.00488*** 0.00357**
(4.43) (3.41) (4.23) (2.29)
Importer-exporter-product FE X X X X
Exporter-year FE X X X X
Importer-specific time trend X X
Controls X X X X
Adjusted R2 0.334 0.328 0.335 0.329
Within R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 33,866,668 29,732,923 33,866,668 29,732,923
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. t-stats shown in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the
country pair level. Data: OECD countries. CIT refers to the central CIT.
TABLE 1.A.14: DIMENSIONS OF CHANGE OF CORPORATE TAX BASE
Dimension of base change
1 The research and development tax credit (R&D credit)
2 Credits for foreign taxes paid
3 The tax treatment of foreign companies, such as credits or otherincentives to attract foreign investment
4 Policies that target evasion or avoidance by companies
5 Investment credits or other tax incentives to promote investment
6 Accelerated depreciation or other depreciation allowances
7 Other tax rates that may affect the corporate tax base, e.g., net worth taxon corporations or extraordinary profits tax
8 Loss carry-forward rules
9 Loss carry-back rules
10 Thin capitalization rules
11 Controlled foreign company (CFC) legislation
12 Other changes to the corporate tax base
Note: Dimensions along which the corporate income tax base can change. Source: Kawano and Slemrod
(2016, p.4).
TABLE 1.A.15: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: CHANGES IN CORPORATE INCOME TAX BASE
N Mean Std Min 25% 50% 75% Max
∆ evasion crackdown 750 .14 .35 0 0 0 0 1
Cum. ∆ evasion crackdown 750 1.9 2.2 0 0 1 3 12
∆ tax base 750 .097 .91 -4 0 0 0 4
Cum. ∆ tax base 750 1.3 4.1 -12 -1 1 3 15
Note: descriptive statistics of changes and cumulative changes in corporate income tax base. The first
two lines refer to changes in policies fighting evasion, whereas the two last lines aggregate changes along
all dimensions listed in table 1.A.14. Source: Kawano and Slemrod (2016).
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TABLE 1.A.16: STATUTORY CIT RATE VERSUS EFFECTIVE AVERAGE TAX RATE — WITHIN EU TRADE
Dep. variable: Value gap, in log
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EATR Exporter -0.00874***
(-7.71)
CIT Exporter -0.00400***
(-5.14)
Log(Intrastat threshold), exporter -0.0284** -0.0230*
(-2.50) (-1.95)
Standard VAT rate, exporter 0.00865*** 0.00961***
(3.23) (3.54)
EATR Importer 0.00766***
(6.12)
CIT Importer 0.00385***
(4.79)
Log(Intrastat threshold), importer 0.0368*** 0.0465***
(3.54) (4.74)
Standard VAT rate, importer -0.00910*** -0.00887***
(-3.51) (-3.49)
Importer-export-product FE X X X X
Importer-year FE X X
Exporter-year FE X X
Controls X X X X
Adjusted R2 0.330 0.329 0.329 0.331
Within R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 15,919,782 15,675,922 15,626,162 14,667,247
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. t-stats shown in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the
country pair level. Data: EU countries, 1998-2017. CIT refers to the central CIT. EATR is the effective
average tax rate at the corporation level as defined and computed by Spengel et al. (2019).
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TABLE 1.A.17: CIT AND REPORTING GAPS: TRADE IN SERVICES (EACH SIDE SEPARATELY)
Dep. variable: Value gap
OECD sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All flows All flows 1-digit 1-digit 2-digit 2-digit
CIT Exporter -0.0107*** -0.00544 -0.0153***
(-2.97) (-1.40) (-3.33)
CIT Importer 0.00380 0.00353 0.00312
(1.22) (0.98) (0.73)
Adjusted R2 0.613 0.608 0.576 0.555 0.631 0.628
Within R2 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.003
Observations 117,982 118,706 37,321 37,176 36,343 36,636
within-EU sample
CIT Exporter -0.0168*** -0.0135*** -0.0181***
(-4.09) (-2.98) (-3.69)
CIT Importer 0.00675* 0.00728* 0.00579
(1.95) (1.73) (1.31)
Adjusted R2 0.625 0.627 0.590 0.589 0.646 0.646
Within R2 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002
Observations 106,612 106,557 30,713 30,668 34,378 34,264
Year FE X X X X X X
Importer-exporter-product FE X X X X X X
Importer-year FE X X X
Exporter-year FE X X X
Controls X X X X X X
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. t-stats shown in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the
country pair level. Data: OECD and EU countries. CIT refers to the central CIT. The columns refer to
different levels of aggregation: (1)-(2) all flows; (3)-(4) 1-digit flows (12 categories); (5)-(6) 2-digit flows
(32 categories).
TABLE 1.A.18: TARIFFS AND REPORTING GAPS
(1) (2)
Value gap, log Quantity gap, log
Tariff 0.00164*** -0.000223
(8.33) (-0.69)
Importer-exporter-product FE X X
Importer-exporter-year FE X X
Adjusted R2 0.346 0.340
Within R2 0.000 0.000
Observations 60,495,458 52,614,533
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. t-stats shown in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the
country pair level. Data: world sample.
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TABLE 1.A.19: TARIFFS AND DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Value gap, log Quantity gap, log Value gap, log Quantity gap, log
Tariff 0.00167*** 0.00137*** 0.00179*** -0.0000874
(5.10) (4.98) (8.18) (-0.20)
Differentiated × Tariff 0.00265*** -0.0000799 -0.000234 -0.000217
(7.70) (-0.19) (-0.82) (-0.46)
Product FE X X
Importer-exporter-product FE X X
Importer-exporter-year FE X X X X
Adjusted R2 0.057 0.056 0.346 0.340
Within R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 62,978,078 54,965,946 60,495,458 52,614,533
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. t-stats shown in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the
country pair level. Data: world sample. Differentiated is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the
product is differentiated, according to the liberal definition of Rauch (1999). This dummy is absorbed by
the product fixed effect when non-interacted with tariffs.
TABLE 1.A.20: TARIFF EVASION AND CORRUPTION LEVELS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Value gap, log Quantity gap, log Value gap, log Quantity gap, log
Tariff 0.00130*** -0.00136** 0.00140*** -0.000586
(5.03) (-2.55) (6.37) (-1.51)
High corruption, importer × Tariff 0.000496** 0.00182***
(2.09) (4.01)
High corruption, both × Tariff 0.000800** 0.000882**
(2.34) (2.00)
Importer-exporter-product FE X X X X
Importer-exporter-year FE X X X X
Adjusted R2 0.344 0.340 0.344 0.339
Within R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 58,165,200 50,635,680 57,278,841 49,863,946
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. t-stats shown in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the
country pair level. Data: world sample. High corruption is a dummy that takes value 1 if a country has
a corruption index below 3, using the index from the ICRG.
TABLE 1.A.21: TARIFF EVASION THROUGH PRODUCT MISCLASSIFICATION
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Value gap, log Value gap, log Quantity gap, log Quantity gap, log
Tariff 0.00297*** 0.00475*** 0.00104*** 0.00306***
(9.69) (10.98) (2.94) (5.45)
Tariff on similar products, HS4 -0.00209*** -0.00281***
(-7.69) (-7.81)
Tariff on similar products, HS5 -0.00445*** -0.00572***
(-12.11) (-9.95)
Importer-exporter-product FE X X X X
Importer-exporter-year FE X X X X
Adjusted R2 0.357 0.376 0.351 0.366
Within R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 49,340,679 20,297,522 42,613,817 17,926,066
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. t-stats shown in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the
country pair level. Data: world sample.
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TABLE 1.A.22: EFFECTS OF TARIFFS ON COMPONENTS OF THE REPORTING GAPS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Imports valuei, log Exports valuee, log Imports quantityi, log Exports quantitye, log
Tariff -0.00355*** -0.00170*** -0.00321*** -0.00375***
(-10.31) (-5.53) (-7.24) (-9.06)
Importer-exporter-product FE X X X X
Importer-exporter-year FE X X X X
Adjusted R2 0.755 0.749 0.785 0.788
Within R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 61,805,551 61,805,551 56,610,573 56,772,659
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. t-stats shown in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the
country pair level. Data: world sample. The dependent variables are the log of, in order of the columns:
reported imports and exports, reported imported and exported quantities. The superscript indicates the
reporting country.
TABLE 1.A.23: NON-LINEAR RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TARIFFS AND REPORTING GAPS
(1) (2)
Value gap, log Quantity gap, log
Tariff 0.00193*** -0.000312
(8.59) (-0.82)
Tariff squared -0.000000911*** 0.000000262
(-5.41) (1.27)
Importer-exporter-product FE X X
Importer-exporter-year FE X X
Adjusted R2 0.346 0.340
Within R2 0.000 0.000
Observations 60,495,458 52,614,533
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. t-stats shown in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the
country pair level. Data: world sample.
TABLE 1.A.24: COMPARISON TO OTHER STUDIES
Paper Setup Estimated α
Fisman and Wei (2004, table
5) China-HK, 1998, cross-section 3%
Mishra et al. (2008, table 2) India and partners, 1990s, panel 0.1%
Javorcik and Narciso (2008,
table 3)
Germany and Eastern European Countries, 1992-2003,
panel 0.9% - 4.5%
Stoyanov (2012, table 3) Canada-US, 1989, cross-section 0.85% - 4.6%
Javorcik and Narciso (2017,
table 14) 15 countries accessing the WTO in 1996-2008, panel 0.73% - 1.31%
TABLE 1.A.25: TARIFF EVASION AND WTO MEMBERSHIP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Value gap, log Quantity gap, log Value gap, log Quantity gap, log
Tariff 0.00190*** -0.00258* 0.00184** -0.00458**
(3.28) (-1.88) (2.50) (-2.10)
WTO Importer=1 × Tariff -0.000353 0.00237* -0.000408 0.00360*
(-0.61) (1.74) (-0.55) (1.65)
Importer-exporter-product FE X X X X
Importer-exporter-year FE X X X X
Adjusted R2 0.346 0.341 0.352 0.351
Within R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 58,574,541 50,929,118 43,183,847 36,239,930
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. t-stats shown in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the
country pair level. Data: world sample, restricted to observations where the exporting country is in the
WTO. The WTO membership dummy is not included alone in the regression, as it would be subsumed
by the importer-exporter-year fixed effect. Columns (1) and (2) are based on the whole sample, whereas
(3) and (4) are estimated solely on differentiated products.
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TABLE 1.A.26: TARIFF AND REPORTING GAPS WITH DIFFERENT FIXED EFFECTS
Dependent variable: Value gap, log
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Tariff 0.00341*** 0.00221*** 0.00251*** 0.000661* 0.000395*
(8.04) (7.50) (7.35) (1.81) (1.72)
Constant 0.0152**
(2.12)
Adjusted R2 0.000 0.046 0.051 0.337 0.338
Within R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 62,996,855 62,995,490 62,995,440 60,517,075 60,517,075
Dependent variable: Quantity gap, log
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Tariff 0.000389 0.000951*** 0.00118*** -0.000579 -0.000616*
(1.05) (4.49) (5.81) (-1.14) (-1.82)
Constant 0.0132*
(1.67)
Adjusted R2 0.000 0.041 0.051 0.328 0.330
Within R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 54,984,914 54,983,559 54,983,504 52,636,106 52,636,106
Year FE X X X X
Importer-exporter FE X X
Product FE X X
Importer-year FE X
Exporter-year FE X X X
Importer-exporter-product FE X X
Importer-specific time trend X
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. t-stats shown in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the
country pair level. Data: world sample.
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TABLE 1.A.27: TARIFF EVASION OVER TIME
(1) (2)
Value gap, log Quantity gap, log
1988-1993 × Tariff -0.000341 -0.00683***
(-0.83) (-6.42)
1994-1998 × Tariff 0.00158*** -0.00246***
(4.79) (-3.61)
1999-2003 × Tariff 0.00201*** 0.00143***
(7.95) (4.29)
2004-2008 × Tariff 0.00206*** 0.000980***
(8.83) (3.64)
2009-2013 × Tariff 0.00183*** 0.00122***
(7.80) (4.33)
2014-2017 × Tariff 0.00194*** 0.00104***
(6.66) (3.17)
Importer-exporter-product FE X X
Importer-exporter-year FE X X
Adjusted R2 0.346 0.340
Within R2 0.000 0.000
Observations 60,495,458 52,614,533
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. t-stats shown in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the
country pair level. Data: world sample. Tariff is interacted with time period dummies for periods 1988−
1993, . . . , 2014− 2017.
TABLE 1.A.28: TARIFF EVASION ACROSS INCOME LEVELS
(1) (2)
Value gap, log Quantity gap, log
Low × Tariff 0.00291*** 0.00207***
(7.00) (3.84)
Lower-middle × Tariff 0.00244*** 0.000330
(6.33) (0.49)
Upper-middle × Tariff 0.00144*** -0.000118
(5.35) (-0.38)
High × Tariff -0.00199*** -0.00488***
(-3.75) (-4.66)
Importer-exporter-product FE X X
Importer-exporter-year FE X X
Adjusted R2 0.346 0.340
Within R2 0.000 0.000
Observations 60,489,384 52,609,632
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. t-stats shown in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the
country pair level. Data: world sample. Income group are as defined by the World Bank. To avoid
countries switching income group over the sample periods, groups are assigned as of 2000.
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Appendix 1.B Additional figures
FIGURE 1.B.1: INTRASTAT EXEMPTION THRESHOLD FOR EXPORTS, BY EU COUNTRY
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Note: Evolution of threshold for exports for each EU member over time. Source: own collection.
88
FIGURE 1.B.2: INTRASTAT EXEMPTION THRESHOLD FOR IMPORTS, BY EU COUNTRY
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Note: Evolution of threshold for imports for each EU member over time. Source: own collection.
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FIGURE 1.B.3: MEAN AND MEDIAN EXEMPTION THRESHOLDS FOR IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OVER TIME
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Note: Average and median threshold for imports and exports across EU countries over time. Source:
own collection.
FIGURE 1.B.4: DEFINITION OF EVENT DATE FOR CORPORATE TAX CHANGES
Time 
Time 
New tax rate becomes binding 
Tax rate change enacted and immediately binding 
Tax rate change enacted 
Time 
New tax rate becomes binding retroactively Tax rate change enacted 
July 12, y January 1st , y+1 
January 1st , y 
November 26 , y 
March 23, y 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
Event Date 
Event Date 
Event Date 
Note: Definition of the event date for corporate income tax rate changes. The event date is defined as the
latest of the date at which the new tax rate became binding and the date at which firms became aware of
it.
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FIGURE 1.B.5: ACCOUNTING PERIOD AND FISCAL YEAR IN THE EU
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(a) Number of firms
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(b) Value of total assets
Note: The sample is Amadeus over the years 2015-2017. This figure plots (a) the average fraction (across
years) of firms whose accounting period coincides with the fiscal year in their country of incorporation;
(b) the same as in (a), where firms are weighted by the value of their assets. The UK’s — in hatched
orange — fiscal year does not coincide with the calendar year, but starts on April 1st. The average
number of firms by year for each country can be found in table 1.A.3.
FIGURE 1.B.6: NUMBER OF OBSERVATION PER YEAR
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Note: This figure plots the number of observations in the sample for which the reporting gap in terms of
value is available. Panel (a) plots this data for the world sample, and also displays the share of observa-
tions for which tariff information is available. Panel (b) plots this data for the within-EU sample, which
is larger as observations are available at a monthly frequency. The data is at the HS 6-digit level in both
figures.
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FIGURE 1.B.7: HISTOGRAMS OF REPORTING GAPS IN THE WORLD SAMPLE
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Note: histograms for each measure of the reporting gaps, in the world sample. The first column plots the
gaps in logs, and the second column using the robustness measure as defined in equation (1.12). The top
and bottom percentiles in terms of the gaps by reporting country are dropped from the sample.
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FIGURE 1.B.8: HISTOGRAMS OF REPORTING GAPS IN THE WITHIN-EU SAMPLE
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Note: histograms for each measure of the reporting gaps, in the within-EU sample. The first column plots
the gaps in logs, and the second column using the robustness measure as defined in equation (1.12). The
top and bottom percentiles in terms of the gaps by reporting country are dropped from the sample.
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FIGURE 1.B.9: AGGREGATE TRADE FLOWS AND REPORTING GAPS IN THE WORLD SAMPLE
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Note: aggregated trade flows (from HS 6-digit level products) for which both the importer and exporter
reports are available, and the resulting aggregate reporting gap. In case products come from several HS
versions for a given reporter-year tuple, only the most recent version is used for the aggregation. The
trade gap is measured as in equation (1.12), so a negative number means that imports are higher than
exports.
FIGURE 1.B.10: MEAN AND MEDIAN REPORTING GAPS OVER MONTHS
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Note: Mean and median gaps in log over months in the within-EU sample, across all products, country
pairs and years.
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FIGURE 1.B.11: TIME SERIES PROPERTIES OF REPORTING GAPS
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(b) Autocorrelation of mean value gap
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Note: Panel (a) displays the mean and median value gap over the whole sample period. Panel (b) and (c)
show the estimated auto-correlation functions for the series in panel (a), at lags of up to 36 months. The
shaded areas indicate the 95% confidence interval bands around zero. In panel (a), the first structural
break coincides with the creation of the European single market in January 1993. The second break
coincides with the extension of the EU from 10 to 25 members in 2004.
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FIGURE 1.B.12: HISTOGRAMS OF CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES
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Note: Panels (a)-(c): all graphs based on central CIT rate in OECD countries. Panels (d)-(f): all graphs
based on combined CIT for all countries covered by the OECD and KPMG data. Panels (g)-(i): all graphs
based on the within-EU sample. The first column contains histograms of the CIT values; the second
column contains histograms of the number of tax change within countries; the third column contains
histograms of the size of the tax changes.
96
FIGURE 1.B.13: DECEMBER-JANUARY GAP DIFFERENCE: LISTED VERSUS NON-LISTED FIRMS
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Note: Scatter plots of mean difference in the reporting gaps between December and January against the
fraction of firms that are not listed (in a given year, weighted by their total assets). Each dot represents
a country-sector-year triple, where sectors are defined according to the NACE revision 2 classification at
the 2-digit level. Gaps and fractions of firms are matched on the exporting country. Panel (a) does not
impose any restrictions on the data, whereas panel (b) only shows data where the fraction of non-listed
firms is lower than 80%. The data on listing status is from BVD Amadeus in years 2015, 2016 and 2017.
FIGURE 1.B.14: HISTOGRAMS OF THE REPORTING GAPS: TRADE IN SERVICES
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Note: histograms of the reporting gaps in the sample of trade in services. Panel (a) and (b) show the
histograms of the gaps measured according to expressions (1.11) and (1.12), respectively.
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FIGURE 1.B.15: HISTOGRAMS OF TARIFFS
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Note: Histograms of (a) tariffs values, for tariffs smaller or equal to 40%; (b) number of changes per
product-country pair (iep) triplet; (c) size of tariff changes, dropping changes below and above the 0.1
and 99.9 percentiles, respectively, for the purpose of exposition. Data: world sample.
FIGURE 1.B.16: TARIFF EVASION OVER TIME AND ACROSS INCOME LEVELS
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(b) Across income levels
Note: Coefficients on tariffs in regressions based on equation (1.14), where tariff is interacted with cate-
gorical variables indicating time periods and income levels. Regression coefficients are from tables 1.A.27
and 1.A.28. The horizontal dashed line represents the baseline estimate of α, the coefficient on tariff in
equation (1.14).
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FIGURE 1.B.17: AMOUNTS OF TARIFF EVASION OVER TIME
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(b) Sub-sample
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Note: Estimated amounts of tariff evasion based on equation (1.20). Panel (a) displays total tariff evasion
across countries over time (in blue) and the average evasion expressed in percentage of trade subject
to tariffs (in orange). Panel (b) displays total evasion for a sub-sample of 19 countries over 15 years,
where data on customs revenues is available consistently over time. The orange dashed line represents
the average evasion expressed as a percentage of customs revenues across countries, over time. Coun-
tries in the sub-sample are: Argentina, Bangladesh, Armenia, Brazil, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Georgia,
Guatemala, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Mauritius, Moldova, Morocco, Namibia, Nicaragua, Peru, South
Africa and Uruguay. Source: world sample and WB’s measure Customs and other import duties (ID:
GC.TAX.IMPT.CN).
99
Appendix 1.C Additional details on the model
1.C.1 Proof of proposition 1
Consider the following accounting problem, where C(·) is a twice continuously dif-
ferentiable function.
max
{Fr ,Mr}
(F−M)− tMr − τ [Fr −Mr(1+ t)φ]− bC(Fr, Mr,ω) (1.21)
where all the variables and the ranges of parameter values are defined as in the main
text. Denote θ = (t, τ) the vector containing all tax rates. Taking first order conditions
yields the following system that implicitly characterizes the solution (F?r , M
?
r ):
−τ − bC1(F?r , M?r ,ω) = 0
−t + τ(1+ t)φ− bC2(F?r , M?r ,ω) = 0
where Ci denote the derivative of C(Fr, Mr,ω) with respect to its ith argument. Define
F?r = f (θ,ω) and M
?
r = g(θ,ω), the explicit solutions to (1.21), i.e. such that the
system of FOCs is satisfied. Denote the FOCs system as
I(θ,ω, C1(F?r , M
?
r ,ω)) = 0, (1.22)
J(θ,ω, C2(F?r , M
?
r ,ω)) = 0. (1.23)
The objects of interest are the derivative of the solutions with respect to elements of θ.
Specifically, taking the derivatives of the system of FOCs with respect to element k of
θ can be written in the following form:
bHC × Dk = Ak
where HC =
(
C11 C12
C21 C22
)
is the Hessian of the cost function where C12 = C21, Dk =(
∂F?r /∂k
∂M?r /∂k
)
is the vector of partial derivatives of the solutions with respect to param-
eter k, and Ak is a vector gathering terms of ∂I(·)/∂k and ∂J(·)/∂k that do not contain
elements of HC. Solving for Dk yields
Dk = b−1H−1C × Ak =
1
b(C11C22 − C12C21)
(
C22 −C12
−C21 C11
)
Ak (1.24)
Finding derivatives of the solutions boils down to specifying Ak for each parameter k
of interest and plugging them in the formula above. For k = t, τ, Ak is as follows:
At =
(
0
−1+ τφ
)
Aτ =
(
−1
(1+ t)φ
)
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Once Dt and Dτ are calculated as above, proposition 1 immediately follows.75 Note
that HC is positive definite and that C(·) is therefore convex under the conditions
given in proposition 1. This is because Tr(HC) = λ1 + λ2 = C11 + C22 > 0 and
det(HC) = λ1λ2 > 0 so it must be that λ1 > 0,λ2 > 0 and HC is positive definite (λs
refer to the eigenvalues of HC).
1.C.2 A generic cost functions that can depend on the tax rates
So far, the cost function was not allowed to depend on the tax rates. However, it is
possible that the expected cost of evasion changes together with the tax rate, if for
instance tax authorities are more vigilant when taxes are higher, or if the cost depends
on the amount of taxed evaded — that themselves directly depend on the tax rates.
If that is so, a higher tax rate will not only increase the marginal benefits of evasion,
but also the marginal cost, making the signing of partial derivatives for comparative
statistics purposes harder.
Given the framework above, the only difference is to allow the cost function to
depend on elements of θ. The only term affected in expression (1.24) is Ak, that now
becomes:
A˜k = Ak − b
(
C1k
C2k
)
where C1k ≡ ∂2C/∂Fr∂k and C2k ≡ ∂2C/∂Mr∂k. Signing the derivatives become harder
as more terms are involved and more assumptions need to be imposed. An illustra-
tion is provided with how optimal reporting of purchases change as the tariff rate
increases, which is given by the following expression:
∂M?r
∂t
=
C11(φτ − 1) + b(C21C1t − C11C2t)
b det(H)
.
The first term in the nominator is negative and the denominator is positive by propo-
sition 1, which, ignoring the second term in the nominator, would result in a negative
partial derivative: as tariffs increase, reported purchases decrease. The second term
is new and appears as the cost function can now directly depend on the tariff rate t.
For the sake of the argument, suppose that C1t = 0, i.e. that the change in the cost
resulting from misreporting sales — which are not subject to tariffs — is independent
of the tariff rate, and that C2t < 0, i.e. that the cost of under-reporting purchases in-
creases at t increases — capturing the idea that border authorities scrutinize that good
more carefully as the tariff increases.76 In that case, the second term in the nominator
75With the exception of showing that
∂(F?r −M?r (1+ t)φ)
∂τ
< 0, which is not obvious. This par-
tial derivative equals (1 , −(1 + t)φ)Dτ , whose sign equals the sign of the following expression:
−C22 − C11((1 + t)φ)2 − 2C12(1 + t)φ, which can be shown to be negative. First, rewrite this as
−C11
[(
(1+ t)φ+
C12
C11
)2
− C
2
12
C211
+
C22
C11
]
, then notice that −C
2
12
C211
+
C22
C11
is positive since det (Hc) > 0.
76It seems reasonable to assume that C2t < 0, C1τ < 0, C2τ > 0, i.e. that the cost function becomes
steeper as the tax rate increases over the region where the optimal reported amount is expected to lie.
For instance with tariffs, one expects reported purchases to be lower than the true amount, so the cost
function should become steeper (more negative) for reported amounts lower that the true value as the
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becomes positive and the sign of the derivative depends on which of the two terms is
larger. The two countervailing forces are as follows: an increase in t induces firms to
under-report purchases more, yet since t increases and customs pay more attention to
trade in that good, firms under-report less. Overall, the relative magnitude of these
forces determines what the ultimate effect of tariffs on reported purchases will be.
Similar analyses can be performed for the effect of CIT on optimal reported amounts.
In general, a sufficient condition for the signs of the comparative statics of interest to
remain unchanged is that C1k and C2k are small in magnitude.
1.C.3 A model with domestics sales and purchases
Firms generally do not export all their sales nor import all their intermediate inputs.
Consider the profit function of a firm that sells and sources both domestically and
abroad (denoted with the superscripts D and A, respectively):
pi = (F−M)− tMAr − τ
[
FDr + F
A
r − (MAr (1+ t) + MDr )φ
]
, (1.25)
where F and M are now the sums of their domestic and foreign components: F =
FD + FA and M = MD + MA. The firm can in principle misreport both domestic and
trade amounts. What determines the extent of misreporting in each amount is the
cost function. Suppose for a moment that the marginal costs to misreport MD versus
MA, as well as FD versus FA are the same. In that case, the model does not have a
unique solution since the marginal benefit (in terms of taxes evaded) is the same for
both FDr and F
A
r . Misreporting in terms of purchases will be a corner solution with all
the cheating done on either MDr or M
A
r depending on the levels of t, which determines
which purchases is best for misreporting.
Allowing misreporting solely through trade Consider the case where misreporting
is only possible through trade:
pi = (F−M)− tMAr − τ
[
FD + FAr − (MAr (1+ t) + MD)φ
]
, (1.26)
with F = FD + FA and M = MD + MA. The marginal benefits, i.e. the derivative of the
profit function with respect to reported imports and exports, are identical to the base-
line model in the text. Insofar as the cost function remains unchanged, proposition 1
remains unchanged.
The predictions may be altered when the cost function is allowed to depend on the
levels of domestic purchases and sales. Specifically, there may be scale effects if large
volumes of domestic transactions render misreporting trade easier. There is a simple
intuition behind this: a firm that sells a large amount domestically may cheat more
on exports, because this hidden by the scale of domestic sales. This would allow for
interesting testable predictions and is left for future work.
tariff rate increases.
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1.C.4 An illustrative cost function
The firm can evade both tariffs and corporate income taxes by misreporting the values
of its sales and purchases. This entails a cost, as detected evasion is punished. De-
noting Fr and Mr the reported amounts, the firm faces the following expected cost of
evading:
C(Fr, Mr) =
b
2
[(
F− Fr
F
)2
F +
(
M−Mr
M
)2
M + a
(
(F−M)− (Fr −Mr)
F−M
)2
(F−M)
]
, (1.27)
where b > 0, a ≥ 0 are parameters capturing the rate at which tax authorities detect
evasion. The cost of evading increases when sales or purchases are not reported ac-
curately, and when the reported gross margin differs from the truth. Specifically, the
cost is increasing in the percentage deviations of the reported amounts from their true
values, and proportional to the true values. This specific cost function accounts for
the fact that the firm’s accounts must remain consistent: if a firm reports low sales and
high costs to lower its taxable revenues, the risk it will be detected increases. This risk
is higher if tax authorities can observe and track this gross margins well, captured by
a high value of a. The key is that irrespective of the incentives to misreport sales and
purchases, they cannot be too far apart. In a sense, the third term of the cost function
binds reported sales and purchases together.
Given the expected cost of evading, the firm optimally chooses reported sales and
purchases to maximize its after-tax profits — which is essentially a compliance opti-
mization problem:
max
{Fr ,Mr}
(F−M)− tMr − τ max {0, [Fr −Mr(1+ t)φ]} − C(Fr, Mr). (1.28)
Under-reporting sales lowers the corporate tax liability, whereas under-reporting im-
ports lowers the tariffs owed yet increases taxable profits simultaneously. The optimal
reported sales and purchases are given by:
F?r = F + F
[
aM(η − τ)− τ(F−M)
b(F−M + a(F + M))
]
(1.29)
M?r = M + M
[
η((1+ a)F−M)− aFτ
b(F−M + a(F + M))
]
(1.30)
where η ≡ τ(1 + t)φ − t is the marginal effect of reported purchases on profits (ig-
noring evasion costs) — a higher value of Mr lowers taxes paid through higher costs,
yet increases the tariff liability. A positive η implies that over-reporting purchases
will increase profits (ignoring evasion costs). Some intuition can be gained from the
expressions above. First, each reported amount consists of the true amount plus a
markup that can either be positive or negative depending on the tax rates and the pa-
rameters of the cost function. Second, as the taxman efficiency at detecting evasion
(b) increases to infinity, the optimal reported values tend to the true values. Third,
assuming that tax authorities do not monitor the gross margin at all (a = 0), reported
sales only depends on the CIT rate, b and the true value of sales, and reported pur-
chases only depend on η, b and the true value of purchases. So the dependence of F?r
on M and of M?r on F comes from that fact that discrepancies of the reported gross
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margin from the true margin increases the probability of getting caught via the third
term of the cost function. Keeping that in mind, the following comparative statics are
proposed.
Proposition 2. Provided that F > M > 0 and a < (F−M)/(Mt):77
1. Reported sales, F?r , depend negatively on the corporate income tax rate;
2. Reported purchases, M?r , depend negatively on tariffs;
3. Reported purchases, M?r , depend negatively on the corporate income tax rate if (1+ t) <
aF
φ((1+ a)F−M) , and positively if the reverse is true;
4. Reported taxable profits, F?r −M?r (1+ t)φ, always decrease as a result of an increase in
corporate taxes.
5. The sensitivity of reported purchases, M?r , to tariffs decreases as the CIT rate increases.
Proposition 2 details the main predictions of the model. Reported purchases decrease
when the tariff rate increases, as the firm’s incentives to evade tariffs increase. When
the CIT rate increases, the firm would like to under-report sales and over-report pur-
chases. However, this would result in a large decrease in the reported gross margin
relative to the true gross margin, increasing the expected cost of evasion. Therefore
the firm will report sales and purchases in such a fashion that this discrepancy is not
excessive. This could lead the firm to lower sales and purchases simultaneously even
though lowering purchases in itself results in higher taxable profits.78 This happens
when
(1+ t) <
aF
φ((1+ a)F−M) , (1.31)
i.e. when tariffs are low, not all costs are tax-deductible or the attention of tax author-
ities to discrepancies in the gross margin is high. All three factors imply that over-
reporting purchases are relatively unattractive: the firm is better off lowering sales
and lowering purchases as well (but by less) to minimize the risk of being caught.79
When (1+ t) ≥ aF/(φ((1+ a)F−M)), the firm finds it more efficient to inflate costs
in order to evade corporate taxes, despite the resulting discrepancy in the reported
gross margin and the associated increase in the evasion cost. This is because higher
tariffs and more cost deductibility imply a higher marginal benefit of inflating costs.80
77The condition a < (F − M)/(Mt) is sufficient to rule out over-reporting of sales upon an increase
in the CIT rate, which could happen in theory for the following reason: CIT rate increases, reported
purchases increase, and so do reported sales to avoid a large discrepancy in gross margin, which would
increase the expected cost of evasion. The condition F > M > 0 ensures positive profits before tax. The
predictions of the model should remain unchanged in case of losses, if the losses can be carried forward
to the next financial year.
78In that case, one can think of the firm reporting in such a fashion as to appear smaller than it actually
is.
79It can be shown that
∂F?r
∂τ
<
∂M?r
∂τ
always. Since the first term is negative, the second term is less
negative — or positive when (1+ t) ≥ aF/(φ((1+ a)F−M)).
80It is in principle possible that a firm may want to inflate costs and inflate purchases (by less) to lower
its taxable profits. This is impossible given the condition that a < (F−M)/(Mt). Intuitively, it is easier
to imagine a firm lowering its sales and purchases, e.g. by hiding part of its business, rather than creating
imaginary sales and purchases for the purpose of evasion.
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Last, the magnitude of tariff evasion decreases when the CIT rate increases as a higher
corporate income tax rate makes tariff evasion — which results in lower reported pur-
chases and therefore higher taxable profits — less attractive. Stated differently, higher
tariffs make condition (1.31) less likely to hold and therefore more likely to over-report
purchases upon an increase in the CIT rate.
Proposition 3. When the tax authorities effectiveness (b) increases:
1. Both reported sales and purchases converge to their true value.
2. Both reported sales and purchases react less in response to a change in the corporate
income tax rate.
3. Reported purchases react less in response to a tariff change.
Proposition 3 details how the reported values change depending on the effectiveness
of tax authorities. The magnitude of evasion decreases when tax authorities are more
efficient at detecting it.
Appendix 1.D Details on custom valuation
The transaction value is an important object as it determines the amount of duties to
be paid by the importer, since most tariffs are ad valorem, i.e. expressed in percentage
of the transaction value. Members of the WTO must adhere to the ”Agreement on Im-
plementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994”, also
known as the Custom Valuation Agreement, CVA henceforth.81 The agreement speci-
fies that customs valuation must be based on the actual price of the goods imported, in
principle as shown on the invoice of the transaction. Importantly, the documentation
used to determine the transaction value is provided by the importer. This valuation
method prevents custom officers to price imports in a discretionary fashion, or to use
external reference prices. If the dutiable value cannot be assessed using the transaction
value method, a series of alternatives can be applied, consisting in obtaining a price
from identical or similar goods (see here for more details, last accessed 19/05/2020).
This arguably limits the scope for evasion by the importer. Javorcik and Narciso
(2017) show that quantity misreporting and outright misclassification are more attrac-
tive evasion methods for WTO members relative to price misreporting, as the valua-
tion requires the exporter’s invoice on which the price is stipulated. The authors argue
that there seems to be more discretion possible for non-WTO countries, in which cus-
tom officers may price imports according to external reference prices or their own
experience or data. In this case, the importer may possibly bribe customs officers to
lower the transaction value and thus the due duties. However, 164 countries are WTO
members by 2017 — most of the countries in the sample — and more than 90% of
observations involve importers members of the WTO.
81Prior to 1994 and the creation of the WTO, the 1979 Tokyo Round Valuation Code was used by more
than 40 members of the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). The determination of the
transaction value was essentially the same as under the 1994 CVA.
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Chapter 2
A Geometry of Innovation
2.1 Introduction
Innovation is a key determinant of economic growth. In this paper, we propose a set of
measures of the importance of inventions based on their similarity to past and future
innovative output. Our thoughts are guided by the simple intuition that inventions
that are dissimilar to existing technologies, yet similar to future innovations may have
anticipated or created shifts in innovation topics and thus been particularly impactful
on the technological landscape.
Our measures require accurate quantification of similarities between inventions.
To this end, we represent around 4.6 million patents as numerical vectors in high di-
mensional space based on their text. Patents of similar textual content are close to each
other in vector space. Armed with these vector representations, we analyse the simi-
larity of a patent’s content to existing patents and topics (i) at the time when it is filed,
and (ii) 10 years later. We test whether patents dissimilar to existing patents/topics
when they are filed yet similar to subsequent patents/topics 10 years later are suc-
cessful innovations, where success is measured in terms of citations, private economic
value and growth in output and profitability of the filing firm. We also analyse long-
term trends in these scores to understand whether such precursor innovations are
harder to produce over time, conditional on research effort. The success of this exer-
cise hinges on how well we can proxy technological differences via differences in the
text of patents describing the protected invention.
Data and methodology Our data consists of approximately 4.6 million utility
patents granted by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) over the
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years 1975-2017, a subset of which is linked to firms from the Compustat database.
After building a document term matrix from their texts — i.e. a word count per
document in the form of a matrix — we apply truncated singular value decomposition
to it (also often referred to as Latent Semantic Analysis, Deerwester et al., 1990) to
obtain vector representations of sizes that are manageable in terms of computing cost.
We use these vector representations to calculate three key metrics (scores) for each
patent based on its location within the technological space over time. Each score is
based on two ingredients: the similarities of the patent to past and future patents. For
these comparisons, we focus our attention on patents filed 10 years before and after
the filing date of the patent of interest, which form what we call backward and forward
spaces, respectively.
The first score is based on what we name centroid patents, which are imaginary mean
patents computed as the mean of all patent vectors within subsets of the technologi-
cal space. Specifically, centroid-based scores are computed for each patent by taking
a ratio of its distance to the centroid of the forward space over that to the centroid
of the backward space, where the spaces either contain patents from all or specific
technological fields. A high score implies that a patent was dissimilar to the existing
mean patent when filed, yet similar to the subsequent mean patent. In other words, it
anticipated a technological shift in the economy or a specific industry.
The second metric — that we call widening score — is a refinement of the idea
above, where the similarity to centroids is replaced by the average similarity to the
patent’s closest neighbours. The term widening refers to the idea that a patent that is
filed in an empty part of space (i.e. that is dissimilar to its neighbours in the backward
space) yet becomes central subsequently (i.e. similar to its neighbours in the forward
space) has widened knowledge in a novel way.
To visualise the spatial geometry of patents, we additionally use a recent t-
Distributed Stochastic Neighbour Embedding (t-SNE) variant by Linderman et al.
(2019) from RNA sequencing visualisation in genetics (see also Maaten and Hinton,
2008, for the first paper on this method). t-SNE is a tool that allows the visualisation
of data patterns present in high-dimensional space in low-dimensional spaces of two
or three dimensions. Applied to our patent representations, it allows us to see clusters
and neighbourhoods that relate to different technological fields and it visually guides
our analysis.
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Findings We find that patents which anticipated economy-wide and field-specific
shifts are cited more, and have higher private economic value. At the firm level, firms
which were granted patents that anticipated shifts in their field tend to grow faster
and to be more profitable, although our analysis does not allow us to claim any causal
links between the specific patent we identify and firm outcomes due to the existence
of differential pre-trends. However, we show that it is possible to identify innovative
firms, which also seem to make higher profits, purely based on the language content
of patents. Due to the persistence of R&D quality in firms, these firms also have been
performing better than their peers some years before filing the patent of interest.
Patents which we identify as widening innovations also tend to be cited more and
have a higher private value. Similarly to patents anticipating more systemic shifts,
firms that patent these inventions tend to have higher growth in profits and output,
as well as capital. Again, firms that we identify as innovative based on their patents’
spatial properties also grew faster than other firms a few years prior to filing the iden-
tified patents. It it reassuring to see that the inventions our methods pick among close
to 3 million patents are the intellectual output of fast-growing, successful firms.
In a subsequent discussion, we argue that methods like ours largely pick up the
evolution of technology over the past 30 years and in particular the information tech-
nology (IT) revolution, which we know has significantly shaped the economy. The IT
revolution is identified by all scores: it resulted in economy-wide and field-specific
shifts in the content of innovation, and early IT patents in the 1990s appeared in a
completely empty part of our representation of the technological space. We find that
IT is responsible for a considerable share of the results we present in this paper, yet
the results qualitatively survive in a sub-sample dropping the most IT-intensive fields
of technology.
Last, trends over the sample period reveal that in fields with high average widen-
ing scores, which we denote higher-innovation fields, the number of patents filed in-
creased consistently over the whole sample period, and so did R&D expenditures.
However, patents per dollar of R&D spending plateaued after 1995. Furthermore,
patents in these fields become increasingly similar to their closest neighbours over
time, and while the average widening score increases up to 1995, it sharply decreases
afterwards. We tentatively interpret these patterns as suggestive that ideas may have
gotten harder to get over time in these fields and provide a discussion of the limita-
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tions of this interpretation.
Relation to the literature This paper relates to several strands of the literature. First,
it contributes to the extensive literature that applies NLP methods to patents to char-
acterize technological progress. Balsmeier et al. (2018) and Packalen and Bhattacharya
(2015) identify novel inventions based on the first appearance on words in the patent
corpus. Bowen, Fre´sard and Hoberg (2018) construct a measure of ex-ante technolog-
ical disruptive potential of patents based on their use of new or fast-growing words
across contemporaneous patent applications. Arts et al. (2018) develop a measure of
text-based patent similarity and ask technology exports from different fields to val-
idate it. The closest paper to the present work is a very recent working paper by
Kelly, Papanikolaou, Seru and Taddy (2018), who develop a conceptually identical
method to ours to identify significant inventions, based on their similarity to previous
and subsequent patents.1 Our paper’s widening score is most closely related to their
score. However, we also develop innovation scores based on mean patents and pro-
vide illustrations of the technological space via novel implementations of dimension
reduction techniques that preserve data patterns from high-dimensional space in low-
dimensional space (Linderman et al., 2019). We also provide tentative evidence that
ideas may have gotten harder to get over time, in line with findings from Bloom et al.
(2020) — among others.
This work also relates to the literature on innovation and economic growth. First,
it contributes to attempts at evaluating the economic importance of inventions. This is
a difficult task only imperfectly measured by citations, which tend to reflect scientific
importance — which is however related to economic value (Hall, Jaffe and Trajten-
berg, 2005; Nicholas, 2008). Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru and Stoffman (2017) provide
a measure of private economic value based on the stock market response to news
about patent publications.2 Our measure of the importance of patents is correlated
to both citations and private economic values, but provides additional insights as to
what features of inventions create value. Our concept of widening inventions relates
to the notion that an innovation can deepen the specialized knowledge of a given nar-
rowly defined technological field, or widen the scope of knowledge by creating a yet
1We refer to this study throughout the paper. When specific references to tables and equations are
given, they refer to the first NBER working paper version dated November 2018, unless otherwise spec-
ified.
2This measure is extended by Kline et al. (2019) to a larger sample of US firms.
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non-existent technology. It also relates to endogenous growth models in the tradition
of Klette and Kortum (2004), where innovations can either replace existing products
or create new ones. Our measure of widening patents tentatively provides a tangible
quantification of the concepts underlying these theories.3
Structure of the paper The paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 describes the
data. Details of the methodology are given in section 2.3. Section 2.4 presents the
results. A discussion of the importance of the IT revolution for our results, and of
several potential measurement issues relating to our methods is provided in section
2.5. Section 2.6 concludes. Additional tables and figures, respectively referenced with
prefixes 2.A and 2.B, can be found in appendices of the same name.
2.2 Data
This section contains details on the data used in this project. Data on patents is from
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). Firm-level data is from the
CRSP/Compustat Merged Database, and data on the economic importance of patents
is from Kogan et al. (2017) and (Stoffman et al., 2019).
2.2.1 Patents
The USPTO provides data on all patents that have been granted in the US, both by US
and foreign entities. We restrict the sample to utility patents granted by the USPTO
over the years 1976-2017, for which detailed information in machine-readable format
is available. There are some cases where two or more patents have the exact same
abstract. This happens when an original patent is followed by continuing applications
that either change claims or focus on a subset of claims from the original application.4
Since these applications refer to the same invention, we only keep the patent that was
first granted.
For each patent, the following information is available: the full texts of the ab-
stract, the description of the invention and the claims; the filing and grant dates; the
International Patent Classification (IPC), which indicates to which areas of technology
3Other work measuring the technological breadth and depth of sectors, firms or patents include Katila
and Ahuja (2002); Ozman (2007); Moorthy and Polley (2010); Lodh and Battaggion (2014), who base their
measures on the diversity and intensity with which technological sub-fields are related to each other.
Our measure is purely based on the text of patents.
4See section 201 of the USPTO manual, for exact definitions (last accessed 19/05/2020).
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TABLE 2.1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF PATENT CITATIONS
N Mean Sd Min p25 Median p75 p90 Max
5-year citations 4,633,305 3 7.1 0 0 1 3 7 1431
10-year citations 4,633,305 6.4 16 0 0 2 6 15 2801
15-year citations 4,633,305 8.9 24 0 0 3 8 21 2801
Citations as of 2017 4,633,305 12 32 0 0 3 11 28 3997
Note: descriptive statistics of the number of citations of patents at different horizons after their grant
dates.
a patent pertains; information on the filing and beneficiary entities (which can differ);
and data on forward citations by subsequent patents.5 The final sample consists of
about 4.6 million patents granted over the years 1976-2017. Out of these, a subset of
around 1.67 million patents is matched to firms from Compustat, using the matches
publicly provided by Kogan et al. (2017) and Stoffman et al. (2019).6 These studies also
provide an estimate of the economic value of most of these patents.
The final sample of patents for which a score can be computed consists of around
2.8 million patents over the years 1985-2008 — as the score can only be calculated
for patents with 10 years of data before and after their filing date, see section 2.3 for
details on the methodology. Out of these 2.8 million patents, around 1.15 million can
be matched to Compustat firms. Figure 2.B.1 plots the number of patents filed and
granted in the sample over time, and the coverage in terms of scores and linkage to
firms. In panel (a), note that the number of filed patents decreases dramatically in the
later years. This is because the data only contains patents that have been granted and
most patents filed in recent years have not been granted yet. On average, a patent is
granted 2.5 years after it was filed. In the whole sample, patents are cited 6.4 times
on average in the 10 years following their publication. The distributions of forward
citations is skewed to the left: 50% of patents get 2 or less citations over 10 years —
descriptive statistics of the number of citations at different time horizons can be found
in table 2.1.
2.2.2 Firms
Firm-level data comes from the Compustat database. It provides financial and ac-
counting data for listed firms in the US. Following Kogan et al. (2017), we restrict the
5Throughout the paper, we use the following terminology to indicate the level of aggregation of the
IPC we refer to: IPC 1 for the 1-digit level, i.e. sections and IPC 3 for the 3-digit level, i.e. classes.
6The data from Kogan et al. (2017) can be found here. Last accessed on 03/05/2020. The data from
Stoffman et al. (2019) can be found here. Last accessed on 03/05/2020. We use the private value and the
patent-firm matches from Stoffman et al. (2019) in this version of the paper since the coverage of the data
is more extensive. The results remain largely unchanged irrespective of the data source we use.
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TABLE 2.2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE FIRM SAMPLE
N Mean Sd Min p25 Median p75 p90 Max
# patents granted 119,836 8.8 78 0 0 0 1 5 4254
# patents filed 119,836 10 98 0 0 0 1 6 8934
1-y gr. rate: capital 107,436 .13 .46 -12 .024 .097 .22 .45 10
1-y gr. rate: profits 98,192 .072 .5 -9.7 -.083 .061 .22 .48 7.8
1-y gr. rate: output 106,319 .082 .51 -10 -.06 .056 .2 .44 9.4
1-y gr. rate: employment 102,799 .05 .41 -8.8 -.062 .029 .15 .35 8.6
Note: # patents granted and filed: number of patents granted and filed for a firm in a given year; 1-y gr.
rates: 1-year growth rates of firm outcomes as defined in the text.
sample to observations where values of SIC (Standard industrial classification of economic
activities) codes and book assets are not missing. We omit industries that never patent,
as well firms from the financial and utilities sectors (SIC codes 6000 to 6799 and 1900 to
1949, respectively). The final sample consists of about 120,000 firm-year observations
over the years 1985-2008. Around 26% of firm-year observations filed at least one
patent over the sample period. The variables of interest at the firm level are profits
— defined as sales minus costs of goods sold — output — defined as sales plus in-
ventories — employment and capital (property, plants and equipment). All variables
are expressed in real terms — profits and output are deflated using the CPI, whereas
capital is deflated using the equipment implicit price deflator from the National In-
come and Product Accounts (NIPA). All firm-level variables are winsorized at the 1%
percent level yearly.
Table 2.2 provides summary statistics for the main variables. The distributions of
number of patents filed and granted are very skewed to the left: while most firms do
not file a patent, few firms innovate massively, filing in excess of 4000 patents in a
given year.7 The big innovators — in terms of patent filed — are large firms like IMB,
Microsoft or Sony, to name a few. Firms in this sample tend to be large (they are all
listed companies) and also tend to grow fast. For instance, the average yearly growth
rate of output is 8.2%.
2.3 Methodology
The following sections introduce the methodology of this paper. In section 2.3.1 we de-
scribe how we build patent representations, illustrate their quality and offer graphical
visualisations thereof. We proceed in section 2.3.2 with explanations of the computa-
tions of the scores we derive for each patent and on which this paper relies, accom-
7An exceptional outlier is IMB in 2008, which filed 8934 patents.
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panied with illustrative examples. Section 2.3.3 introduces the regression frameworks
for the analysis of patent- and firm-level outcomes.
2.3.1 Patent representations
The ultimate aim of this section is to represent patents in the form of numerical vectors
based on their textual content. The main purpose of our patent representations is
to measure how similar patents are to each other. It may be useful to think of each
patent as a dot in a plane, in which case a numerical representation of a patent is the
coordinates of that dot. If the texts of two patents are similar to each other, the dots
representing them will be close to each other on the plane.
2.3.1.1 Derivation
This section explains how we obtain numerical representations of patent texts (docu-
ments) based on the words (terms) they contain. Throughout this section, matrix rows
and columns are indexed by i = 1, . . . , m and j = 1, . . . , n, respectively. We denote row
i of matrix B as bi∗ and column j as b∗j
Document term matrix The document term matrix (dtm) stores the number of oc-
currences of each word (term) for each patent (document) in matrix form. Suppose the
entire corpus consists of four patents. Patent one’s full text reads “Invention!”, patent
two reads “A good invention.”, patent three “A better invention.”, and patent four “A
last good invention.” When analysing the USTPO database, we concatenate the texts
of the abstract, brief description, and claims. After deleting punctuation, numbers,
and converting everything to lower case letters, the resulting document term matrix
— denoted A˜ — would have the following form, storing word counts for m = 4 doc-
uments and n = 5 terms:
a invention better good last
0 1 0 0 0
1 1 0 1 0
A˜
4×5
toy
= 1 1 1 0 0
1 1 0 1 1
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Each row vector is a 5-dimensional patent representation. As already visible in this
example, dtms are usually sparse, i.e. contain large numbers of zero elements. In
our application, we create vector representations for m = 4, 633, 363 unique patents
from 1976 to 2017. To reduce noise and irrelevant information, we delete words which
appear in less than 5 documents. Furthermore, we also delete all words which are con-
tained in 15% or more of the documents.8 Without this, each row vector/document
would seem similar as they would share very common words (’the’, ’invention’, etc.)
which have little signal for the technical content of a patent.9 Although both steps
substantially decrease the number of columns, we are still left with n = 765, 149
columns/words in our final dtm, which is therefore of dimension 4, 633, 363× 765, 149.
To make documents comparable despite being of different lengths, we divide each row
by its total word count to obtain the shares each word represent in the document and
denote the resulting matrix A:
A = diag−1(r1, . . . , rm)A˜
where ri is the sum of all elements of row i of A˜: ri =
n
∑
j=1
a˜ij. Unlike related work
such as Kelly et al. (2018), we do not employ additional inverse document frequency
(idf) steps — which weigh words by the inverse of their relative frequency of appear-
ance, i.e. giving more importance to rarer words — but rather delete common words
across all years as discussed above. Kelly et al. (2018) also introduce a concept they
call “backward-IDF” which makes the idf weights solely depend on previously filed
patents (see Kelly et al., 2018, for full details). In contrast, we build the patent dtm
using all years of the dataset and subsequently select the rows linked to the years we
study. In our example above, normalising by word counts implies the following dtm:
a invention better good last
0 1 0 0 0
1/3 1/3 0 1/3 0
A
4×5
toy = 1/3 1/3 1/3 0 0
1/4 1/4 0 1/4 1/4
8We also delete stop-words such as ’the’, ’a’, etc., however, these words are likely contained in 15% or
more of the documents and therefore would already have been deleted.
9Note that we abstract from this step in the exemplary dtm discussed here.
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Centroids This matrix now also allows the illustration of a concept which we use to
direct our thinking in this paper. It is the mean patent vector of (potentially a subset of)
the dtm or its counter parts in reduced dimensions (see next paragraph). We call this
imaginary mean patent centroid, which for any matrix B is the vector of mean values
of its columns:
centroidB = (m−1
m
∑
i=1
bi1, . . . , m−1
m
∑
i=1
bin)
In the above example the centroid patent vector would be centroidAtoy = (11/48,
23/48, 1/12, 7/48, 1/16). Different times and different industries (i.e. subsets of
rows) have different centroids, which are essentially the average frequency of occur-
rence of a term across documents.
Dimension reduction with truncated SVD In the next step, we reduce the dimen-
sionality (columns) of the dtm A. On the one hand this yields more manageable di-
mensions for computing millions of similarities between vectors, on the other hand
it allows parts of the graphical analysis of section 2.4 which is based on low dimen-
sional representations. Following the Natural Language Processing literature, we use
truncated singular value decomposition (tSVD) on A to obtain an approximation of
it which we store in matrix Z.10 For a discussion of the technique, see for example
Strang (2016). If we had subtracted column means in A before applying the SVD, the
columns in Z would be the often-used Principal Components. The truncated version
of the SVD computes only those vectors associated with the largest N singular values
of A. This makes running this method feasible when considering very large matrices
such as our true dtm which is of dimension 4, 633, 363× 765, 149, i.e. has trillions of
cells. We choose the first 300 components from the tSVD to represent our documents
in reduced dimensions. The matrix Z is therefore of dimension 4, 633, 363× 300. Each
component/column is a linear combination of words. Each row is a depiction of a
patent’s textual content in a common space. Vectors of patents with similar content
have a similar angle. Running such a dimension reduction on a dtm and using it for
analysis is often called Latent Semantic Analysis (Deerwester et al., 1990). In fact, a
10SVD is a factorization of a matrix B which takes the form UΣVT where the diagonal entries of Σ —
which is a diagonal matrix — are the singular values of B, and U and V are the corresponding left- and
right-singular vectors of B, respectively. For a given matrix B, Σ is unique when the decomposition is
such that the singular values are in descending order. Truncated SDV yields an approximation of B of
the form UkΣkV
T
k where only the largest k singular values and associated singular vectors are used.
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system using it for information retrieval was actually patented in the USTPO under
patent number 4839853 from 1988 but it is now expired!11 To continue with our exam-
ple, we run tSVD on our exemplary 4× 5 dtm Atoy with three components. It yields:
ztoy∗1 z
toy
∗2 z
toy
∗3
0.9377 0.3453 −0.0387
0.4621 −0.3002 −0.1103
Z
4×3
toy = 0.4390 −0.1909 0.3223
0.3626 −0.2791 −0.1496
Dimension reduction with t-SNE We use the vectors obtained from the tSVD for
computations. These computations are faster with 300-dimensional vectors than with
their 765, 149-dimensional counterparts in the dtm. Yet, to visualise the patents in
space, we need representations in two or three dimensions. Taking only the first 2
or 3 columns from the SVD would not preserve enough meaningful geometric infor-
mation. Could we still have a glimpse into the structures in high dimensional space?
The method of t-distributed stochastic neighbour embedding (t-SNE) by Maaten and
Hinton (2008) achieves exactly this. It preserves cluster and structures from high di-
mensional space and separates clusters of vectors in low dimensional space. This
makes groups and patterns of observations visible. Intuitively, it depicts objects that
are similar (dissimilar) in high-dimensional spaces as points that are close (far) from
each other in low-dimensional space. We employ a very recent and faster variant
of t-SNE developed by Linderman et al. (2019) that the authors used for visualising
single-cell RNA sequences in genetics. This fast interpolation-based t-SNE (FIt-SNE)
creates a good approximation and is feasible even for matrices of large dimensions like
our patent representation matrix containing around 4.6 million patents/rows. We use
their method to further reduce the dimensions of the patent representations contained
in Z down to only two columns:
Z
4,633,363×300
→ Zt-SNE
4,633,363×2
Again, each row in this new matrix is a patent that can now be represented by
only two values (for visualisation only). We can therefore plot its position in a plane.
In terms of parametrisation, we use 20, 000 iterations and a learning rate of 386, 113
11See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Latent_semantic_analysis
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which is based on the amount of rows in our matrix.12
Computing similarities between patents The main purpose of our patent represen-
tations is to compute similarities between patents. Patents of similar content should
have similar numerical vectors. Instead of the row vectors contained in A — which
are too large for computation purposes — we use those in Z to compute these similari-
ties.13 In line with standard practice in the NLP literature, we use the cosine similarity
to measure the similarity between two vectors — i.e. the angle between them — as
opposed to the Euclidean distance which is undesirably sensitive to vector lengths.14
Cosine similarity between vectors x and y is given by:
cosim(x, y) = ∑
n
k=1 xkyk√
∑nk=1 x
2
k
√
∑nk=1 y
2
k
∈ [−1, 1] (2.1)
Going back to our example, patent number 2 “A good invention” has the following
cosine similarities with the other patents:
cosim(ztoy2∗ , z
toy
i∗ ) = (0.5941, 1, 0.69251, 0.9900).
The patent’s similarity with itself is 1 (the Cosine of a 0-degree angle is 1) and the
most similar patent is indeed patent 4 “A good last invention.” which only differ by
one word.
2.3.1.2 Illustrations
Illustrating match quality Once we have computed Z, each row vector is the repre-
sentation of a patent. As discussed above, picking one row, computing its similarity
with each other row, and then sorting the array allows to find the most similar patents.
Table 2.3 illustrates the most similar patent found for a few examples. Sometimes, the
12We are grateful to the author George Linderman for his explanations and the recommendation of the
paper Kobak and Berens (2019) which, among others, discusses hyper-parameter settings for t-SNE. We
use their recommendation for the learning rate (m/12) and leave all other hyper-parameters at FIt-SNE’s
default with the exception of the number of iterations which we set to 20, 000.
13We cannot use row vectors contained in Zt-SNE. These vectors are only used for graphical illustrations
as, in particular, the distances between vectors in 2 dimensions (i.e. points) are distorted to allow for
clusters of similar vectors from higher dimensions to be depicted graphically. See figure 2.1 for a practical
example.
14When thinking about similar patents, it might seem most natural to think of Euclidean distance:
vectors which are close in space should have similar content. This works if we standardise vectors by
their L2 norm, forcing them to have unit length and thus to lie on an N-sphere. The reason is that similar
documents, i.e. rows in Z, might otherwise still have different lengths. However, the angle of vectors
that point into the same direction is zero, even if these vectors have different lengths, hence the appeal
of Cosine similarity.
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closest match is a patent which seems to be a small modification of the original (see
e.g. example 3 in the table). Yet, we also show cases where our tools returns a most
similar patent which is a less close match. Match quality seems very good given that
such a method only has information on the set of words that a document contains. In
fact, Latent Semantic Analysis has also been proposed for patent examination support
(Elman, 2007). Example 4 is the only somewhat odd match. In fact, both technologies
are much more similar than visible from the abstracts and can e.g. be used for earth-
quake detection.15 This is why we concatenate the texts of abstract, brief description,
and claims instead of solely relying on the abstract. Furthermore, methods like ours
would be biased by common headers or names contained in the patents, hence the
deletion of frequently appearing words (those that are in at least 15% of documents in
our case). Yet, matches would still be biased by headers or other common structures
contained in small subsets of patents and which could be unrelated to the inventions
themselves, e.g. if one firm uses a specific and unique writing style for all of its patents.
A further illustration of the match quality is provided in figure 2.B.2. On average,
the 100 closest neighbours of any given patent are more likely to come from the same
technological field (as measured by the IPC 1, i.e. IPC sections) than any other field.
This is reassuring as patent contents are likely to be field-specific.
Illustrating t-SNE The 300 components of Z obtained via tSVD appear to be good
representations of documents which allow us to calculate similarities between patents.
Yet, two of those alone unfortunately do not contain enough visual information to
discern any interesting structures from high dimensional space in just two dimensions.
Figure 2.1 illustrates this. It contains all patents (each being a point on the plane) from
1976 to 1985 represented by their first two vectors from the tSVD — in panel (A) —
and from the t-SNE — in panel (B). The difference is very stark. t-SNE, which was
built to separate cluster structures from higher dimensions into lower dimensional
representations, allows groups of patents of similar content to emerge graphically. We
will later show that patents within clusters come from similar technological fields.
15This is visible from the full texts of the patents, which can be accessed online here (last accessed
19/05/2020).
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TABLE 2.3: EXEMPLARY PATENT MATCHES
Reference
patent
Beginning of abstract Closest
match
Beginning of abstract
9475668
(2013)
A modular element for a creel
includes a structure having at
least one support for supporting
a package or bobbin of yarn; the
structure being modularly cou-
plable with other similar struc-
tures to allow the feeding of
multiple yarns to a textile ma-
chine; ...
4753064
(1986)
The spinning or twisting ma-
chine comprises a plurality of
drafting rolls, a plurality of asso-
ciated spindles and positioned
between them a plurality of yarn
breaking devices pivotable be-
tween an upright spinning ma-
chine operating position into a
yarn breaking position. ...
4900994
(1988)
An automatic window glass el-
evating apparatus for moving a
motor normally or reversely by
drive control by a switch actu-
ation to move a window glass
in a closing or opening direction
which has a resistor connected
in series with the motor, ...
4746845
(1986)
An automatic window regulator
for automobiles includes a drive
motor for lifting and lowering
the window glass, and a detec-
tor for detecting when there is a
foreign object jammed between
the window glass as it is lifted or
lowered and a window frame. ...
4640147
(1987)
A gear assembly comprising
two gears and a spring in the
form of a C-shaped clip inter-
connecting the two gears. Two
pins are provided on one of
the two gears and the spring
has two holes, one in each end
thereof, whereby the spring can
be carried by one gear in a pre-
tressed state by means of the
pin-and-hole connection. ...
4745823
(1988)
A gear assembly comprising
two gears and a spring in the
form of a C-shaped clip for ap-
plying a resilient force between
the gears. Two pins are pro-
vided on the respective side sur-
faces of the gears to receive the
spring which has concave end
surfaces to be received by the
pins. ...
8919201
(2012)
An acceleration measuring ap-
paratus that can easily detect
acceleration with high accuracy
is provided. In the appara-
tus, positional displacement of
a swingable pendulum member
is detected, feedback control is
performed to maintain the pen-
dulum member in a stationary
state using an actuator, ...
8677828
(2012)
Provided is a device capable
of easily and accurately detect-
ing a vibration period when,
for example, an earthquake oc-
curs. When a quartz-crystal
plate bends upon application
of a force, capacitance between
a movable electrode provided
at its tip portion and a fixed
electrode provided on a vessel
to face the movable electrode
changes, ...
Note: first sentences of the abstracts of 4 patents (left column) and that of their closest match (right
column). The 7-digit numbers to the left of the texts correspond to the patent number, and the file year
is in parenthesis underneath.
2.3.2 Computing scores
The empirical analysis of this paper employs a range of metrics which proxy the in-
ventiveness of a patent. This section describes the calculations of these innovation
scores which we compute for each patent, continuing the illustrative examples from
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FIGURE 2.1: DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TSVD AND T-SNE
(A) The two first components obtained from the SVD
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Note: each dot represents a patent filed from 1976 to 1985. Panel (A) plots the two first components
(columns) from Z obtained via tSVD. Panel (B) plots the two first components (columns) from Zt-SNE
obtained via t-SNE.
the previous section.
Backward and forward spaces Each score is based on two fundamental ingredients.
A comparison of the patent of interest to patents in the past, and a comparison to
patents in the future. For this reason, we introduce the notions of backward and for-
ward spaces, which are sets of patents filed within a number of years of the patent of
interest. Both include patents from the current year, i.e. all patents filed in the same
year as the patent of interest. Both our backward and forward time intervals consist
of 10 years.16 Going back to our example, if the 4 patents in Ztoy are from 1976, 1989,
16If a patent is from 1995, then its backward interval would be {1986, 1987, . . . , 1995} and its forward
interval would be {1995, 1996, . . . , 2004}. The intersection of the two sets is {1995}.
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1995, and 2004:
ztoy∗1 z
toy
∗2 z
toy
∗3
0.9377 0.3453 −0.0387 (1976)
0.4621 −0.3002 −0.1103 (1989)
Z
4×3
toy = 0.4390 −0.1909 0.3223 (1995)
0.3626 −0.2791 −0.1496 (2004)
Then for patent number three from 1995 we have the following backward and forward
space, which we denote Zb and Z f :
ztoy∗1 z
toy
∗2 z
toy
∗3
0.4621 −0.3002 −0.1103 (1989)
Z
2×3
b,1995,toy = 0.4390 −0.1909 0.3223 (1995)
ztoy∗1 z
toy
∗2 z
toy
∗3
0.4390 −0.1909 0.3223 (1995)
Z
2×3
f ,1995,toy = 0.3626 −0.2791 −0.1496 (2004)
In our data, these two spaces can easily contain hundreds of thousands of patents.
Taking a constant 10 year interval around a given year makes computations compara-
ble across patents, yet prevents us from computing scores for any patent filed before
1985 and after 2008. In some applications, backward and forward spaces are limited
to patents filed within the same technological fields as the patent of interest. In the
next sections, we detail the calculations of each score.
2.3.2.1 Centroid-based scores
Since centroids are mean vectors, observing the evolution of centroids of subsets of
Z can give insightful information on the importance of topics over time and across
technological fields. Centroids are therefore informative in themselves. Our centroid-
based scores capture how a patent differs from topics that were important in the past
and anticipates topics that become important in the future. Centroid-based scores
therefore rely on the comparisons of a given patent vector to the centroids of the back-
ward and forward spaces. Continuing with the example, the backward and forward
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centroids are given by:
centroidZb,1995,toy = (0.4506,−0.2456, 0.1060)
controidZ f ,1995,toy = (0.4008,−0.2350, 0.0864)
Following Kelly et al. (2018), we name similarities to patents in the past and future
backward and forward similarities, respectively. If a patent is dissimilar to the back-
ward centroid and similar to the forward centroid, we conjecture it is innovative and
we would like it to have a high score. Like Kelly et al. (2018), we use the fraction of
two similarities as the final score, albeit our scores in this paragraph are based on cen-
troids and not on pairwise comparisons. We denote the score of patent i as Scorei and
thus for patent 3 in our toy example:
Scorecentroid-based3 =
cosim(ztoy3∗ , controidZ f ,1995,toy)
cosim(ztoy3∗ , controidZb,1995,toy)
=
0.9117
0.9221
= 0.9887
The score is less than 1, meaning that patent 3 is more similar to the backward space
centroid than to the forward space centroid. In the examples above, the backward and
forward spaces contain all patents irrespective of their technological field. We name
scores relying on all patents macro scores and the centroids used in their construction
macro centroids, as they span all innovations. In contrast, we are also interested in
refining the analysis and study dynamics within technological fields. In this case, we
compute IPC centroids and IPC scores at the IPC level, i.e. only including patents from
the same IPC code as the patent of interest in the backward and forward spaces.
2.3.2.2 Widening scores
The widening score does not rely on centroids, but on the distance of a patent to its
closest neighbours in the forward and the backward spaces. Widening innovations are
patents whose textual content is different from existing patents at the time when they
are filed and similar to patents subsequently filed. The term widening reflects the idea
that these patents extend knowledge in a novel way and spur innovation. The steps
to construct this score are similar to those in building the centroid-based scores. First,
we compute the cosine similarity between the patent vector of interest and all patents
in the backward and forward spaces (including itself). The similarities are stored in
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vectors BSi and FSi, which stand for backward and forward similarities:
BSi = (cosim(zbk∗, z
b
1∗), . . . , cosim(z
b
k∗, z
b
m∗))
FSi = (cosim(z
f
l∗, z
f
1∗), . . . , cosim(z
f
l∗, z
f
m∗))
where the indices k and l correspond to the rows patent i occupies in Zb and Z f , re-
spectively. In our toy example:
BS3 = (0.6925, 1) and FS3 = (1, 0.5912)
Next, the backward- and forward neighbourhood similarities are defined as the mean dis-
tance of the patent of interest to the 100 closest patents in the respective spaces (exclud-
ing itself). For this purpose, we store the 100 largest values of BSi and FSi excluding
the similarities with itself in sets BNS100i and FNS
100
i . Our toy example reaches its
limit as the backward and forward spaces only contain one patent each — other than
the patent of interest — so in this case:
BNS1003 = {0.6925} and FNS1003 = {0.5912}
Again the final score is built such that a patent that was dissimilar to patents in the past
and similar to patents in the future has a high score. We compute the final widening
score as:
Scorewideningi =
FNS100i
BNS100i
where FNS100i and BNS
100
i are the averages of the sets. In our toy example, the final
score is given by Scorewidening3 = 0.5912/0.6925 = 0.8537. Again, a score less than
one indicates that the patent is closer on average to its neighbours in the past than to
its neighbours in the future. Contrary to centroid-based scores, the widening score
compares the patent vector of interest to all patents contained in the backward and
in the forward spaces. The centroid-based scores rely on the mean patents to describe
the backward and forward spaces and involve much less pairwise comparisons, which
makes them computationally cheaper. Yet, our widening score should have a better
chance at finding which parts of space that are still relatively empty as the patent
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is compared to all other individual patents in these spaces. Our widening score is
almost identical to that developed by Kelly et al. (2018), except that they take the sum
of similarities to all patents in the spaces. The next section introduces the empirical
strategy we use to link measures of patents’ success to their scores.
2.3.3 Regression frameworks
This section details the regressions that are estimated at the patent and firm levels.
The regressions will be run with both centroid-based and widening scores. In this
section, we therefore us a generic term score in the regressions and the descriptions for
exposition purposes.
2.3.3.1 Citations
The aim is to check whether our scores are associated with forward citations. Strictly
speaking, the exercise is not a prediction exercise as information available only several
years after the filing date is used to compute the scores. We estimate regressions of the
following form:
citationspj f ,t+h = β score standardizedpj f ,t + FE+ epj f ,t, (2.2)
where the dependent variable is the number times a patent p from IPC code j owned
by firm f — when this information is available — is cited by other patents h years
after its grant year t, where h ∈ {5, 10}. The variable score standardized is the score
of the patent, as defined above, standardized to unit standard deviation to make the
interpretation of regression coefficients easier. FE is a set of fixed effects that varies de-
pending on the exact specification. Combinations of filing year, IPC codes at different
levels and firm fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at the filing
year level. An alternative specification in logs will also be estimated for robustness, as
follows:
log(1+citationspj f ,t+h) = β˜ log(scorepj f ,t) + FE+ epj f ,t, (2.3)
where the score variable is not standardized to unit standard deviation, and the re-
maining variables are defined above. β˜ can therefore be interpreted as an elasticity.
The coefficients of interest are β and β˜, which we expect to be positive, i.e. a high
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score is predicted to be associated with more forward citations. This is the hypothe-
sis that will be tested. The regressions above will also be estimated using the private
economic value of patents as dependent variable, another measure of importance of
a patent. Note that the citations are counted from the grant date of a patent, yet the
scores are computed using the filing year of a patent as the time of reference for deter-
mining the technological landscape relevant at the time of innovation.
2.3.3.2 Firm-level outcomes
At the firm level, the aim is to estimate the effect of filing patents with a high score on
firm-level outcomes in the following years. We choose the filing date as opposed to
the grant date to define the event, because a firm may start using a patented invention
before the patent is granted. The firm-level outcomes of interest are output, profits,
capital and employment. Patent-level information must be aggregated at the firm
level. One firm may file several patents in a given year — especially in this sample of
large firms. Patents with a high score are typically rare and filed only by few firm-year
observations. We define high-score patents as patents whose scores are in the top 5% of
the overall score distribution net of year fixed effects.17 The variable of interest at the
firm level is a dummy denoted D f i,t that takes value 1 if firm f from industry i —
defined as the 3-digit SIC code — filed such a patent in year t. We consider a dummy
as opposed to the number of top patents since firm-year observations that file a top
patent typically represent a small fraction of the observations, and observations with
more than one top patent are even rarer (as noted by Kelly et al., 2018, p. 29).
The generic specification of interest at the firm level closely follows that in Kelly et
al. (2018, equation 19) and reads:
log
[
1
| h |
h
∑
τ=1
Yf i,t+τ
]
− log Yf i,t = βhD f i,t + γZ f i,t + FEit + e f i,t+h, (2.4)
where Yf i,t is either output, profits, capital or employment of firm f from industry i in
year t, Z f i,t is a vector of controls and D f i,t is defined above.18 The left-hand side of
the regression is the growth rate of the average of outcome variable Y between t and
t+ h relative to its value in year t.19 Following Kelly et al. (2018), we consider horizons
17The results are also estimated for a threshold of 1% for robustness, and are available upon request.
18This specification is also similar to equation (12) in Kogan et al. (2017).
19The coefficients for h < 0 are therefore the growth rate between t+ h and h, taking t as the base year.
A negative βh hence indicates a positive growth rate if h < 0.
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between -5 and +10, i.e. from 5 years before and up to 10 years after the filing date.20
In all these regressions, we control for the log of total assets, the age of the firm since
its entry into the data, a dummy for whether the firm filed a patent in that year, the
log of (1+) the number of filed patents in that year, a dummy for whether the firm
is in the top percentile(s) in terms of number of patents filed in that year, the share
of top patents among filed patents in that year (for that firm), as well as in the stock
of patents up to t− 1 (for that firm). The lag of the level of the outcome variable —
whose growth rate is the dependent variable — is also included in all regressions. By
including year-industry fixed effects, the aim to is compare how a firm that files a top
patent fares relative to other firms in that industry, at that time. Standard errors are
clustered two-way at the firm and year levels.21
The coefficients of interest are the sequence of βh. This specification allows to test
for the absence of pre-trends: βh ∀h < 0 should not be significantly different from 0,
otherwise that firm may already be on a different trend before the filing date, and this
may be unrelated to the invention. This dynamic specification also allows to study the
effect of filing a top patent over time, as it is not obvious when — if at all — the effects
should be apparent.
It should be noted that the dependent variable in equation (2.4) is very smooth
over time for a given firm, i.e. it will vary little and especially so in the later years.
This is because the average profits over longer horizons is not very sensitive to the last
data point added to the average. Furthermore, a stance needs to be taken relative to
missing data points as it is unclear what should the value of the average growth rate
be if a value (or more) is missing at some point of time within the horizon of interest,
which is not uncommon given the unbalanced nature of the panel. For robustness
and transparency, we drop any observation which has a missing or more at any given
horizon. This changes the composition of the sample over h whereby the effects for
large h are estimated based on firms that survive at least for that long. However, this
way of proceeding guarantees that firms with missing data are not artificially kept
in the sample when they are in fact not observed.22 As a last robustness check, we
20Kelly et al. (2018) also use the filing year as the event date.
21Autocorrelation-consistent standard errors were also used (in conjunction with clustering) for ro-
bustness as the dependent variable is likely to be auto-correlated over time. The resulting standard
errors are usually much smaller. We chose to err on the side of caution and report the main results with
the regular clustered standard errors.
22The results generally look stronger and the sequence of βh is smoother when keeping observations
with missing data points, but we feel it is partly artificially driven.
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also estimate (2.4) with the growth rate of firms outcomes over the whole horizon as
dependent variable, namely log Yf i,t+h − log Yf i,t as in Kogan et al. (2017).
2.4 Results
In this section, we go through our results. We first document shifts in economy-wide
and field-specific topics of innovation, and study the success of patents and firms
anticipating these shifts. Second, we show that patents with high widening scores
perform particularly well and so do the firms filing them, although there is evidence
that these firms were already outperforming their peers prior to filing these patents.
Last, we study long-term trends in our innovation scores in an attempt in understand
whether ideas have become harder to find over time.
2.4.1 Macro and field-specific shifts in innovation
We first attempt to visualise economy-wide (macro) and IPC-specific shifts in inno-
vation and to see whether patents anticipating these shifts have higher citations and
benefit the filing firms. For this purpose, we use the concept of centroids which was
introduced and discussed in sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2.
2.4.1.1 Visual intuition
First recall that a centroid is the mean vector of a set of patents. This set of patents is
a subset of Z. For a macro centroid, this subset contains all patents in the economy
filed in a range of years. For an IPC centroid, it contains all patents filed in a range of
years within a given IPC code. Put differently, centroids are imaginary mean patents
at a given time, either of the whole economy or of a specific field. We are interested in
the change in centroids over time.
Economy-wide shifts To illustrate the exercise intuitively, consider the movement
of the mean of the first two components of the tSVD between periods 1976-1985 and
2006-2015, as depicted in figure 2.2. For graphical illustration we only use patents
filed at the two time extremities of our sample, but we use the whole sample in regres-
sions. As already noted in section 2.3.1.2 the spatial information contained in the two
first components is very limited.23 Figure 2.2 shows a move in centroid vectors. Al-
23We cannot use the t-SNE vectors to compute centroids as t-SNE is a tool for visualisation only and
the distances between clusters are distorted.
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FIGURE 2.2: ECONOMY-WIDE (MACRO) CENTROIDS (FIRST TWO SVD COMPONENTS)
(A) All patents filed from 1976 to 1985
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(B) All patents filed from 2006 to 2015
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Note: each dot represents a patent, whose coordinates are the two first components (columns) from Z
obtained via tSVD. Panel (A) plots each patent filed over 1976-1985, and panel (B) each patent filed over
2006-2015.
though it appears tiny visually, it hopefully carries the intuition of what such changes
in centroids mean.
Since relying on the first two dimensions of Z does not offer much insight, we ex-
ploit a great particularity of centroids, namely that we can look “into” their language
content. We compute the same centroids using the corresponding rows in the dtm
(in which columns are words), which yields mean word frequencies.24 Recomputing
the same two centroids based on the dtm suggests significant centroid movements
over time. Figure 2.3 illustrates that whereas the economy-wide centroid over 1976-
1985 prominently features words from chemistry such as acid or gas, the centroid over
2006-2015 shows words such as memory, semiconductor, or network. The movement of
the imaginary mean patent for the whole economy intuitively depicts the develop-
ment of the computing age.
24Hence we can switch from numerical points in our 300-dimensional space to the words underlying
in these points (subject to some approximation error).
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FIGURE 2.3: WORD CONTENT OF ECONOMY-WIDE CENTROIDS
(A) Words in 1976 to 1985 macro centroid
(B) Words in 2006 to 2015 macro centroid
Note: the size of a word is proportional to its frequency. Words frequencies are obtained by averaging
columns of the dtm over the subset of rows corresponding to the patents of interest: in panel (A), all
patents filed in 1976-1985; in panel (B), all patents filed in 2006-2015.
Field-specific shifts The same methodology allows to look into shifts in innovation
topics at an arbitrarily disaggregated IPC code level. First note that for many IPC 3
codes (i.e. IPC categories at the 3-digit level) the words associated with the centroids
are surprisingly stable, suggesting that popular innovation topics in these fields re-
mained stable over time.25 We illustrate the movement in centroids for two IPC 3
fields with relatively clear changes: “H04: Electric communication technique” in fig-
ure 2.B.3, and “C01: Inorganic chemistry” in figure 2.B.4. In H04, the movement in
centroid content immediately reveals the emergence of wireless communication tech-
nologies. For instance, the word network was hardly mentioned before and telephone
became mobile. In C01 the words used indicate that chemistry patents with acids lost
in importance whereas carbon and gas rose in popularity within this sub-field. Note
that IPC 3 codes are still relatively aggregated. The same concept of centroid visual-
25In general, world cloud visualisations provide a good first idea. However, font size does not only
relate to frequency but also e.g. to the method used to position large amount of words in a rectangular
shape. Depending on the random seed chosen they can give somewhat different impressions.
129
FIGURE 2.4: SCORES VERSUS CITATIONS
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Note: binned scatter of scores against 10-year forward citations. Number of bins in each plot is 100.
Binned scatter plots with varying number of bins are provided in figures 2.B.7, 2.B.8 and 2.B.9, and
scatter plots of the raw data are provided in figure 2.B.10.
isation can be used at higher levels of disaggregation. Centroids are very handy for
a quick visualisation of shifts in innovation topics over time, but do not allow any
kind of quantitative analysis. The next section links our centroid scores to patent- and
firm-level performance measures.
2.4.1.2 Regressions
The existence of macro and field-specific shifts suggests that the timing and content
of firms’ innovative output may matter for how successful their patents are, and ulti-
mately for their economic performance. Specifically, a firm that anticipates or starts a
major shift in the technological landscape may reap the benefits of being among the
first to do so. This idea applies both at the macro level — an invention in the IT sector
in the 1990s may be very influential — and at the IPC level within a narrowly defined
technological field. How far a patent is to the relevant centroid when it is filed and
how close it is to the new centroid over the 10 subsequent years may be indicative of
how topical a patent is. In the following sections, we study whether such patents have
higher citations, and whether they are associated with better performance at the firm
level. The scores in this section are the centroid-based scores as described in detail in
section 2.3.2. The macro scores are computed with backward and forward spaces that
contain all patents (their mean patent is the macro centroid) and the IPC 3 scores are
computed with backward and forward spaces that only contain patents of the same
IPC 3 as that of the patent for which the score is computed (the mean of this set of
patents is an IPC centroid).
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TABLE 2.4: 10-YEAR CITATIONS AND MACRO SCORE
Dependent variable: 10-year citations
Whole sample Until 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Macro score, standardized 3.976*** 4.425*** 3.873*** 4.517*** 4.474*** 4.012***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -17.16*** -19.60***
(0.000) (0.000)
Year FE X X X X
IPC 3 FE X X
Firm FE X X
Adjusted R2 0.043 0.079 0.147 0.086 0.122 0.215
Within R2 0.028 0.023 0.042 0.041
Observations 2,896,300 2,896,013 1,152,830 1,545,952 1,545,675 612,934
Note: *: p<0.1, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. P-values from standard errors clustered at the filing year level in
parenthesis.
Citations Both macro and IPC 3 scores are positively associated with patent cita-
tions, as depicted in figure 2.4.26 Patenting an invention far from the centroid at the
time of filing yet close to the new centroid 10 years later is associated with higher ci-
tations. To formalize the results, equation (2.2) is estimated using both the macro and
IPC 3 scores. The results can be found in columns (1), (2) and (3) of tables 2.4 and 2.5,
respectively. The relation between scores and citations is statistically significant and
economically large. In the specification including filing year and IPC 3 fixed effects, a
one standard deviation increase in the macro score is associated with an increase of 4
citations, more than half of the mean citations (see table 2.1). Similarly, a one standard
deviation increase in the IPC 3 score is associated with an increase of 3 citations — half
of the mean citations in the sample.27 Higher IPC 3 scores are also associated with a
higher economic value as measured by Stoffman et al. (2019), whereas this is not true
for macro scores — see tables 2.A.4 and 2.A.5 in the appendix. All the results above
remain qualitatively unchanged using citations 5 or 15 years after grant date.
It should be noted that the association between citations and scores is somewhat
weaker in the last decade of our sample. Columns (4), (5) and (6) of tables 2.4 and 2.5
present the results of the same regressions as above, limiting the sample to the years
up to 2000. Although the coefficients have similar magnitudes, the within R-squared
are significantly higher. It is unclear why this is the case. Tentatively, it could be due
26Since binned scatter plots sometimes hide heterogeneity in the raw data, binned scatter plots with
varying number of bins are provided in figures 2.B.7 and 2.B.8 for the macro and IPC 3 scores, and scatter
plots of the raw data are provided in figure 2.B.10.
27The results using specification (2.3) can be found in the appendix, in tables 2.A.2 and 2.A.3. The
results are similar.
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TABLE 2.5: 10-YEAR CITATIONS AND IPC 3 SCORE
Dependent variable: 10-year citations
Whole sample Until 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IPC 3 score, standardized 3.071*** 2.999*** 2.790*** 3.584*** 3.417*** 2.881***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -13.78*** -16.27***
(0.000) (0.000)
Year FE X X X X
IPC 3 FE X X
Firm FE X X
Adjusted R2 0.025 0.075 0.143 0.048 0.124 0.205
Within R2 0.024 0.018 0.047 0.030
Observations 2,745,260 2,745,260 1,118,094 1,448,555 1,448,555 590,788
Note: *: p<0.1, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. P-values from standard errors clustered at the filing year level in
parenthesis.
to the increase in the number of patents filed in the later years, which results in a more
crowded space in the vector representation and prevents our method from identifying
meaningful centroids. This issue will be further discussed in section 2.5.
It is interesting that the relationship with citations is strong both at the macro and
the IPC 3 levels. At the macro level, it is likely to reflect the advantage of being an
early innovator in a field that will become important for the economy as a whole.
Given the illustrations of the previous section, it seems that the macro scores are likely
to capture the IT revolution, a field that was near non-existent in the 1980s and that
came to dominate the technological landscape in the 1990s and 2000s. Indeed, most
of the patents with high macro scores are from IT-related sectors. This is also true for
IPC 3 scores, which perhaps indicates that IT is the sector whose centroid moved the
most over time.
Firm-level performance A firm that files a patent with a high score may benefit from
such an invention. In order to test whether this is the case, equation (2.4) is estimated
for both the macro and the IPC 3 scores. The treatment variable is a dummy that
indicates whether a firm filed a patent in the top 5% of the chosen score distribution,
which we call a high-score patent.28 The results are shown graphically in figures 2.5
and 2.6, which depict the sequence of estimated βh for profits, output, capital and
28As mentioned in section 2.3.3, we consider top patents in the distribution of scores removing year
fixed effects, which means that high score patents are those with the highest scores among the patents
filed in the same year. We also ran the regressions using the top patents in the overall distribution without
removing year fixed effects, and the effects are similar. The results are also similar when classifying the
top 1% patents as high-score patents.
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FIGURE 2.5: TOP MACRO PATENTS AND FIRMS DYNAMICS
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Note: estimates from equation (2.4) using the macro score to qualify top patents. 95% confidence intervals
are depicted. The coefficient is the growth rate between year t + h and t using t as the base year, so for
negative h a negative coefficient implies a positive growth rate between t + h and t.
employment.29
The results suggest that filing a top patent in terms of IPC 3 scores is generally asso-
ciated with higher subsequent growth in output and capital for the filing firm relative
to other firms in that industry and year, although the effects are not strongly signifi-
cant. Profits seem to be on an upward trajectory even before the event date. These pre-
trends suggest that those firms that file a high-score patent are already growing faster
than other firms before the innovation happens. It is therefore impossible to identify
the causal effect of patenting a high-score invention on profits. Instead, our method
seems to identify firms which are generally innovative. Since innovative output is
highly persistent, it is perhaps not surprising that high-score patents are produced by
firms that have a consistently high level of innovation and that grow faster than other
firms on average. Filing a top patent in terms of the macro score does not result in any
strongly statistically significant effect on profits, output, capital or employment for the
filing firm.
2.4.2 Widening existing ideas
We now use our geometrical approach to define a group of patents that widened
knowledge by venturing into unexplored parts of the technological space which sub-
29The results estimated using the alternative specification of (2.4) with log Yf i,t+h − log Yf i,t as depen-
dent variable can be found in figures 2.B.11 and 2.B.12.
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FIGURE 2.6: TOP IPC 3 PATENTS AND FIRMS DYNAMICS
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Note: estimates from equation (2.4) using the IPC 3 score to qualify top patents. 95% confidence intervals
are depicted. The coefficient is the growth rate between year t + h and t using t as the base year, so for
negative h a negative coefficient implies a positive growth rate between t + h and t.
TABLE 2.6: ONE DIGIT IPC CODES (IPC SECTIONS)
Code Name
A Human necessities
B Performing operations; transporting
C Chemistry; metallurgy
D Textiles; paper
E Fixed constructions
F Mechanical engineering; lighting; heating; weapons; blasting
G Physics
H Electricity
sequently became important.
2.4.2.1 Visual intuition
We start by providing our definition of widening patents. A widening patent is a patent
which is dissimilar to its closest neighbours in the set of patents filed in the past 10
years, and similar to its closest neighbours in the set of patents filed in the following
10 years. In other word, a widening patent enters a part of space with few existing
patents and this region is subsequently populated in the following years.
While our centroid-based scores allow us to study economy-wide and within-field
shifts, they are ill-suited to identify widening patents if the neighbours of a patent
belong to different IPC fields. In that case, the IPC-specific centroid may not represent
the relevant technologies most related to the patent of interest. Figure 2.B.2 in section
2.3.1.2 already suggested that there may be considerable heterogeneity in terms of
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patents’ IPC within neighbourhoods. To consolidate this argument, consider panel
(A) of figure 2.7, which depicts patents filed from 1976 to 1985 based on the t-SNE
algorithm introduced in section 2.3.1. Each dot represents a patent and is coloured
according to the IPC section (IPC 1) to which it belongs — a list thereof can be found
in table 2.6. Note that importantly, the algorithm has no information on the IPC code a
patent belongs to when computing the patent vectors. A few striking patterns emerge.
First, patents in chemistry (C) electronics and physics (G and H) are concentrated in
relatively separated and homogeneous clouds. In other words, a patent from IPC
C, G or H is mostly surrounded by patents from the same field. Patents from other
IPC sections such as Human Necessities (A), Textiles (D), or Fixed Constructions (E)
are much less clustered and seem to spread across many topic areas of the language
space. Due to this heterogeneity in clusters, our widening score is better suited to
capture widening patents.
The t-SNE visualisation offers other interesting insights into the data when com-
paring patents filed at the two time extremities of our sample in panel (A) and (B)
of figure 2.7. The areas of space for Physics (G) and Electricity (H) in 2006 to 2015
are very crowded whereas they were almost empty back in 1976-1985, in line with
what we would expect from the IT revolution: whole new fields were created. We
can already surmise that many widening patents will originate in these fields, as
will be confirmed in section 2.5. The two snapshots of 1976-1985 and 2006-2015 also
suggest that some clusters appear and disappear over time. For example, a sub-
field of chemistry strongly linked with human necessities appeared around coordi-
nates (z∗1 = −300, z∗2 = −200) while another sub-field of chemistry at coordinates
(z∗1 = −180, z∗2 = −400) disappeared.
2.4.2.2 Regressions
Armed with the widening scores computed as described in section 2.3.2, we anal-
yse whether high-score patents — which we call widening patents — are successful
patents in terms of citations and private value, and whether the firms from which the
inventions originate benefit and perform better relative to their peers. The widen-
ing scores allow for a neater narrative and a finer analysis than the centroid scores,
where the score of a patent was obtained by comparing its content to economy-wide
or sector-specific average content at different points in time. A patent with a high
135
FIGURE 2.7: IPC-COLOURED T-SNE REPRESENTATIONS
(A) IPC 1-coloured t-SNE representation of patents from 1976 to 1985
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(B) IPC 1-coloured t-SNE representation of patents from 2006 to 2015
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Note: scatter plots of the two columns of Zt-SNE. Each dot is a patent, coloured by the IPC 1 category to
which it belongs.
widening score is a patent that was distant to its closest neighbours when filed and
that got new close neighbours in the subsequent 10 years. The neighbours need not
be from the same sector or field of technology.
Citations High widening scores are associated with more citations: a one standard
deviation increase in the score is associated with 3 to 4 additional citations over 10
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TABLE 2.7: 10-YEAR CITATIONS AND WIDENING SCORE
Dependent variable: 10-year citations
Whole sample Until 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Widening core, standardized 4.026*** 3.395*** 3.495*** 4.334*** 3.488*** 3.407***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -133.9*** -145.1***
(0.000) (0.000)
Year FE X X X X
IPC 3 FE X X
Firm FE X X
Adjusted R2 0.044 0.075 0.148 0.067 0.119 0.212
Within R2 0.024 0.024 0.038 0.038
Observations 2,896,300 2,896,013 1,152,830 1,545,952 1,545,675 612,934
Note: *: p<0.1, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. P-values from standard errors clustered at the filing year level in
parenthesis.
years — an increase representing about 50% to 60% of the mean citations over 10
years in the sample. The results can be found in table 2.7 — and table 2.A.6 for the
specification in logs. Both the magnitudes and goodness of fit are similar to the re-
sults obtained using macro and IPC 3 scores, which is somewhat surprising since the
definitions of the scores differ markedly. The relationship between scores is discussed
in section 2.5.1. Widening patents are also associated with higher private values — as
reported in table 2.A.7 — and the correlation is much higher than in the case of IPC
3 scores, but unstable across specifications using different sets of fixed effects. All the
results above remain qualitatively unchanged using citations 5 or 15 years after grant
date. Note again the decrease in the goodness-of-fit of these regressions in the years
after 2000 — columns (1)-(3) versus (4)-(6) in tables 2.7 and 2.A.6.
A high score could in principle be the result of a high forward neighbourhood sim-
ilarity and a low backward neighbourhood similarity — our definition of widening
patents — but could also be driven by a very low backward neighbourhood similar-
ity and a low forward neighbourhood similarity. In that case, the patent would be
very dissimilar at the time of filing, and yet remain fairly dissimilar 10 years later —
although less so. It would be difficult to argue that such a patent is a widening inno-
vation. To confirm that the positive association between citations and widening scores
is driven by wideners, figure 2.8 reports the average citations for patents in different
quintiles of the distributions of backward and forward neighbourhood similarities.
Citations increase as a patent is dissimilar in the backward space and similar in the
forward space, which matches our narrative nicely.
137
FIGURE 2.8: MEAN CITATIONS PER DECILE OF BACKWARD AND FORWARD WIDENING SIMILARITY
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Note: Panel (a) displays the mean citations of patents whose backward and forward neighbourhood
similarities fall in the corresponding combinations of quartiles of the distributions of scores, and panel
(b) reports the underlying number of observations. A high value of the quartile means higher similarity.
The values on the y-axis are swapped (i.e. they range from 4 to 1).
Firm-level performance The results can be found in figure 2.9.30 Firms that file a
high-score patent see their profits, output and capital grow faster than their peers
within the same industry and years. There is however very strong evidence of exist-
ing pre-trends, as suggested by significantly negative coefficients before the event date
(the filing of the high-score patent). Those firms were on a differential trend before the
invention came out. As mentioned earlier, this renders causal statements about the
effect of filing a high-score patent impossible. It seems that we identify fast-growing
firms that innovate and continue to grow fast relative to other firms after the patent
has been filed. It is however reassuring that the effects seem to be stronger than when
high-score patents are identified using macro and IPC 3 scores since the widening
scores are identifying widening patents — which may be rarer inventions — whereas
the other two scores merely identify patents that anticipated a general shift in inno-
vation. However, the firms with high widening scores are often IT firms. Table 2.A.1
lists the firms with most top patents in the distribution of widening scores (i.e. patents
in top 5 percentiles of the score distribution net of year fixed effects). They are all
IT-related.
It is interesting to note that differential pre-trends can also be observed when con-
sidering the filing of top patents in terms of citations and private value. Specifically,
30The results estimated using the alternative specification of (2.4) with log Yf i,t+h − log Yf i,t as depen-
dent variable can be found in figure 2.B.13
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FIGURE 2.9: WIDENING PATENTS AND FIRMS DYNAMICS
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Note: estimates from equation (2.4) using the widening score to qualify top patents. 95% confidence
intervals are depicted. The coefficient is the growth rate between year t+ h and t using t as the base year,
so for negative h a negative coefficient implies a positive growth rate between t + h and t.
estimating equation (2.4) classifying top patents as being in the top 5% of the private
value distribution or in the top 0.1% of the citations distributions yield pre-trends in
both cases (especially marked in the case of private value) as reported in figures 2.B.17
and 2.B.18. This problem in estimating the causal effect of top patents — irrespective
of the criteria used to qualify them — seems to be a recurrent issue.
2.4.3 Have ideas become harder to find?
In this section, we apply our methodology to a question hotly debated in the growth
literature, namely whether ideas are becoming harder to find over time. There has
been recent evidence that while research effort has increased substantially over the last
decades, research productivity has declined in tandem (Gordon, 2017; Bloom, Jones,
Van Reenen and Webb, 2020). Because the relationship between ideas and patents may
vary over time, counting patent per dollar of R&D expenditure may be misleading
(Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004). We attempt to understand whether ideas have
gotten harder to get over our sample period based on our widening scores.
The premise of this exercise is that we can proxy the novelty of ideas with our
widening score and its components, specifically the backward similarity that measures
how different a patent is to the stock of existing patents. We study the evolution of
these measures over time and across technological fields to investigate whether ideas
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FIGURE 2.10: AGGREGATE TRENDS IN THE US
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Note: panel (a): Gross domestic spending on R&D in billion 2012 USD and number of researchers in
full time equivalents (source: OECD series GDEXPRD and RESEARCHER); panel (b): number of patents
filed by US entities; panel (c): number of patents filed per billion USD spent on R&D (contemporaneous);
panel (d): average backward neighbourhood similarity to 100 closest neighbours and widening score
across patents filed by US entities.
are getting harder to get, taking into account research effort as measured by R&D
expenditures. The fundamental idea is that if patents become less innovative over
time conditional on research effort, ideas may have become harder to get.
2.4.3.1 Aggregate trends
As a motivation, figure 2.10 plots economy-wide trends in the US over the period
1985-2008. Several striking patterns emerge. First, research effort as measured by R&D
spending and research workers have consistently increased over the years. The num-
ber of patents filed yearly by US entities also steeply increased up until the 2000s when
it plateaued. Number of patents per dollar of R&D increased over 1985-1995, stabi-
lized afterwards, and started to decline after 2000 (this pattern is similar for patents
per researcher).31 If every patent was an idea of constant quality, one would tenta-
tively infer that ideas might have become harder to find sometime between 1995 and
2000, resulting in less innovative output per research input.
31This calculation is only motivational, as R&D expenditures probably result in patents in the fol-
lowing years and not in the current year. The graphs plots number of patents per R&D billion dollars
contemporaneously spent.
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However, ideas may not be of constant quality and a patent may protect an in-
vention which is more or less novel and impactful. Panel (d) in figure 2.10 plots the
average backward neighbourhood similarity of patents to their 100 closest neighbours
— the denominator in our widening score — as well as the average widening score
over time. The average backward neighbourhood similarity consistently increases
over time, suggesting that the content of patents becomes more similar over time.
The average widening score increases up until 1995 and sharply decreases afterwards.
Combined, these trends suggest that novel ideas may have gotten harder to find over
time after 1995. The next sections dissect the data across innovation fields to offer
further support to this conclusion. A discussion of potential caveats of our approach
follows in section 2.5.
2.4.3.2 Comparison across fields
These aggregate trends may hide insightful heterogeneity as some fields saw the birth
of numerous innovative and original ideas (e.g. the IT-related fields) whereas other
fields did not. We would like to explore whether it may have been easier to find ideas
in fields with high widening scores relative to other fields. The average scores over
time per IPC 1 codes are plotted in figure 2.11 for all patents and in figure 2.B.22 for
patents linked to Compustat firms, in which case data on R&D is also available at the
IPC level. There is heterogeneity in levels and trends across fields. First, IPC G and
H (physics and electricity, where the IT revolution mostly originated) display higher
widening scores on average, and steeper increases over time in both backward and
forward neighbourhood similarities, as well as in the number of filed patents. The
decline in the widening scores post-1995 is also the most pronounced. Second, IPC
A (human necessities) and C (Chemistry and metallurgy) both display high and sta-
ble backward and forward neighbourhood similarities.32 Third, the remaining fields
appear to exhibit similar patterns: low and mildly increasing backward for forward
neighbourhood similarities. Forth and perhaps most importantly, all sectors expe-
rience a similar hump-shaped patterns in their average widening scores over time,
peaking in the early 1990s and decreasing afterwards, driven by a flattening in the
forward neighbourhood similarity relative to the backward neighbourhood similarity.
32The spike in both the average backward and forward neighbourhood similarities in 1995 are likely
due to a large inflow of patents of similar contents which appear in both the backward and forward
spaces. There is indeed a corresponding spike in the number of patents filed in 1995.
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FIGURE 2.11: TRENDS BY IPC 1
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Note: panel (a): average backward neighbourhood similarity by IPC 1 over time; panel (b): average
forward neighbourhood similarity by IPC 1 over time; panel (c): average widening score by IPC 1 over
time; panel (d): number of patents filed by IPC 1 over time. Sample: all patents.
This last pattern may suggest that impactful ideas are getting harder to find: inven-
tions become more similar to those in the past, and spawn less related innovations in
the future. It is however surprising that this pattern is present in each IPC 1 fields.
This could be consistent with new IT-related words being newly used across all IPC
sections — and not only in patents of IPC sections G and H.33 From figure 2.B.22, one
can see that R&D expenditures at the firm level kept rising. Patents per dollar of R&D
are relatively stable for most fields, except A and C where it decreased significantly.34
To ease the reading of the data, we divide the sample into two groups of techno-
logical fields according to their average widening score over the sample period. We
denote fields with high and low average widening score higher- and lower-innovation
fields, respectively. We restrict the sample to IPC 3 codes with at least 10,000 patents
(this represents 95% of the observations) and obtain two groups of 31 IPC 3 fields
each. The trends for each fields group are displayed in figure 2.12 (and figure 2.B.23
33A similar pattern can be seen in figure 3 of the updated version of Kelly et al. (2018) — the working
paper dated February 2020. However, they do not dissect the data by IPC 1, but by the percentiles of the
widening score.
34We refrain from overly interpreting the decrease in the number of patents filed by Compustat firms
over years 2003-2008 as this may be a decrease in the number of firm-patent matches as opposed to an
actual decrease in filing. This decrease in the matched patents is also visible in panel (b) of figure 2.B.1.
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for patents linked to Compustat firms, with R&D figures). Higher innovation fields
— dominated by IPC 3 from sections B, G and H — are characterized by an increas-
ing backward neighbourhood similarity and a forward neighbourhood similarity that
first increases up to 1995 and then flattens, resulting is a strongly hump-shaped widen-
ing score. Patents filed exploded over the sample period. Lower-innovation fields —
predominantly from sections C and F — exhibit similar yet much less pronounced pat-
terns, and flows of patents filed increased only slightly over the sample period. These
trends are consistent with the interpretation that innovation has been relatively easier
in higher-innovation fields in the late 1980s and early 1995s before hitting decreasing
returns as ideas became harder to get, whereas they have been relatively hard to find
in lower-innovation fields throughout the sample. Taking into account R&D expen-
ditures in the firm-matched sample, much more money is spent in higher-innovation
fields, yet the number of patents per dollar of R&D expenditures plateaus around
1995. Overall, this tentatively suggests that innovation was once easier in the higher-
innovation fields before becoming harder.35
2.5 Discussion
In this section, we discuss how the different scores relate to each other and emphasize
the importance of IT-related innovation for our results. We finish with explanations of
potential problems our method might be subject to.
2.5.1 Relationships between scores
Recall that macro, IPC and widening scores are calculated for every patent in our
sample between 1985 and 2008. As explained in section 2.3.2, the scores are the ratio
of a forward similarity and a backward similarity, which are essentially similarities to a
reference point capturing the existing technological states at different point in time. A
patent dissimilar to existing patents at the time of filing and similar 10 years later will
have a high score. Table 2.8 reports some descriptive statistics. First note that both the
35As a last tentative piece of evidence in support of the claim that innovation may have been easier in
higher-innovation fields, we show anecdotal evidence that returns to improvements of existing technolo-
gies may be higher in lower-innovation fields. The intuition is that a successful improvement would be
more rewarded in fields where ideas are hard to find and innovation is low. We compare patents contain-
ing at least 5 keywords associated with the notion of improvement to the rest of the patents and find that
the difference in average citations between the former and the latter is larger in lower-innovation fields
relative to higher-innovation fields, as shown in table 2.A.11. However, these words are more likely to
appear in longer documents, and length itself is positively correlated with citations. This could therefore
be purely mechanical.
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FIGURE 2.12: TRENDS BY IPC 3 GROUP
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Note: panel (a): average backward neighbourhood similarity by IPC 3 group over time; panel (b): av-
erage forward neighbourhood similarity by IPC 3 group over time; panel (c): average widening score
by IPC 3 group over time; panel (d): number of patents filed by IPC 3 group over time. IPC 3 fields are
divided into two groups according to their average widening scores. Sample: all patents.
TABLE 2.8: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF INNOVATION SCORES
N Mean Sd Min p25 Median p75 p90 Max
Macro score 2,896,300 .994 .152 .093 .887 .966 1.08 1.19 3.06
IPC 3 score 2,745,260 .997 .135 .0899 .927 .993 1.06 1.14 4.74
Widening score 2,896,300 1.01 .0286 .551 .998 1.01 1.02 1.05 2.36
mean and the median scores are close to 1, which means that on average the position of
a patent relative to its neighbours in the backward and forward spaces is very similar.
Forward and backward similarities are indeed very highly correlated — see figure
2.B.5. The scores are positively correlated with each other with correlations ranging
from 0.33 to 0.46. A correlogram of the scores containing the histograms of each score
distribution and scatter plots of the scores against each other can be found in figure
2.B.6. Even though all these scores capture similar notions, they differ markedly from
one another. In light of these low correlations, in is somewhat surprising that all scores
exhibit similar correlations with citations (cf. tables 2.4, 2.5 and 2.7).
2.5.2 The importance of IT
An approach which identifies innovative patents as those that were dissimilar to
past language but similar to future language will tend to give highest scores to
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FIGURE 2.13: CITATIONS PER IPC
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Note: each cell is the average number of citations within 10 years of the filing year, by year and IPC
section (IPC 1). Cells are colored such that higher values have hotter colors.
those patents which were in empty parts of the space when they got released. Our
t-SNE-driven intuition suggests that patents with high scores will come in large
proportions from electronics and physics fields as these areas have been the emptiest
in the early years of our sample. The heatmaps in figures 2.13 and 2.14 confirm this
intuition. The former shows average 10-year citations per year-IPC 1 combination and
the latter displays the corresponding widening scores. As expected, our widening
score is highest in IT-related areas, which is where the space must have been the
emptiest.
Figures 2.B.19, 2.B.20, and 2.B.21 show the same for macro and IPC 3 scores, as well
as depict the number of patents per cell. In the case of macro centroids, IT patents in
the 1990s have even higher scores relative to other patents, reflecting the move of the
entire economy towards IT technologies over the time span we consider. In the case
of IPC 3 scores, average score values are more balanced as each IPC code has its own
reference point. It seems that methods such as the ones discussed here — as well as in
other related papers, in all likelihood — identify the IT revolution.
One possible worry is that our results are solely driven by patents relating to the
IT sector. At the macro level, IT is one important sector that was nascent in the 1980s,
and became central in the subsequent decades. At the IPC level, IPC G and H —
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FIGURE 2.14: WIDENING SCORES
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Note: each cell is the average widening score, by year and IPC section (IPC 1). Cells are colored such that
higher values have hotter colors.
Physics and Electricity, the IPC seemingly most related to IT — account for over 50%
of granted patents in our sample. Regarding widening patents, we also find that large
IT firms disproportionately file high-score patents — see table 2.A.1. It is therefore
natural to wonder whether the results are robust to excluding patents from these tech-
nological areas. We do so by dropping all patents from IPC codes G and H once the
scores have been computed, and re-estimate all our results.36 In general, the results
are qualitatively unchanged, although in most cases the magnitudes of the effects are
smaller — they sometimes as much as halve. The patent-level regression results can
be found in tables 2.A.8, 2.A.9 and 2.A.10 for macro, IPC 3 and widening scores, re-
spectively. The decrease in magnitude is strongest for the macro scores: in the citations
regressions, both coefficients and r-squared decrease by around 50%. For results based
on IPC 3 and widening scores, the decrease in magnitude is smaller. At the firm level,
the estimated effects of filing a top patent are generally smaller and less significant,
but qualitatively similar as can be seen in figures 2.B.14, 2.B.15 and 2.B.16.37
One marked difference is the relationship between private value and scores, which
36We do not, however, re-estimate the vector representation of patents dropping IPC codes G and H,
i.e. we use the same scores as in the main text, simply omitting patents from those IPC codes. Omitting
IT patents before computing patent representations would result in severely biased patent vectors.
37The differential pre-trend issue is also less severe, but this is probably only due to the decrease in
significance across all coefficients and not a sign that differential pre-trends are less worrying in this
subsample.
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is most cases becomes negative. It is unclear why that is so: it seems that the positive
relationship between scores and private value was solely driven by patents from IPC
codes G and H — it is not the case that these patents have systematically higher values
than those in other fields, however. Overall, it seems that IT alone is indeed responsi-
ble for some, yet not all of the results presented.
2.5.3 Construction of the scores
The widening scores are built using the proximity of patents to their 100 most similar
neighbours in space. This cutoff is arbitrary and entails a trade-off. On the one hand,
taking the distance to more patents, e.g. 500, might dilute the information that we
attempt to capture on the proximity of the closest inventions, by taking the average
distance over too many patents. On the other hand, choosing too few patents, e.g. 10,
may also give a misleading idea of the position of a patent relative to its neighbours
— e.g. if the 10 are very close and filed by the same firm, and the 11th is really far.
We chose 100 as it seemed to be a good compromise, but the results are similar when
using alternative thresholds.38 Furthermore, it is not obvious that this threshold must
remain constant over time. Since the space becomes increasingly crowded over time
as the volume of patents increases, the closest 100 to a patent in 1985 may be further
away than the closest 100 to a patent in 2008 even if patent texts were completely
random. An alternative could be to let the threshold change over time proportionally
to the number of patents in the forward and backward spaces.
2.5.4 Potential measurement issues
There are a number of limitations to our approach relating to the construction of the
scores that we would like to submit to the reader. These issues will guide our future
work.
First, distances between patents in the vector space may have different meanings
across fields. As an hypothetical example, two patents relating to chemistry may have
many words in common yet describe completely different inventions, whereas two
patents in the field of computing sharing many words may be similar inventions. If
this difference were constant over time, the widening scores would not be impacted
as they are the ratio of two similarities. It could be an issue if it changes over time.
38We tried 50, 100, 200 and 500.
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Suppose that differences between IT-related patents are expressed in fewer and fewer
words, i.e. that the texts of IT-patents become more similar over time, yet the differ-
ence in technological content remains identical. The widening score would increase
over time even if the rate of innovation remains the same. A similar trend would
be observed if the language used in patents converged over time and became more
homogeneous irrespective of the technological content of inventions.39
Second, the numbers of patents present in the backward and forward spaces gen-
erally increase over time as the number of patents filed per year tends to increase.40
Since the vector space has the same dimensions throughout — it has been built based
on the document term matrix of the entire set of patents — the “density” of the space
increases over time.41 Using the 2-dimensional example, if the plane is a square of
fixed dimensions, as the number of dots (patents) increases, the space between patents
decreases on average — even if coordinates of the dots were random. In reality, patent
vectors are not random and higher-innovation fields experience much more dras-
tic increases in patent numbers. Even if these patents were worthless, they would
use some words found in other patents within these fields, resulting in increasingly
crowded backward and forward spaces. It is unclear whether this is problematic and
the observed trends mechanically result from this increase in density, or whether more
crowded spaces indicate that innovation is harder. Further work is required to better
understand these dynamics.
Third, forward and backward neighbourhood similarities may be influenced by
strategic patenting practices by large firms, who strategically file large amounts of
patents of related contents in an effort to create “patent thickets” (Shapiro, 2000) char-
acterized by numerous patents with overlapping content and owned by several firms
(Noel and Schankerman, 2013). New entrants wanting to innovate face potentially
complex legal battles and might be discouraged to do so, de facto yielding a competi-
tive advantage to these large firms. This phenomenon seems to be particularly acute
in IT-related fields. Overall, patents of very similar contents might be the result of
39This is unlikely since these words would appear in more that 15% of documents and be deleted from
the abstracts when we build our document representations.
40The numbers of patents present in the backward and forward spaces can decrease if the flow of
newly filed patents is smaller than the flow of patents exiting the spaces.
41The dimension-reduced matrix Z is computed with all patents from all sectors and years together, i.e.
on the entire matrix X with roughly 4.6 million patents. We then extract different subsets of patent vectors
from this matrix and analyse them throughout this paper. If we think of the convex hull spanned around
all row vectors in Z as having a fixed size, analysing larger subsets of vectors it could mechanically
decrease the distance between vectors as more of this convex hull is filled with vectors. This might then
mechanically decrease innovation scores towards the end of the sample when most patents are filed.
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these strategies and this will impact our measures of neighbourhood similarities.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we apply methods from natural language processing to analyse the in-
novative content of patents based on their text. Numerical representations of patents
as high-dimensional vectors allow us to compute similarities between documents at
a large scale. We structure our thoughts around the idea that patents dissimilar to
past inventions and similar to future ones may have anticipated or started shifts in
innovation topics, making the particularly successful. Our measures of success are
patent citations, private value and performance indicators of the filing firm. We find
that patents which anticipate economy-wide or field-specific shifts in topical innova-
tion are more successful, as are those that widen knowledge in the technological space.
Causal interpretation of the effect of filing such patents on firms’ outcomes is rendered
difficult by the existence of differential pre-trends: firms that file such patents already
outperform their competitors prior to filing the patent. We show that our results are
mainly driven by the IT revolution. Last, we study trends in our measures to provide
tentative evidence that ideas may have gotten harder to get over time, especially in
the fields that experienced high levels of innovation over the last decades.
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Appendix 2.A Additional tables
TABLE 2.A.1: FIRMS WITH MOST TOP PATENTS, WIDENING SCORE
Company name # of patents # of top patents top in % of top in % of
all top patents all own patents
INTL BUSINESS MACHINES CORP 71,134 7,809 5.4 11
MOTOROLA SOLUTIONS INC 17,967 3,060 2.1 17
HITACHI LTD 44,870 2,926 2 6.5
CANON INC 37,651 2,518 1.7 6.7
NEC CORP 23,083 2,381 1.6 10
HP INC 25,653 2,229 1.5 8.7
PANASONIC CORP 35,297 2,200 1.5 6.2
MICROSOFT CORP 21,169 2,187 1.5 10
AT&T CORP 8,563 2,078 1.4 24
SONY CORP 29,547 2,069 1.4 7
INTEL CORP 22,738 1,841 1.3 8.1
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO 27,283 1,498 1 5.5
LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES INC 8,646 1,205 0.83 14
TEXAS INSTRUMENTS INC 15,350 1,144 0.79 7.5
SUN MICROSYSTEMS INC 7,563 1,065 0.74 14
TELEFONAKTIEBOLAGET LM ERICS 7,078 1,056 0.73 15
XEROX HOLDINGS CORP 15,080 933 0.64 6.2
EASTMAN KODAK CO 17,524 924 0.64 5.3
GENERAL MOTORS CO 13,528 828 0.57 6.1
MICRON TECHNOLOGY INC 19,602 821 0.57 4.2
Note: list of firms owning the highest number of top patents over years 1985-2008, ranked using the
widening score. The second column indicates the number of patent belonging to that firm, the third
column indicates that of top patents belonging to that firm (patents whose score ranks in the top 5% of
the overall score distribution, controlling for year fixed effects); the forth and fifth columns contain the
fractions of top patents accruing to that firm (i) out of all the top patents and (ii) out of all the patents of
that firm.
TABLE 2.A.2: 10-YEAR CITATIONS AND MACRO SCORE: LOG SPECIFICATION
Dependent variable: Log( 1+10-year citations)
Whole sample Until 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log(macro score) 1.991*** 2.032*** 1.732*** 2.194*** 1.976*** 1.768***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 1.623*** 1.828***
(0.000) (0.000)
Year FE X X X X
IPC 3 FE X X
Firm FE X X
Adjusted R2 0.069 0.167 0.212 0.117 0.163 0.217
Within R2 0.040 0.038 0.048 0.052
Observations 2,896,300 2,896,013 1,152,830 1,545,952 1,545,675 612,934
Note: *: p<0.1, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. P-values from standard errors clustered at the filing year level in
parenthesis.
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TABLE 2.A.3: 10-YEAR CITATIONS AND IPC 3 SCORE: LOG SPECIFICATION
Dependent variable: Log( 1+10-year citations)
Whole sample Until 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log(IPC 3 score) 1.378*** 1.434*** 1.188*** 1.572*** 1.589*** 1.188***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 1.618*** 1.837***
(0.000) (0.000)
Year FE X X X X
IPC 3 FE X X
Firm FE X X
Adjusted R2 0.027 0.162 0.202 0.046 0.163 0.199
Within R2 0.033 0.024 0.052 0.031
Observations 2,745,260 2,745,260 1,118,094 1,448,555 1,448,555 590,788
Note: *: p<0.1, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. P-values from standard errors clustered at the filing year level in
parenthesis.
TABLE 2.A.4: PRIVATE VALUE AND MACRO SCORE
Dependent variable: Log(private value)
Whole sample Until 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log(macro score) -0.629** 0.298 0.209** -0.909** 0.438 -0.0250
(0.016) (0.204) (0.041) (0.013) (0.179) (0.841)
Constant 1.803*** 1.687***
(0.000) (0.000)
Year FE X X X X
IPC 3 FE X X
Firm FE X X
Adjusted R2 0.002 0.123 0.887 0.005 0.120 0.906
Within R2 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
Observations 1,153,764 1,153,567 1,152,830 613,783 613,608 612,934
Note: *: p<0.1, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. P-values from standard errors clustered at the filing year level in
parenthesis.
TABLE 2.A.5: PRIVATE VALUE AND IPC 3 SCORE
Dependent variable: Log(private value)
Whole sample Until 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log(IPC 3 score) 1.067*** 0.672*** 0.215*** 1.236*** 0.975*** 0.0911**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010)
Constant 1.792*** 1.662***
(0.000) (0.000)
Year FE X X X X
IPC 3 FE X X
Firm FE X X
Adjusted R2 0.004 0.124 0.888 0.006 0.124 0.906
Within R2 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.000
Observations 1,119,019 1,119,019 1,118,094 591,628 591,628 590,788
Note: *: p<0.1, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. P-values from standard errors clustered at the filing year level in
parenthesis.
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TABLE 2.A.6: 10-YEAR CITATIONS AND WIDENING SCORE: LOG SPECIFICATION
Dependent variable: Log( 1+10-year citations)
Whole sample Until 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log(widening score) 12.51*** 8.176*** 7.760*** 11.27*** 8.324*** 7.660***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 1.425*** 1.536***
(0.000) (0.000)
Year FE X X X X
IPC 3 FE X X
Firm FE X X
Adjusted R2 0.097 0.162 0.212 0.092 0.162 0.215
Within R2 0.035 0.037 0.046 0.049
Observations 2,896,300 2,896,013 1,152,830 1,545,952 1,545,675 612,934
Note: *: p<0.1, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. P-values from standard errors clustered at the filing year level in
parenthesis.
TABLE 2.A.7: PRIVATE VALUE AND WIDENING SCORE
Dependent variable: Log(private value)
Whole sample Until 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log(widening score) -1.215 3.466*** 1.252*** 0.122 4.270*** 0.545**
(0.492) (0.000) (0.000) (0.919) (0.000) (0.025)
Constant 1.812*** 1.663***
(0.000) (0.000)
Year FE X X X X
IPC 3 FE X X
Firm FE X X
Adjusted R2 0.000 0.124 0.887 0.000 0.122 0.906
Within R2 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.000
Observations 1,153,764 1,153,567 1,152,830 613,783 613,608 612,934
Note: *: p<0.1, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. P-values from standard errors clustered at the filing year level in
parenthesis.
TABLE 2.A.8: CITATIONS, PRIVATE VALUE AND MACRO SCORE: WITHOUT IT
(1) (2) (3) (4)
10-year citations Log(1+10-year citations) Private value Log(private value)
Macro score, std. 2.277*** -6.457***
(0.000) (0.000)
Log(macro score) 1.799*** -1.307***
(0.000) (0.000)
Year FE X X X X
IPC 3 FE X X X X
Adjusted R2 0.067 0.120 0.086 0.118
Within R2 0.015 0.027 0.005 0.004
Observations 1,402,076 1,402,076 431,894 431,894
Note: *: p<0.1, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. P-values from standard errors clustered at the filing year level in
parenthesis.
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TABLE 2.A.9: CITATIONS, PRIVATE VALUE AND IPC 3 SCORE: WITHOUT IT
(1) (2) (3) (4)
10-year citations Log(1+10-year citations) Private value Log(private value)
IPC 3 score, std. 2.499*** -3.452***
(0.000) (0.001)
Log(IPC 3 score) 1.595*** -0.764***
(0.000) (0.000)
Year FE X X X X
IPC 3 FE X X X X
Adjusted R2 0.072 0.125 0.081 0.116
Within R2 0.022 0.031 0.002 0.002
Observations 1,260,360 1,260,360 400,019 400,019
Note: *: p<0.1, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. P-values from standard errors clustered at the filing year level in
parenthesis.
TABLE 2.A.10: CITATIONS, PRIVATE VALUE AND WIDENING SCORE: WITHOUT IT
(1) (2) (3) (4)
10-year citations Log(1+10-year citations) Private value Log(private value)
Widening score, std. 2.553*** -0.996
(0.000) (0.224)
Log(widening score) 8.388*** -0.827
(0.000) (0.101)
Year FE X X X X
IPC 3 FE X X X X
Adjusted R2 0.071 0.120 0.081 0.114
Within R2 0.020 0.027 0.000 0.000
Observations 1,402,076 1,402,076 431,894 431,894
Note: *: p<0.1, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. P-values from standard errors clustered at the filing year level in
parenthesis.
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TABLE 2.A.11: RETURN TO PATENTS CONTAINING IMPROVEMENT-RELATED WORDS
Mean Median Mean Median
N Length cites cites N Length cites cites
Whole sample period: 1985-2008
Hihger-innovation fields Lower-innovation fields
No key words 2,123,967 897.95 10.39 4 848,199 1,069.22 5.60 3
Key words 37,514 1,795.18 12.56 5 20,375 2,336.94 7.61 4
% change 20.89 25 35.82 33.33
Earlier years: 1985-1995
Hihger-innovation fields Lower-innovation fields
No key words 505,670 879.40 10.35 6 330,515 1,085.08 5.64 3
Key words 7,535 2,019.98 12.99 7 7,320 2,130.46 7.84 5
% change 25.41 16.67 39.03 66.67
Later years: 1996-2008
Hihger-innovation fields Lower-innovation fields
No key words 1,618,297 904.07 10.40 4 517,684 1,058.72 5.58 2
Key words 29,979 1,738.68 12.45 4 13,055 2,452.71 7.48 3
% change 19.74 0 34.07 50
Note: mean and meadian 10-year citations by innovation field groups (higher- versus lower-innovation
IPC 3 fields ranked by their average widening score over the sample priod) for patents containing at least
5 key words signalling improvement versus other patents. The key words are: advance, advances, en-
hance, enhances, improve, improves, refine, refines, substitute and substitutes. Column N is the number
of patents per group and Length is the average number of words in an abstract.
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Appendix 2.B Additional figures
FIGURE 2.B.1: NUMBER OF PATENTS OVER TIME
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(b) Score and firm coverage
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Note: panel (a): number of patents filed and granted per year. Panel (b) number of patents for which
a score is available, and that can be linked to firms in Compustat using the matches by Stoffman et al.
(2019).
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FIGURE 2.B.2: NEIGHBOURHOOD COMPOSITION BY IPC 1
(A) IPC distributions in patent neighbourhoods 1976 - 1985
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40.42 18.73 16.61 1.46 3.49 7.29 7.34 4.66
11.23 46.55 9.99 2.41 3.81 10.82 9.02 6.17
13.56 10.75 65.69 1.04 0.81 1.97 3.48 2.70
12.92 28.42 11.61 24.25 3.00 7.40 8.51 3.90
14.93 27.49 5.51 1.23 23.04 15.03 7.20 5.56
8.88 20.21 2.94 0.97 3.99 50.17 7.17 5.67
6.21 12.78 4.52 0.73 1.46 4.90 53.06 16.36
4.36 8.51 3.20 0.48 1.42 3.94 17.71 60.38
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(B) IPC distributions in patent neighbourhoods 2006 - 2015
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IPC 1 codes of patents in its neighbourhood
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49.75 11.33 12.28 0.50 2.46 4.65 12.65 6.38
11.21 43.34 7.78 0.99 3.60 9.69 13.72 9.67
19.53 9.49 55.46 0.55 0.89 1.64 6.05 6.40
13.13 23.50 9.92 23.55 3.10 6.84 12.88 7.07
15.85 23.10 4.87 0.63 23.46 13.32 10.46 8.31
8.39 17.10 2.11 0.38 3.85 48.23 11.28 8.66
3.97 4.72 1.71 0.13 0.63 2.15 65.89 20.81
2.49 4.10 1.67 0.12 0.64 2.01 21.95 67.02
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Note: for a patent belonging to the IPC 1 code in reach row, a cell contains the average share of its 100
closest neighbouring patents by IPC 1 code. Each row sums up to 100. Panel (A) is based on patents filed
in the years 1976-1985 and panel (B) on patents filed in 2006-2015.
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FIGURE 2.B.3: WORD CONTENT OF FIELD-SPECIFIC CENTROID OF “H04: ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION
TECHNIQUE”
(A) Words in 1976 to 1985 H04 IPC centroid
(B) Words in 2006 to 2015 H04 IPC centroid
Note: the size of a word is proportional to its frequency. Words frequencies are obtained by averaging
columns of the dtm over the subset of rows corresponding to the patents of interest: in panel (A), patents
filed in 1976-1985 in IPC 3 H04; in panel (B), patents filed in 2006-2015 in IPC 3 H04.
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FIGURE 2.B.4: WORD CONTENT OF FIELD-SPECIFIC CENTROID OF “C01: INORGANIC CHEMISTRY”
(A) Words in 1976 to 1985 C01 IPC centroid
(B) Words in 2006 to 2015 C01 IPC centroid
Note: the size of a word is proportional to its frequency. Words frequencies are obtained by averaging
columns of the dtm over the subset of rows corresponding to the patents of interest: in panel (A), patents
filed in 1976-1985 in IPC 3 C01; in panel (B), patents filed in 2006-2015 in IPC 3 C01.
FIGURE 2.B.5: BACKWARD VERSUS FORWARD SIMILARITIES
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(c) Widening score
Note: scatter plots of backward and forward similarities for each score type: macro, IPC3 and widening.
Each dot is a patent.
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FIGURE 2.B.6: CORRELOGRAM OF SCORES
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Note: the histograms of the scores are displayed on the diagonal, and scatter plots of scores against each
other are displayed off the diagronal. Each dot is a patent.
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FIGURE 2.B.7: MACRO SCORES VERSUS CITATIONS
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Note: binned scatter of scores against 10-year forward citations, with varying number of bins. Each dot
is a patent.
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FIGURE 2.B.8: IPC 3 SCORES VERSUS CITATIONS
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Note: binned scatter of scores against 10-year forward citations, with varying number of bins. Each dot
is a patent.
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FIGURE 2.B.9: WIDENING SCORES VERSUS CITATIONS
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Note: binned scatter of scores against 10-year forward citations, with varying number of bins. Each dot
is a patent.
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FIGURE 2.B.10: SCATTER PLOTS OF SCORES AGAINST CITATIONS: RAW DATA
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Note: scatter plots of 10-year citations against scores. The histograms of each variables are displayed on
the outside of the boxes. Each dot is a patent.
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FIGURE 2.B.11: TOP MACRO PATENTS AND FIRMS DYNAMICS: CUMULATIVE GROWTH RATES
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Note: estimates from equation (2.4) with alternative definition of growth rate using the macro score to
qualify top patents. Dependent variable is log Yf i,t+h − log Yf i,t, i.e. the growth rate of the outcome value
between time 0 and h. 95% confidence intervals are depicted. The coefficient is the growth rate between
year t+ h and t using t as the base year, so for negative h a negative coefficient implies a positive growth
rate between t + h and t.
FIGURE 2.B.12: TOP IPC 3 PATENTS AND FIRMS DYNAMICS: CUMULATIVE GROWTH RATES
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Note: estimates from equation (2.4) with alternative definition of growth rate using the IPC 3 score to
qualify top patents. Dependent variable is log Yf i,t+h − log Yf i,t, i.e. the growth rate of the outcome value
between time 0 and h. 95% confidence intervals are depicted. The coefficient is the growth rate between
year t+ h and t using t as the base year, so for negative h a negative coefficient implies a positive growth
rate between t + h and t.
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FIGURE 2.B.13: WIDENING PATENTS AND FIRMS DYNAMICS: CUMULATIVE GROWTH RATES
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Note: estimates from equation (2.4) with alternative definition of growth rate using the widening score
to qualify top patents. Dependent variable is log Yf i,t+h − log Yf i,t, i.e. the growth rate of the outcome
value between time 0 and h. 95% confidence intervals are depicted. The coefficient is the growth rate
between year t+ h and t using t as the base year, so for negative h a negative coefficient implies a positive
growth rate between t + h and t.
FIGURE 2.B.14: TOP MACRO PATENTS AND FIRMS DYNAMICS: WITHOUT IT
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Note: estimates from equation (2.4) using the macro score to qualify top patents. 95% confidence intervals
are depicted. The coefficient is the growth rate between year t + h and t using t as the base year, so for
negative h a negative coefficient implies a positive growth rate between t+ h and t. The sample excludes
patents from IPC 1 codes G and H.
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FIGURE 2.B.15: TOP IPC 3 PATENTS AND FIRMS DYNAMICS: WITHOUT IT
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Note: estimates from equation (2.4) using the IPC 3 score to qualify top patents. 95% confidence intervals
are depicted. The coefficient is the growth rate between year t + h and t using t as the base year, so for
negative h a negative coefficient implies a positive growth rate between t+ h and t. The sample excludes
patents from IPC 1 codes G and H.
FIGURE 2.B.16: TOP WIDENING PATENTS AND FIRMS DYNAMICS: WITHOUT IT
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Note: estimates from equation (2.4) using the widening score to qualify top patents. 95% confidence
intervals are depicted. The coefficient is the growth rate between year t+ h and t using t as the base year,
so for negative h a negative coefficient implies a positive growth rate between t + h and t. The sample
excludes patents from IPC 1 codes G and H.
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FIGURE 2.B.17: TOP PRIVATE VALUE PATENTS AND FIRMS DYNAMICS
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Note: estimates from equation (2.4) using private value from Stoffman et al. (2019) to qualify top patents.
A top patent is one in the top 5% of the private value distribution (controlling for year fixed effects). 95%
confidence intervals are depicted. The coefficient is the growth rate between year t + h and t using t as
the base year, so for negative h a negative coefficient implies a positive growth rate between t + h and t.
FIGURE 2.B.18: TOP PATENTS IN TERMS OF CITATIONS AND FIRMS DYNAMICS
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Note: estimates from equation (2.4) using citations at the 10-year horizon to qualify top patents. A
top patent is one in the top 0.1% of the citations distribution (controlling for year fixed effects). 95%
confidence intervals are depicted. The coefficient is the growth rate between year t + h and t using t as
the base year, so for negative h a negative coefficient implies a positive growth rate between t + h and t.
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FIGURE 2.B.19: MACRO SCORES
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0.9684 0.9725 0.9410 0.9545 0.9394 0.9265 1.1195 1.0794
0.9690 0.9627 0.9433 0.9425 0.9335 0.9139 1.1203 1.0843
0.9609 0.9540 0.9301 0.9307 0.9235 0.9045 1.1253 1.0959
0.9524 0.9454 0.9187 0.9137 0.9156 0.8952 1.1278 1.1066
0.9419 0.9372 0.9051 0.9034 0.9096 0.8890 1.1226 1.1130
0.9355 0.9280 0.8903 0.8991 0.9023 0.8836 1.1215 1.1242
0.9270 0.9200 0.8860 0.8922 0.8976 0.8789 1.1206 1.1280
0.9213 0.9159 0.8749 0.8793 0.8883 0.8781 1.1235 1.1314
0.9153 0.9094 0.8725 0.8666 0.8895 0.8787 1.1275 1.1334
0.9103 0.9073 0.8743 0.8552 0.8864 0.8782 1.1272 1.1349
0.8953 0.9088 0.8523 0.8415 0.8913 0.8854 1.1363 1.1374
0.8885 0.9079 0.8298 0.8398 0.8917 0.8906 1.1320 1.1306
0.8832 0.9090 0.8286 0.8462 0.8923 0.8963 1.1212 1.1127
0.8836 0.9071 0.8228 0.8424 0.8929 0.9019 1.1139 1.0972
0.8871 0.9067 0.8233 0.8420 0.8935 0.9050 1.1064 1.0814
0.8991 0.9111 0.8420 0.8542 0.8964 0.9132 1.0997 1.0680
0.9063 0.9125 0.8428 0.8803 0.9006 0.9167 1.0850 1.0562
0.9039 0.9126 0.8336 0.8661 0.9037 0.9186 1.0713 1.0462
0.9094 0.9151 0.8351 0.8929 0.9042 0.9189 1.0668 1.0396
0.9155 0.9182 0.8418 0.8851 0.9103 0.9228 1.0631 1.0361
0.9235 0.9206 0.8499 0.9090 0.9120 0.9239 1.0565 1.0331
0.9248 0.9236 0.8528 0.9185 0.9197 0.9284 1.0508 1.0288
0.9272 0.9300 0.8587 0.9198 0.9282 0.9323 1.0425 1.0254
0.9307 0.9394 0.8684 0.9294 0.9385 0.9380 1.0355 1.0207
0.84
0.90
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Note: each cell is the average macro score, by year and IPC section (IPC 1). Cells are colored such that
higher values have hotter colors
FIGURE 2.B.20: IPC 3 SCORES
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1.0250 0.9967 1.0003 1.0234 1.0013 1.0033 1.0007 0.9831
1.0211 0.9940 0.9995 1.0161 0.9987 1.0023 0.9958 0.9774
1.0259 0.9916 0.9984 1.0078 0.9962 1.0005 0.9967 0.9755
1.0231 0.9905 0.9988 0.9776 0.9971 0.9988 0.9949 0.9745
1.0190 0.9929 0.9977 0.9798 0.9950 0.9961 0.9911 0.9700
1.0144 0.9945 0.9949 0.9972 0.9922 0.9956 0.9950 0.9778
1.0132 0.9943 0.9959 1.0057 0.9901 0.9974 0.9964 0.9788
1.0115 0.9934 0.9965 1.0007 0.9876 0.9989 0.9944 0.9826
1.0087 0.9925 0.9991 0.9793 0.9936 0.9996 0.9959 0.9861
1.0111 0.9915 1.0011 0.9775 0.9948 0.9991 0.9955 0.9919
1.0093 0.9901 0.9990 0.9786 0.9925 0.9978 1.0063 1.0000
0.9992 0.9906 0.9889 0.9910 0.9899 0.9977 1.0084 1.0022
0.9919 0.9910 0.9858 0.9630 0.9906 0.9983 1.0104 0.9976
0.9915 0.9898 0.9802 0.9492 0.9921 0.9985 1.0131 0.9964
0.9963 0.9903 0.9878 0.9220 0.9937 0.9996 1.0107 0.9938
1.0073 0.9926 1.0124 0.8867 0.9922 0.9987 1.0128 0.9933
1.0080 0.9917 1.0210 0.9123 0.9966 1.0028 1.0062 0.9917
1.0026 0.9929 1.0155 0.8940 1.0014 1.0040 0.9986 0.9887
1.0067 0.9965 1.0170 0.9938 1.0008 1.0044 0.9958 0.9863
1.0055 0.9989 1.0145 0.9627 1.0003 1.0124 0.9965 0.9856
1.0066 0.9999 1.0107 1.0083 1.0006 1.0079 0.9961 0.9861
1.0080 0.9996 1.0059 0.9864 0.9998 1.0099 0.9970 0.9843
1.0073 1.0004 1.0042 0.9761 0.9983 1.0089 0.9965 0.9846
1.0069 1.0010 1.0017 0.9915 0.9964 1.0086 0.9978 0.9858
0.960
0.975
0.990
1.005
1.020
Note: each cell is the average IPC 3 score, by year and IPC section (IPC 1). Cells are colored such that
higher values have hotter colors
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FIGURE 2.B.21: OBSERVATIONS (TOTAL: 2, 745, 260)
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5438 11207 9149 203 1268 5022 10880 9079
5888 11913 8941 181 1328 5050 11525 9693
6567 12732 9501 170 1313 5414 12839 10197
7094 13915 10548 212 1297 5787 14517 11838
7452 14333 11185 200 1423 6074 15897 13168
7820 14880 11418 214 1435 6291 16287 13697
7950 14917 11183 199 1430 6202 17068 14906
8892 14983 11755 228 1343 6321 17960 15657
9802 15207 11799 222 1320 6214 18538 16071
11744 15950 12883 280 1290 6373 22546 19247
13938 17470 14955 310 1368 6795 26288 22211
12698 18203 12789 308 1447 7338 30300 25889
14954 20590 14850 307 1722 8013 35932 31116
14763 20112 13490 320 1882 8096 36554 32681
16485 20562 14621 251 1873 8503 39477 35594
17545 22080 15806 248 1971 9282 45446 38162
18171 23782 17156 300 2194 10411 50263 41543
17553 23302 15254 280 2328 10507 50201 42187
16183 21760 12681 201 2173 9616 50286 40868
15276 20477 11625 208 2112 9601 52850 42460
15345 20211 11164 213 1910 9643 55358 44699
16355 19649 11447 260 2034 9340 56942 47002
16833 19994 11548 206 2133 9717 60158 47869
16915 20637 11573 261 2538 9988 62016 48938
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Note: each cell is the total number of patents filed, by year and IPC section (IPC 1). Cells are colored
such that higher values have hotter colors
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FIGURE 2.B.22: TRENDS BY IPC 1 — PATENTS LINKED TO FIRMS
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Note: panel (a): average backward neighbourhood similarity by IPC 1 over time; panel (b): average
forward neighbourhood similarity by IPC 1 over time; panel (c): average widening score by IPC 1 over
time; panel (d): number of patents filed by IPC 1 over time; panel (e): firms’ R&D expenditure in each
IPC 1 field; panel (f): patents per dollar of R&D expenditure (contemporaneous). Sample: patents linked
to Compustat firms. The shaded area corresponds to years in which a decrease in the number of patents
filed by Compustat firms is observed, yet it is unclear whether this decrease is due to fewer patent-firm
matches or to an actual decrease in filing. R&D expenditures at the firm level are allocated to IPC 1 fields
based on the fraction of patents filed in each field in the 10 following years.
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FIGURE 2.B.23: TRENDS BY IPC 3 GROUP — PATENTS LINKED TO FIRMS
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Note: panel (a): average backward neighbourhood similarity by IPC 3 group over time; panel (b): aver-
age forward neighbourhood similarity by IPC group over time; panel (c): average widening score by IPC
3 group over time; panel (d): number of patents filed by IPC 3 group over time; panel (e): firms’ R&D
expenditure in each IPC group; panel (f): patents per dollar of R&D expenditure (contemporaneous).
Sample: patents linked to Compustat firms. The shaded area corresponds to years in which a decrease
in the number of patents filed by Compustat firms is observed, yet it is unclear whether this decrease is
due to fewer patent-firm matches or to an actual decrease in filing R&D expenditures at the firm level
are allocated to IPC 1 fields based on the fraction of patents filed in each field in the 10 following years.
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Chapter 3
Cross-border Value Added Tax
Fraud In The European Union
3.1 Introduction
Value Added Tax (VAT) is an important source of revenues in the European Union
(EU). In 2018, VAT revenues accounted for 17.4% of total tax revenues of Member
States and for more than half of revenues from taxes on production and imports.1
Every year, Member States experience large losses in VAT revenues to fraud and non-
compliance. Official statistics by the European Commission indicate that EUR 137.5
billion in potential VAT revenues were lost in 2017, about 11% of the theoretical tax
liability (Poniatowski et al., 2019).
This paper studies the effects of a reform of the EU VAT rules that removes the
possibility for firms to engage in a set of well-known fraudulent schemes. These
fraud strategies exploit a weakness in the way within-EU cross-border transactions are
treated for VAT purposes, which allows fraudsters to collect VAT without rightfully re-
mitting it to the tax authorities. Crucially, international trade flows are misreported as
a direct consequence of these fraudulent manoeuvres. This paper proposes a quantifi-
cation of the amount of fraud the reform eliminates by tracking discrepancies between
trade statistics reported by importing and exporting countries around the reform time.
This is an important question in the EU policy circles (European Commission, 2018)
and the present exercise is indirectly informative of the levels of VAT fraud prevailing
in the EU.2
1Source: Eurostat, database gov 10a taxag.
2European Commission (2018, p. 5) relates that “A short survey was sent to all Member States to
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The fraud schemes studied in this paper exploit two features of the VAT system
(de la Feria, 2019). First, cross-border transactions are subject to the Reverse Charge
Mechanism which shifts the liability of the tax from the seller onto the buyer. In other
words, whereas the seller normally charges VAT on its sale and remits it to the taxman,
it is the responsibility of the buyer to pay VAT on its purchase to its own national
tax authorities under the Reverse Charge Mechanism — exports are zero-rated and
imports are subject to domestic VAT. This is consistent with the destination principle:
goods are taxed in the country where they are sold.3 Second, the absence of customs
between EU countries removes the ability to collect VAT at the border, shifting instead
the duty to report to the buyer and resulting in a time lag between the time at which
the transaction takes place and that of taxation.
I consider three types of fraud enabled by these features. First, Missing Trader
Intra-Community (MTIC) fraud, in which a firm imports goods from another Member
State and sells it domestically, collecting VAT on the sale. The firm then disappears
without remitting the VAT from its sale and without having paid VAT on its import.4
This scheme is mostly run by criminal organisations and is believed to cause govern-
ments large revenue losses. Second, domestic sales being falsely reported as exports,
which are VAT-free. The fraudster pockets the VAT on its domestic sales as the author-
ities do not expect to collect any VAT on exports. Third, imports reported as domestic
purchases: since VAT is rebated on purchases (irrespective of the origin) but it has not
been paid on imports at the time of transaction, disguising imports as domestic pur-
chases allows the firm to benefit from a rebate for VAT it has never paid. Each of these
fraud schemes results in misreported trade flows.5
The reform allows Member States to impose the Reverse Charge Mechanism on
domestic transactions of selected goods, rendering all fraud schemes above ineffective.
MTIC fraud is removed as firms cannot charge VAT to their customers anymore and
therefore become unable to run away with any taxed amounts. Disguising domestic
sales as exports is not profitable anymore since VAT cannot be charged to customers
enquire about their experiences with estimating VAT fraud and/or Missing Trader Intra-Community
(MTIC) fraud. The results showed that there is little experience in estimating the size of these types of
fraud.”
3The destination principles applies to most international transactions in most countries.
4The key difference between MTIC fraud and misreporting sales of goods sourced domestically is the
fact that firms dodge the payment of VAT on imports whereas it is much harder to do so for domestic
purchases. In MTIC schemes, the fraudsters gain VAT on whole the sale value and not only on the value
added. More details are given in section 3.3.2.
5Formally, imports and exports within the EU are called arrivals and dispatches, respectively. I use
imports and exports throughout the paper for simplicity.
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irrespective of their country of establishment. Last, the gain from misrepresenting
imports as domestic purchases vanishes since purchasers are also liable for VAT on
their purchases made domestically.
I collected data on 54 instances of implementation of the Domestic Reverse Charge
Mechanism (henceforth abbreviated as DRCM) spanning different goods across 24
Member States over years 2004-2019. To measure the effect of the reform on fraud,
I exploit an empirical strategy originally used in the literature on tariff evasion in
international trade (Fisman and Wei, 2004). In trade statistics, each trade flow is
reported twice: once by the exporter as an export, and once by the importer as an im-
port. The difference between these reported figures (reported exports minus reported
imports) is defined as a reporting gap. When the reporting incentive changes for one
side — e.g. because the level of tariff changes, inducing importers to lower their
reported imports to pay less tariff — but remains constant for the trading partner,
the reporting gap changes as a result. Identification of fraud therefore relies on the
reaction of the reporting gaps — computed using aggregate trade flows between
countries at the 8-digit product level — to the implementation of the DRCM, which
changes the reporting incentives of the fraudsters located in the country of reform. I
use a difference-in-difference approach comparing the reporting gaps associated with
the goods to which the DRCM applies (treated) to those to which it does not (control)
within a narrowly defined time window around the reform date.
This exercise presents challenges that I discuss at length in the text. Perhaps the
most important one is the fact that goods to which the DRCM is applied are selected
based on suspicion of high levels of fraud, i.e. the assignment is not random. In that
sense, the inferred level of fraud must be understood as that prevailing for these goods
at the time of reform, and cannot be taken as a precise estimate of the importance of
VAT fraud in the EU.
I find that in the months following the reform, the reporting gaps associated with
treated goods imported by the reform country decrease by around 3% on average rel-
ative to goods not subject to the DRCM. In other words, reported imports increase
relative to reported exports. This is consistent with the removal of MTIC fraud and of
the fraudulent disguise of imports as domestic purchases. The reporting gaps associ-
ated with treated goods exported by the reform country are not impacted at the time of
reform. This suggests that fraud involving mis-classification of domestic sales as ex-
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port is quantitatively less important. This is consistent with the view that MTIC-type
schemes are the most important type of cross-border VAT fraud (Lamensch and Ceci,
2018).
There is considerable heterogeneity in the effects of the reform across the 54
episodes. In some instances, the reporting gaps associated with imported goods
that are treated decrease by as much as 63%. In other rarer cases, the reporting gaps
significantly increase in contradiction to all predictions. The inferred magnitudes of
fraud prevailing pre-reform (as measured by the change in the reporting gaps) appear
to be larger in countries with higher values of the VAT rate, corruption levels and
VAT non-compliance, as well as in countries with less efficient customs. I do not find
evidence of fraud shifting to other goods that are not subject to the DRCM.
I compute pre-reform fraud amounts based on the reaction of the reporting gaps
at the time of reform and trade volumes of the treated products. I find that these
figures are very sensitive to whether I use the average treatment effect across events
or event-specific estimates. Summing across all events, estimated fraud in the year
leading to the reform ranges from EUR 610 million to EUR 1.6 billion. Irrespective of
the choice of parameters underlying these calculations, fraud removed by the reform
is tiny compared to VAT revenues (0.06%-0.2% on average). This is surprisingly low
in light of all the efforts undertaken by the EU to fight this type of VAT fraud.
Relation to the literature This paper contributes to the literature concerned with
estimating VAT fraud, focusing on specific schemes that involve misreporting of cross-
border transactions. Keen and Smith (2006) provide a review of known VAT schemes.
Gradeva (2014) shows a correlation between VAT rate in the importing country and
reporting gaps in the EU which she interprets as evidence of MTIC fraud, as the gains
from fraud are proportional to the VAT rate. Benzarti and Tazhitdinova (2019) suggest
that trade flows (i.e. real activity) do not appear to react to changes in VAT rates in
the EU, concluding that VAT appear not to distort trade. Based on the reporting gap
method also used in this paper, Ferrantino et al. (2012) show that in the case of China
— which does not systematically fully rebates VAT on exports, unlike in the EU —
traders under-report their exports to evade VAT.
Besides fraud involving cross-border transactions, VAT fraud attracted attention
as this tax is believed to be self-enforcing in nature since buyers have an incentive to
ask for receipts and report their purchases in order to get VAT refunds, which entails
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a paper trail. Pomeranz (2015) demonstrates that this paper trail has considerable
enforcement power when combined with deterrence measures that incentivise firms
to report accurately — e.g. a threat of audit. However, the last transaction to the final
consumer is not subject to this self-enforcing mechanism. Naritomi (2019) studies
the effects of rewarding consumers for reporting their purchases and finds that firms
selling to final consumers increase their reported sales significantly in response. In the
EU, Hopland and Ullmann (2019) finds that restaurants in Germany evade VAT by
mis-classifying dine-in meals as take-away, the former being subject to the standard
rate whereas the latter benefits from a reduced rate.
Zı´dkova´ (2019) calculates the impact of one instance of the application of the
DRCM on the trade balance between Czech Republic and the rest of the EU and
interprets its decrease as evidence of MTIC fraud — assuming that MTIC-enabled
trade shifts to other goods or countries upon implementation of the DRCM. The
approach I take does not rely on trade balance data, but on the difference between
reported imports and exports induced by fraud. The two papers closest to the present
study are Stiller and Heinemann (2019) (in German) and CASE (2015) (in Polish).
They study how the reporting gaps react to the DRCM in specific instances of the
reform in Germany, Austria and Poland. My work differs from theirs in several
ways. First, I use data at the 8-digit level of the Combined Nomenclature without
aggregating trade flows, which allows more precision in both definition of the treated
goods and in estimation. Second, I study all instances (to the best of my knowledge)
in which the DRCM was applied.
This paper also build on studies that use reporting gaps to estimate tariff eva-
sion. The idea to compare values of the same trade flow reported independently by
the importing and exporting countries originates in the seminal work by Fisman and
Wei (2004). Using data on trade between China and Hong Kong, the authors found
evidence of tariff evasion by investigating the effect of changes in tariff rates on the re-
porting gaps in a cross-section of products. This approach was extensively used subse-
quently (see amongst others Mishra et al., 2008; Javorcik and Narciso, 2008; Stoyanov,
2012; Javorcik and Narciso, 2017; Kellenberg and Levinson, 2019; Levin and Widell,
2014; Farhad et al., 2018; Demir and Javorcik, 2020). In Bussy (2020), I use it to investi-
gate corporate income tax evasion.
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Structure of the paper Section 3.2 introduces the VAT rules in the EU. Fraud schemes
involving cross-border transactions and their relation to the Domestic Reverse Charge
Mechanism are explained in section 3.3. Section 3.4 lays out the theoretical link be-
tween the trade reporting gaps and cross-border VAT fraud. The data and the em-
pirical strategy are introduced in sections 3.5 and 3.6, respectively. Section 3.7 details
the results and section 3.8 concludes. Additional tables and figures, respectively ref-
erenced with prefixes 3.A and 3.B, can be found in appendices of the same name.
3.2 The Value Added Tax rules in the EU
In this section, I describe the VAT rules of the EU, and its details related to intra-
community trade, i.e. trade taking place between two Member States. A detailed
description of the VAT system in the EU is provided by Baldwin (2007). The VAT
legislation is stipulated in Council Directive 2006/112/EC (VAT Directive henceforth)
— and 77/388/EEC before 2006.
European Value Added Tax VAT is a type of consumption tax whose collection takes
place incrementally along the production stages. VAT generally applies to all trans-
actions in an economy: sellers charge VAT on their sales to buyers at every stage of
production. The seller can deduct VAT from its own business purchases, so that the
total VAT for which the seller is liable over a given period of time amounts to the VAT
charged to its consumer, minus the VAT paid on its own purchases. Since business
expenses are VAT-deductible, the tax base is aggregate consumption (Baldwin, 2007).
Importantly, firms along the production chain are liable for VAT on their value added,
but charge it to their customers. Ignoring the effects VAT can have on prices and the
administrative costs of accounting for it, a firm that can fully deduct VAT on its inputs
should be indifferent between living in an economy where VAT is in place, versus
one where it is not. In practice, almost all purchases can be accounted as business
purchases except expenses on luxuries, amusements or entertainment (art. 176 VAT
Directive).
One attractive feature of the VAT is the apparent ease of its implementation. The
tax authority does not chase after firms to collect the tax as buyers have an incentive to
ensure that the transaction is reported accurately, since VAT on their purchases can be
deducted from their final VAT liability. The effort in assessing the tax base is delegated
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from the tax authority to the buying firms. In practice, businesses are required to file
their VAT returns several times a year, stating their sales and purchases over the tax
period on the basis of which their VAT balance is determined.6
There may be several VAT rates in each country, and tax rates are currently not
harmonized across countries. In addition to the standard rate — which applies to
most products — each country can have up to two reduced rates that typically apply
to products of first necessity, such a foodstuff or medical equipment. At the time of
writing, the European Commission set a minimum standard rate of 15% and a mini-
mum lowest reduced rate of 5%, limits above which EU members are free to set their
national rates.
VAT on cross-border transactions It is important to distinguish between business-
to-business (B2B) and business-to-consumer (B2C) transactions in intra-community
cross-border trade. To qualify as B2B, the buying firm must be registered for VAT in
the destination country. B2B transactions account for most of trade in terms of vol-
umes and are subject to different rules than domestic transactions. Whereas domestic
transactions are all subject to the VAT and each seller charges VAT on its sales, exports
to a business located (and registered for VAT) in an another EU country are zero-rated
(i.e. the exporter does not charge VAT).7 The importer is liable for VAT on its imports
from another member state. This follows the so-called destination principle, whereby
the VAT is collected and kept by the country in which the goods are being sold — i.e.
where the goods are located after the sale. In other words, there is no VAT on exports,
but VAT is levied on imports. Because there are no customs, it is the responsibility of
the importer to declare the transaction in its VAT return and pay the tax in the des-
tination country at the rate applicable in that country. The shifting of the liability of
VAT from the seller to the buyer is called Reverse Charge Mechanism and it applies to all
within-EU international B2B transactions. The chain whereby VAT is systematically
charged on sales and remitted to the authorities by the seller is broken, potentially
leaving more scope for a variety of fraudulent schemes that I describe in section 3.3.
6The frequency at which VAT returns must be filed varies across countries. The EU VAT Directive
allows tax periods of one, two or three months. For instance, the tax period is 3 months in the UK.
7Sales to consumers that do not have a valid VAT registration number in the destination country
qualify as B2C. A firm selling to non-taxable consumers in another member state must register for VAT
in the destination country and charge VAT at the applicable national rate, unless its total sales fall below
a certain threshold (in which case it charges VAT at the rate applicable in its own country). This threshold
is called a threshold for distance selling and its value vary across countries. The current thresholds can be
found here (last accessed 19/05/2020).
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3.3 VAT fraud in the European Union
VAT Fraud in the European Union is a serious issue that results in large revenue losses
for governments. Fraud is difficult to measure due to its illegal nature and the most
common measure of losses due to non-compliance is the VAT Gap, defined as the dif-
ference between the theoretical and the actual VAT liabilities.8 It is available for all
Member States, and constitutes a guide to policy when it comes to EU legislation. In
2017, the VAT Gap in the EU-28 amounted to EUR 137 billion or 11.2% of the theo-
retical tax liability — i.e. the tax liability according to the tax law (Poniatowski et al.,
2019). Whilst the VAT Gap is small in some countries (e.g. ca. 0.6% in Cyprus and
Luxembourg), it is large in others and exceeds 30% in Romania and Greece. However,
fraud is only a fraction of the VAT Gap and its size is subject to intense debate, with
estimates ranging from EUR 20 to EUR 100 billion annually (European Commission,
2018). Other factors such as mistakes, bankruptcies and insolvencies preventing firms
from paying VAT are also contained in the VAT gap.
3.3.1 Types of VAT fraud
VAT fraud can take many forms. Keen and Smith (2006) and (European Commission,
2018) provide a comprehensive list of the known types of fraud on the VAT system.
The rallying feature of these schemes is that firms collect VAT and do not remit it fully,
or claim credit to which they are not entitled. One can generally divide fraud into two
categories. On the hand, classical fraud schemes that include under-reporting sales,
false claims for credit or refund, or credit claimed for VAT on non-business expenses
(for which refund is not available). Any firm can engage in that type of fraud in princi-
ple. On the other hand, organized VAT fraud run by criminal organizations involving
cross border transactions, that exploit weaknesses in the EU VAT system and that are
described in the next section.
3.3.2 The Reverse Charge Mechanism on cross-border transactions as an
enabler of fraud
The Reverse Charge Mechanism transfers the liability of the tax from the seller onto
the buyer. In practice, this means that for a given transaction the seller zero-rates the
8For a critique of these methods, see Keen and Slemrod (2017); Gemmell and Hasseldine (2014).
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sale (i.e. does not charge VAT) and the buyer owes VAT to the tax authorities. Since
firms can claim refunds on VAT paid on purchases, the buyer does not pay any VAT in
practice: the VAT owed is claimed back on the same form. The Reverse Charge Mech-
anism applies to transactions between Member States since the inception of the Single
Market.9 The absence of customs within the EU results in a second feature, namely the
fact that importers do not pay VAT when the goods clear customs but are responsible
for self-reporting their imports when their VAT return is due, i.e. with a time lag be-
tween the moments of purchase and reporting. The combination of these two features
resulted in the emergence of Missing Trader Intra-Community (MTIC) fraud (de la Fe-
ria, 2019, p. 173). The most basic incarnation of MTIC fraud involves a tax-registered
firm importing goods from another EU country (VAT-free), subsequently selling it do-
mestically (charging VAT) and disappearing before remitting the VAT collected from
its client. MTIC schemes are essentially an extreme version of sales under-reporting in
which no sales are reported. More sophisticated versions of the MTIC scheme exist, in-
volving buffer (legal) companies and repeating the fraud above in a loop. Sometimes,
the missing trader does not simply disappear but files for bankruptcy before remitting
VAT. For a comprehensive description of each scheme — which all have in common
that a firm goes missing before remitting the VAT is legally owed — see European
Commission (2018, pp. 9-14).
Besides fraud involving a missing trader, the Reverse Charge Mechanism on cross-
border transactions and the absence of customs give rise to two other fraud strategies.
First, firms may disguise domestic sales as intra-community supplies, allowing them
to charge VAT without remitting it to the tax authorities (since within-EU exports are
VAT-free). Second, firms may make false claims for refunds by importing goods from
another EU Member State — on which VAT is due domestically — and claiming, how-
ever, that the purchase was domestic — in which case they would have paid VAT to
the seller and would be entitled to a refund. Doing so allows them to pocket a re-
fund for a purchase on which they actually did not pay VAT. However, MTIC fraud is
believed to be quantitatively more important (Lamensch and Ceci, 2018).
9It applies to international transactions in almost all VAT systems around the world.
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3.3.3 The Reverse Charge Mechanism on domestic transactions as a solu-
tion to fraud
The European Commission has been aware of the possible fragility of the system since
its creation, and has been battling fraud ever since. One particular reform aiming at
stifling MTIC-type fraud is the extension of the reverse charge mechanism to selected
domestic transactions: by removing the ability of the missing trader to charge VAT on
its domestic sales, the fraudulent scheme is effectively neutralized (in theory at least)
as fraudsters cannot collect VAT anymore. The disguise of domestic transactions as
cross-border activity (and conversely) to unduly gain VAT monies also become inef-
fective.
The application of the DRCM to selected domestic supplies became progressively
available to Member States over time on a optional basis and subject to notification
to the European Commission. Importantly, Member States must subsequently file a
report on the apparent effectiveness of the measure. In other words, implementing
the DRCM is costly and endogenous to the level of fraud. The scope of products
eligible for DRCM widened over time, starting from construction work, supply of
waste and immovable property in 2006 (art. 199 of the VAT Directive) to trade in
emission permits in 2010 (art. 199a of the VAT Directive) and to a wider range of
goods including mobile telephones, game consoles, laptops, supplies of cereals and
raw and semi-finished metals in 2013 (modification of art. 199a of the VAT Directive).
The DRCM has also been granted to some countries for selected goods and services
on the basis of art. 395 of the VAT Directive (de la Feria, 2019).10 In some instances,
the DRCM is only imposed to transactions whose value exceed a threshold so as to
reduce the compliance and administrative costs to small businesses.
Whilst it effectively removes the ability of the missing trader to collect VAT (and
run away with it), the DRCM presents its own challenges that are currently heatedly
debated among lawmakers in the EU. The main problem is the removal of the chain
of incremental cross-checks and tax collection that make VAT so attractive (see section
3.2), transforming the VAT system into a Retail Sales Tax in which the tax is only col-
10Note that many of the supplies specified in art. 199 and 199a are services, and therefore beyond the
scope of the present study that only focuses on tradable goods. There are two other and more recent
legal bases for applying the DRCM. Since, 2013 art. 199b VAT Directive allows the quick application of
the DRCM “to combat sudden and massive fraud liable to lead to considerable and irreparable financial
losses”. Since, 2019 art. 199c VAT Directive allows the temporary application of a Generalized DRCM to
all domestic transactions.
183
lected at the last stage of the chain.11 Furthermore, MTIC fraud may be displaced to
other products that are not subject to the DRCM. The next section details the theoreti-
cal link between MTIC fraud and the trade reporting gaps.
3.4 VAT fraud and the reporting Gap
To measure the importance of pre-reform fraud, I propose to investigate how bilat-
eral trade asymmetries — i.e. the difference between reports of a given trade flow by
the exporting and the importing countries, that I denote reporting gaps — react to the
implementation of the DRCM. Intuitively, fraud schemes involving a missing trader
or disguising domestic transactions as cross-border trade will result in trade asymme-
tries. In a nutshell, the idea of the empirical exercise is to observe how trade asymme-
tries change once the ability to fraud is removed, and thereby estimate the importance
of fraud prevailing prior to the reform. In this section, I formally define the measure
of trade asymmetries and establish how they are expected to change in response to the
DRCM.
3.4.1 The reporting gaps
The reporting gaps are constructed using mirror statistics, i.e. information on the same
gross flow that is reported twice: once by the importer (as an import) and once by the
exporter (as an export). The gaps are computed in terms of value and quantities.
Formally:
X gaplogiepym = log(exports X
e
ipym)− log(imports Xiepym), (3.1)
where X ∈ {value, quantity}, i denotes the importing country, e denotes the exporting
country, p the product and y and m refer to the year and month of observation. The
superscripts denote who reports the trade flow and subscripts designate the trade
partner. The reporting gaps as calculated in (3.1) can be read as the size of the gap
expressed in terms of the value of reported imports. In Bussy (2020), I describe at
length what factors may influence the reporting gaps and this discussion is largely
relegated there, except for specifics relevant to the current study.
11Naritomi (2019) shows that evasion appears to be particularly important at the last stage of the chain.
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3.4.2 Theoretical relationship between VAT fraud and the reporting gaps
Any type of fraud scheme whereby one side has an incentive to report a transaction
whereas the other does not will result in a disparity in trade reports and therefore in
the reporting gaps. I consider in turn the three types of fraud introduced in section
3.3.2 focusing on their effect on the reporting gaps and how the DRCM affects this re-
lationship. I explicitly derive testable predictions that will be empirically investigated.
3.4.2.1 Missing trader fraud
An illustration of the most basic incarnation of this fraud can be found in figure 3.B.1.
The importer purchases supplies from abroad and sells them on domestically, charg-
ing VAT, and disappears before remitting VAT to the authorities. As a result, the trans-
action is reported on the exporter’s side, but not on the importer’s side. This results in
an increase in the reporting gap as defined in (3.1). Once the DRCM is implemented,
it is not possible for the importer to charge VAT to the local firm anymore. As MTIC-
related transactions stop, the reporting gap are predicted to decrease — reported im-
ports remain unchanged since the missing trader never reported, and reported exports
decrease.
Prediction 1. Upon implementation of the DRCM in the importing country, the reporting
gaps associated to those products subject to it decrease.
Another prediction immediately follows: MTIC fraud may be displaced to other
products which have similar characteristics. Typically, MTIC fraud is concentrated
among high-value and low-weight/volume products - such as precious metals, com-
puter chips and laptops.
Prediction 2. As MTIC fraud is displaced to other products in response to the implementation
of the DRCM in the importing country, the reporting gaps associated with those products
increase.
3.4.2.2 Imports disguised as domestic purchases
In this type of fraud, firms import goods from another EU Member State, on which
VAT is due domestically and based on their own report. They claim, however, that
the purchase was domestic, in which case they would have paid VAT to the seller and
would be entitled to a refund. Doing so allows them to pocket a refund for a purchase
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on which they actually did not pay VAT at the time of purchase. An illustration is
provided in figure 3.B.2. This behaviour impacts the reporting gaps positively, as the
exporter reports truthfully whereas the importer does not report its imports. With the
DRCM in place, VAT on domestic purchases cannot be refunded, because these are
effectively treated as cross-border transactions: they report it, pay VAT on it and get
the refund simultaneously.
Prediction 3. When the DRCM is implemented in the importing country, firms become un-
able to unduly claim refunds by disguising imports as domestic purchases. They report their
imports truthfully and the reporting gaps decrease.
3.4.2.3 Domestic sales disguised as exports
Firms claim to make sales of goods to another EU member, which are VAT free. In
reality they sell the goods within their country, charging VAT and pocketing the VAT
amount instead of remitting it to the tax authorities. Figure 3.B.3 contains an illustra-
tion of this strategy. Since exports are artificially inflated whilst reported imports are
not impacted, the reporting gaps rise. With the DRCM in place, the firm pretending to
export cannot charge VAT domestically on the actual sale, and therefore cannot fraud
in this fashion.
Prediction 4. When the DRCM is implemented in the exporting country, firms cannot collect
VAT on domestic sales, eliminating the incentive to disguise them as exports and resulting in
a decrease in the reporting gaps.
3.4.3 Underlying assumptions
To summarize, the reporting gaps are expected to react unambiguously to the imple-
mentation of the DRCM both in the importing and exporting countries. Regarding
MTIC fraud, the underlying assumptions are that the missing trader does not report
its purchases, whereas the exporter does. In all variants of the MTIC scheme, the ex-
porter is either an honest firm or an accomplice that must look like as honest firm.
It is therefore reasonable to assume that it will dutifully report the transaction. Since
the missing trader disappears before filing its VAT return, it is very likely that the
transaction is not reported on that side of the reporting gaps.
However, not all firms are obliged to report their transactions for statistical pur-
poses. As explained in details in Bussy (2020, section 3.2.2), only firms whose volumes
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of imports and exports exceed specified thresholds report to a system called Intrastat,
on the basis of which official trade statistics are produced. These thresholds are set
such that 97% of total exports and 93% of total imports are accounted for, and given
the skewed distribution of firms’ size, many smaller firms are exempt from reporting.
In 2017, an average of 12.6% and 20.2% of VAT-registered traders were providers of
statistical information for imports and exports, respectively (Eurostat, 2017). If the ex-
porter is exempt from reporting, no discrepancy will appear in the reporting gaps as
neither side is reporting. In that sense, this empirical strategy may miss fraud perpe-
trated by smaller firms that do not show up in trade statistics.
3.5 Data
In this section, I describe the data on the DRCM events and on the reporting gaps.
The data on all DRCM events was hand-collected, mostly from national laws and Eu-
ropean Commission documents. Details can be found in appendix 3.C. Trade data
underlying the reporting gaps is from Eurostat.
3.5.1 Sample definition
I identified 54 instances — defined as a country and time — where the DRCM was
applied to selected products, denoted v = 1, . . . , 54. A list of the events can be found
in table 3.A.1: they span 24 EU countries and over the years 2004-2019. There are two
samples at a monthly frequency: the importer sample in which the treatment (i.e. the
implementation of the DRCM) takes place in the importing country, and the exporter
sample in which it takes place in the exporting country. They cover trade between the
country in which the reform takes place and its partners over a time window spanning
12 months before and after each event. A graphical representation can be found in
figure 3.B.4. The event time is denoted t ∈ [−A, B], where A = 12, B = 11 and the
event takes place at t = 0 by convention. An observation is a product p at the 8-digit
level of the Combined Nomenclature (CN), traded between importing country i and
exporting country e in event v at a given event time t. Note that each observation is
observed at a given calendar date (month and year ym).12 Overall, the samples contain
between 36 and 37 million observations and a summary of the relative (aggregated)
12There is a one-to-one mapping between event number-event time (vt) and calendar year-month (ym).
Therefore, an observation can be equivalently defined as eipym or eipvt.
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TABLE 3.1: OBSERVATIONS PER GROUP
Exporter sample Importer sample
With overlap Without overlap With overlap Without overlap
Group N # p N # p N # p N # p
Control 36,755,945 13,676 29,653,654 13,657 36,380,729 13,927 31,133,306 13,916
Treatment 266,177 971 176,654 856 274,433 1,056 189,376 971
Note: Number of observations and unique products (#p) for the control and treatment groups, summed
across all events. The treatment group is composed of observations to which the DRCM applies. This
table only contains observations where the reporting gap in terms of value is non-missing. The columns
without overlap refer to observations for which DRCM reforms do not overlap with each other over time
within a country.
sizes of the control and treatment groups can be found in table 3.1. Although there is
no perfect overlap of events within countries (in which case the events would count as
one), 13 out of the 54 events have a partial overlap with each other — i.e. the DRCM
was implemented several times within the same country less than 2 years apart. Last,
very few observations for which the DRCM was introduced and then abolished within
12 months of the introduction have been dropped from the sample.
3.5.2 Reporting gaps
The reporting gaps are defined at the CN 8-digit level — the finest grain available
from Eurostat — since the treatment is often defined at such a dis-aggregated level.13
Descriptive statistics of the reporting gaps can be found in table 3.2. The mean gap
hovers between 2% and 5% across samples, and can be extremely large. The positive
mean indicates that on average, reported exports exceed reported imports. This may
be due to the fact that Intrastat thresholds for reporting imports are generally higher
than in the case of exports (cf. section 3.5.3). Figure 3.B.5 displays the histograms of the
reporting gaps, as well as the mean and median gaps over months. As previously dis-
cussed in Bussy (2020), the gaps are strongly cyclical. For robustness, the regressions
are also estimated dropping the top and bottom percentiles of the reporting gaps.
3.5.3 Other data
Data on Intrastat thresholds was hand-collected and is freely available here (last ac-
cessed 19/05/2020). Data on the standard VAT rate, which applies to the vast majority
13For instance, when the DRCM applies to waste and scraps of metal, it may only target 8-digit prod-
ucts. As an illustration, waste and scrap of manganese is product code 8111 00 11 and the 6-digit code
8111 00 does not only cover waste and scrap, but other manganese products to which the DRCM does
not apply.
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TABLE 3.2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE REPORTING GAPS
Importer sample
N Mean Std Min 25% 50% 75% Max
Value gap, in log 36,655,162 0.04 1.93 -17.20 -0.58 0.02 0.76 17.20
Quantity gap, in log 32,652,504 0.05 2.10 -18.85 -0.69 0.01 0.87 19.14
Exporter sample
N Mean Std Min 25% 50% 75% Max
Value gap, in log 37,022,122 0.03 1.94 -16.41 -0.60 0.01 0.75 17.20
Quantity gap, in log 33,043,192 0.02 2.11 -18.15 -0.69 0.00 0.83 18.11
Note: The importer sample is that in which the events occur in the importing country, and the exporter
sample that in which the events occur in the exporting country.
of products, come from the European Commission. Data on the VAT gaps come from
Barbone et al. (2013) (for years 2000-2011), Poniatowski et al. (2018) (for 2012) and
Poniatowski et al. (2019) (for 2013-2017). The Burden of customs procedure and Efficiency
of customs indices describing customs quality are from the World Bank, and the Cor-
ruption index is provided by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).
3.6 Empirical strategy
In this section, I detail the regression equations that will be estimated, as well as dis-
cuss the underlying identification assumptions and threats thereto.
3.6.1 Regression equations
The general strategy is a difference-in-difference approach where the treatment is the
implementation of the DRCM. For each instances of the DRCM, treated products are
those to which the DRCM applies and the control group is composed of all the other
products to which the DRCM does not apply.
Static setup The static specification of the difference-in-difference regression is
Gapjt = γj + δt + βDjt + FE+ ejt, (3.2)
where the index j denotes a unit: a product p traded between importing country i
and exporting country e in event v, i.e. j ≡ (i, e, p, v). The dependent variable Gapjt
is a measure of the reporting gap. t ∈ [−A, B] denotes the event time, which spans
A periods before the treatment and B periods after the treatment. In most specifica-
tions, A = 12, B = 11 such that the event window spans 12 months on either side of
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the event time. γj and δt are unit and event time fixed effects, respectively. Djt is a
dummy that takes value 1 if observation j is subject to the DRCM at time t.14 FE is a
vector of fixed effects, which either include calendar time (ym), calendar time-product
(ymp), calendar time-importer and calendar time-exporter (ymi and yme), calendar
time-country pair (ymie) fixed effects. Event and calendar times differ because events
are scattered over time and across countries and products. Given the seasonality in
the reporting gaps, including calendar time fixed effects is desirable. In light of pre-
dictions 1, 3 and 4, βˆ — the estimate of β — is expected to be negative when (3.2) is
estimated off the importer or exporter samples.
Dynamic specification In order to check that the parallel pre-trend assumption
holds as well as study the dynamic effects of the treatment, a dynamic version of (3.2)
is estimated as follows:
Gapjt = γj + δt +
B
∑
k=−A
βkDkjt + FE+ ejt, (3.3)
where Dkjt = 1[t = ej + k] is a dummy indicating that the event took place k periods ago
— ej is the date at which unit j has been treated. The regression admits A leads (pre-
trends) and B lags (dynamic effects) of the treatment event dummy. βk = 0, ∀k < 0 is
the necessary condition to rule out differential pre-trends between treatment and con-
trol groups. In light of predictions 1, 3 and 4, the estimated dynamic effects βˆk, ∀k > 0
are expected to be negative when (3.3) is estimated off the importer or exporter sam-
ples.
3.6.2 Identification
First, I describe the typical timing of a DRCM reform and its implications for identifi-
cation. Second, I discuss the two main threats to identification in the empirical strategy
above: reverse causality and omitted variable bias.
Timing Art. 199 and 199a VAT Directive allow Member States to apply the DRCM
to specified good on a voluntary basis. Any implementation must be notified to the
European Commission. Since the DRCM reforms are subject to publication in the
national laws and therefore subject to political scrutiny that takes time, the reform
14The estimated β in (3.2) is the same as would be obtained by interacting dummies for the treatment
group and the post period, conditional on including j and t fixed effects.
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is not a surprise to fraudsters. I define the announcement date as the moment at
which the DRCM is passed into law — firms may know of the reform even before
that, as project of laws are made public before their final approval and publication.
On average, the DRCM reform was announced 70 days prior to its implementation
across all events. As a consequence, there is a possible anticipation bias if fraud ceases
before the actual reform date. Hence the importance of estimating equation (3.3), in
which one might detect this issue if one observes βˆk 6= 0 for k immediately before the
event time.15
Reverse causality Reverse causality concerns arise if fraud causes the implementa-
tion of the DRCM, which we know is precisely what happens in reality. There are two
dimensions of potential reverse causality in the present case. First, a cross-sectional
dimension: those products to which the application of the DRCM is legally permitted
are fraud-prone (art. 199 and 199a VAT Directive). Second, a time dimension: the
significant administrative costs associated with the application of the DRCM must be
justified by strong suspicions of fraud for it to be worth the while of Member States.
It is therefore possible that only when fraud becomes important enough over time do
countries implement the DRCM. The high frequency of the data allows to look within
a restricted time frame within which one can be confident that the reporting gaps
react to the DRCM and not the other way around, which should mitigate the time
dimension the reverse causality. However, since the DRCM applies to goods most
vulnerable to fraud, the estimated coefficients in regressions (3.2) and (3.3) can only
be interpreted as the effect of the DRCM in this fraud-prone environment. It is for
instance impossible to infer the size of cross-border VAT fraud in general from these
estimates.
Omitted variable bias As explained in Bussy (2020, section 3.2), the reporting gaps
encompass many factors unrelated to evasion or fraud, such as transportation costs —
that only appear in reported imports — and asymmetries in the Intrastat declaration
thresholds between the importing and the exporting countries — that can result in one
side declaring, whereas the other does not. Generally, the reporting gaps are functions
15The announcement date always falls within the event window. The earliest a DRCM reform was
announced was 254 days prior to implementation.
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of VAT fraud and other potentially confounding factors:
Gapjt = f (VAT fraudjt,χjt) (3.4)
where χjt denotes the components of the gap that do not pertain to VAT fraud. The
challenge of using the reporting gaps to identify VAT fraud becomes apparent in this
expression. Not controlling for the determinants of χjt in the regression would result
in an omitted variable bias, unless χjt is uncorrelated with Djt. Identification thus
relies on fixed effects and controls to account for the components of χjt that may be
correlated with the timing or scope of the reform.
Since treatment is at the level of a product-country pair-event (iepv), many fixed
effects can be included in the regressions in an attempt to control for potentially con-
founding elements of χjt. For instance, changes in the Intrastat reporting threshold
or in the corporate income tax rate in the exporting country, which are common to
all products, would be absorbed by an exporter-time (et) fixed effect. Besides, limiting
the study to a narrow time window around the event decreases the risk of unobserved
factors confounding the results.
Other factors There are two other factors that are likely to result in underestimating
MTIC fraud as measured by the reaction of the reporting gaps to the DRCM. First, as
mentioned in section 3.4.3, traders with lower annual trade volumes are not required
to report for statistical purposes. Although the levels of thresholds are controlled for
in regressions (via country-time fixed effects), the reporting gaps would not react to
the implementation of the DRCM if all exporters were exempted from reporting the
transaction associated with the fraud. While there is anecdotal evidence that some
MTIC fraud takes place in the form of smaller transactions to avoid detection, statis-
tical agencies have noticed discrepancies in reported trade. For instance, the HMRC
in the United Kingdom actually corrects aggregated trade statistics for MTIC activities
(HMRC, 2019).16 Furthermore, more evolved versions to the MTIC scheme involve
16HMRC (2019, p. 9) writes:
Because the recording of EU trade data is based on Intrastat declarations from VAT reg-
istered businesses, the way in which the fraudulent transactions are reported means that
any exports relating to the fraud are reported, but imports (arrivals) relating to the fraud
are not. As a consequence, UK import (arrival) statistics would be under reported without
an adjustment for MTIC.
The adjustment is made in division 99 of the CN classification, as part of the monthly non-response
estimate. The method used to estimate MTIC in the UK is confidential.
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a network of firms to which misreporting (at other stages than the missing trader)
would attract unwanted attention. In conclusion, in is likely that part of MTIC fraud
will be undetected in the reporting gaps.
Second, the application of the DRCM is sometimes limited to transactions whose
value exceed a certain threshold in order to minimize the compliance costs to small
businesses. If fraud took place in the form of very low volume transactions only the
DRCM would be ineffective. However, this threshold is typically low (≤ EUR 10,000),
uncommon — applied in 7 member states for selected goods as of 2014 (European
Commission, 2014) — and seems unlikely to be binding.
3.7 Results
In this section, I detail the results of the study, starting with a visual inspection of the
treatment effect in the raw data, followed by estimates of the difference-in-difference
exercise laid out in section 3.6. Last, I provide estimates of the level of fraud removed
by the DRCM.
3.7.1 Visual inspection
Predictions 1, 3 and 4 all imply a negative impact of the implementation of the DRCM
on the reporting gaps, irrespective of whether the reform takes place in the import-
ing country — which prevents MTIC schemes and profits from disguising imports as
domestic purchases — or in the exporting country — in which case misreporting do-
mestic sales as exports is not profitable anymore. Figures 3.B.6 to 3.B.10 and 3.B.11 to
3.B.15 plot the mean reporting gap (in terms of value) over time across products in the
treatment group (units j that are subject to the DRCM) and the control group (the rest
of the units) in the importer and exporter samples. Under the aforementioned predic-
tions, one would expect the mean gap in the treatment group to decrease relative to
that in the control group from the reform time onward.
These figures offer two main insights. First, it is not the case that the reporting
gaps systematically decrease after the DRCM is implemented. Although it clearly
does in some events (e.g. events 5, 31, 32, 42 or 45 when the DRCM is implemented
in the importing country), it is unclear in most instances and some events display the
opposite pattern (i.e. the gaps in the treatment group increase relative to the control
group, e.g. in events 17, 41 or 51 when the DRCM is implemented in the importing
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country). Second, the mean gap is considerably more volatile in the treatment group
relative to the control group. This is because there are much fewer observations in the
treatment group.
Tables 3.A.2 to 3.A.5 provide the number of observations and products in the treat-
ment groups, as well as the mean gap pre- and post-reform for each event separately
(when the reform takes place in the importing and exporting country). These tables
confirm that the control groups generally dwarf the treatment groups. The difference-
in-difference in reporting gap means (in value terms) is also provided — calculated
using the raw data.17 In 32 (31) out of 54 events in which the reform takes place in the
importing (exporting) country, the DiD estimate is negative. Although this represents
the majority of the cases, there is a significant fraction of events in which the report-
ing gaps associated with the treated products do not decrease relative to the control
group.
3.7.2 Baseline results
Static estimates Estimates of equation (3.2) in the importer and the exporter sam-
ples (i.e. when the DRCM takes place in the importing and the exporting country,
respectively) can be found in table 3.3. Columns (1) to (5) contain the estimates from
regressions with increasingly stringent sets of fixed effects.
Upon implementation of the DRCM in the importing country, the reporting gaps
experience a significant decrease of 2.5% to 3.5% depending on the fixed effects in-
cluded in the regressions.18 The coefficients are relatively stable across specifications,
suggesting that the fixed effects do not pick up significant confounding omitted vari-
ables. The number of observations in column (5) is lower as including ymkp fixed
effects restricts the sample to events that have a time overlap across countries, i.e. a
product (p) traded with partner country (k) at a given time (ym) must be observed
across more than one reform country (c). The results are consistent with predictions
1 and 3. On the one hand, the DRCM prevents MTIC fraud such that reported ex-
ports that were associated with the fraud disappear whilst reported imports remain
constant (as the missing trader never reported the imports), implying a decrease in the
reporting gaps. On the other hand, firms that disguised imports as domestic purchases
17The difference-in-difference (DiD) is calculated as DiD = (Gapcont.,pre − Gapcont.,post) −
(Gaptreat.,pre −Gaptreat.,post).
18The estimates of β are semi-elasticities in this case. The implementation of the DRCM is associated
with a 100β% change in the reporting gaps.
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TABLE 3.3: BASELINE STATIC DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE: VALUE GAP
Importer sample
Dependant variable: Value gap, log
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DRCM (Djt) -0.0349*** -0.0248** -0.0314*** -0.0302*** -0.0280**
(-3.51) (-2.07) (-3.15) (-3.03) (-2.22)
Adjusted R2 0.478 0.483 0.479 0.479 0.508
Within R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 36,115,872 35,957,790 36,115,854 36,115,584 29,952,923
Exporter sample
Dependant variable: Value gap, log
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DRCM (Djt) -0.0101 0.00272 -0.0102 -0.00990 -0.0102
(-1.14) (0.21) (-1.14) (-1.10) (-0.66)
Adjusted R2 0.484 0.491 0.485 0.485 0.502
Within R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 36,477,528 36,314,706 36,477,528 36,477,290 27,287,522
t, j FE X X X X X
ymp FE X
ymc FE X X
ymk FE X
ymck FE X
ymkp FE X
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. t-stats shown in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the
country pair level. Fixed effects (FE): event time (t), unit (j ≡ iepv) calendar time (ym), product (p),
country in which the reform takes place (c = i in the importer sample, and c = e in the exporting sample),
partner country (k = e in the importer sample, and k = i in the exporting sample). The dependent
variable is the reporting gap in terms of value, in logs as specified in expression (3.1).
to unduly pocket the VAT rebate cannot profit from this scheme anymore. Reported
imports increase as they report truthfully, lowering the reporting gaps. I attempt to
translate these point-wise elasticities into levels in section 3.7.4.
The implementation of the DRCM in the exporting country does not impact the
reporting gaps significantly. Point estimates suggest a decrease of the reporting gaps
of about 1%, but this effect is not precisely estimated. The negative impact on the
gaps is consistent with prediction 4: once the DRCM is applied, firms cannot benefit
from disguising domestic sales as exports, a strategy that previously allowed them to
collect VAT without remitting it to the authorities. Reported exports decrease and so
do the reporting gaps.
Overall, the results are consistent with the predictions. The fact that the effect of the
DRCM when implemented in the exporting country is smaller in magnitude and not
significant is also telling and consistent: not only are two types of frauds neutralized
when the DRCM is implemented in the importing country (MTIC fraud and disguised
imports), but it also is expected that MTIC fraud is the quantitatively most important
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FIGURE 3.1: BASELINE DYNAMIC DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE: VALUE GAP
(A) Importer sample
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Note: Sequences of βˆk from equation (3.3), estimated on the importer and exporter samples with the fol-
lowing fixed effects: j, t, ymc, ymkp. The coefficient in the period immediately preceding the implemen-
tation of the DRCM has been normalized to 0. 99%-, 95%- and 90%-confidence intervals are depicted in
different colour shades.
fraud Lamensch and Ceci (2018).
Dynamic estimates One concern with the estimates above is the potential existence
of differential pre-trends. For instance, if the reporting gaps associated with treated
products were on a downward trend over the whole event window (including prior
to the implementation of the DRCM), that would be picked up as a negative βˆ in
regression (3.2). However, this would be caused by differential pre-trends and not
by the DRCM intervention. Estimates of the series of βk in equation (3.3), with the
strictest set of fixed effects (y, t, ymc, ymkp), can be found in figure 3.1. First, the par-
allel pre-trend assumption does not appear to be violated in either sample, since none
of the βˆk, ∀k < 0 are significant. Second, while the RMC does not have any significant
impact when implemented in the exporting country, it appears to have a negative im-
pact in the months following its implementation in the importing country: all point
estimates of the dynamic effects are negative. These findings echo the results from
the static specification in table 3.3. However, only few dynamic effects post-DRCM
are significant, and it seems that they revert back towards zero after the 9th month
post-treatment, in contrast to the predicted permanent decrease in the reporting gaps.
These patterns are robust to the inclusion of all the combination of fixed effects listed
in table 3.3.
Summary and robustness checks Overall, the findings are in line with the predic-
tions from section 3.4, although they lack statistical significance in the dynamic spec-
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ification. The reporting gaps react negatively to the implementation of the DRCM
in the importing country, consistent with the elimination of MTIC fraud and imports
disguised as domestic purchases. When the DRCM is applied in the exporting coun-
try, the effect on the reporting gaps are negative although smaller and not significant.
This is also consistent with the supposition that fraudulent disguise of domestic sales
as exports is quantitatively less important than MTIC fraud.
The results are robust to balancing the sample (see table 3.A.6), to removing event
overlaps (see table 3.A.7), to dropping extreme values in terms of the reporting gaps
(see table 3.A.8) and to controlling for the levels of VAT main rates and Intrastat thresh-
olds in both countries (when the fixed effects allow, see table 3.A.9).19 Throughout
these additional specifications, the results are stable and the magnitudes of the effects
of the DRCM on the reporting gaps tend to be slightly larger than the baseline in table
3.3. Last, as shown in table 3.A.10, the results are robust to controlling for the imple-
mentation of the DRCM in the partner country — in table 3.3, this is only the case in
column (5) with the inclusion of ymkp fixed effects.20
3.7.3 Further findings
In this section, I provide a series of additional results based on specifications akin to
(3.2) and (3.3), but exploiting additional heterogeneity across countries or products.
3.7.3.1 Reported traded quantities also react to the DRCM
The predictions in section 3.4 should hold for the reporting gaps expressed in terms of
values as well as quantities, since for each fraud type the implementation of the DRCM
modifies the firms’ incentives to report whole transactions — unlike in the case of tariff
evasion where the traders may have an incentive to lie on the unit value as opposed
to the quantity, e.g. if the goods are differentiated and it is harder for customs to
determine the true price (Javorcik and Narciso, 2008). For instance in the case of MTIC
fraud, the DRCM removes the ability of the importer to carry out the fraud and all
the trade generated by the scheme prior to the reform is predicted to disappear post-
19A tiny fraction of products are not subject to the main rate, but to reduced rates. It is not easy to
know which products are subject to reduced rates as it varies from country to country and over time and
it is not systematically documented in terms of CN codes. However, since the vast majority of products
are subject to the main rate, ignoring this imprecision should not change the results.
20Controlling for reforms in the partner country is especially important since the set of products to
which the DRCM can be applied is identical across Member States, which increases the risk of a reform
affecting a trade flow simultaneously in the origin and destination countries.
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reform, affecting the trade value and traded quantities alike.21 The estimates from
regressions (3.2) and (3.3) using the reporting gaps in terms of quantities as dependent
variable can be found in table 3.A.11 and figure 3.B.16, respectively. The results are
almost identical to the baseline, suggesting that firms change their reports of whole
transactions when the DRCM is implemented.
3.7.3.2 The effects of the DRCM are heterogeneous across events
Up until now, the estimation was based on all cases pooled together, yielding an aver-
age treatment effect across all events. However, it is probable that the DRCM reform
did not have the same effect in each episode. I estimate equation (3.2) separately for
each event and plot the resulting estimates in figure 3.2.22 There is indeed significant
heterogeneity across events. First, whereas it is expected that βˆv < 0, ∀v, there are
some events in which the DRCM is associated with an increase in the reporting gaps,
contrary to all predictions. Second, the effect of the DRCM on the reporting gaps is
not significant in many cases when estimated on an event-by-event basis. Third, there
is considerable variation in terms of the magnitudes of the estimated β, which range
from −0.63 to 0.53. In comparison, the point estimates in the baseline specification
were around −0.03 and −0.01 when the reform takes place in the importing and ex-
porting countries, respectively.
The interpretation of positive values of βˆv in light of the predictions from section
3.4 is challenging. Those are events in which the reporting gaps of the treated products
increased relative to those of other goods. A naive approach is to consider that no
fraud was eliminated by the introduction of the the DRCM in these instances since the
reporting gaps did not decrease. A more prudent path is to consider the existence of
other factors that impacted the reporting gaps at the time of reform, resulting in the
observed increase. Given the high number of coefficients estimated, positive estimates
could be the result of innocuous measurement errors.23 These omitted factors might
21A similar logic applies to the disguise of imports as domestic purchases and of domestic sales as
exports: firms misreport the whole transaction prior to the reform and stop post-reform, affecting traded
values and quantities alike.
22Alternatively, I estimate equation (3.2) on the whole sample interacting the treatment dummy (Djt)
with a dummy for the country in which the reform takes place. The results are very similar. Note that
when estimating (3.2) event by event, it is not possible to include ymkp fixed effects since at a given point
in time (ym), a good (p) traded with a partner (k) appears only once in the event-specific sample.
23However, this cannot result from classical measurement errors (i.e. errors uncorrelated with the
latent true variables). In that case, measurement errors in the dependent variable (which is more likely
in the present case) leave OLS unbiased and consistent, whereas measurement errors in the independent
variables result in an attenuation bias but cannot cause a switch in sign.
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FIGURE 3.2: EVENT BY EVENT DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE: VALUE GAP
(A) Importer sample
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(B) Exporter sample
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Note: Event-specific βˆ from equation (3.2), obtained by estimating the equation separately for each event
with fixed effects j, t, ymck. 99%-, 95%- and 90%-confidence intervals are depicted in different colour
shades: blue (red) when point estimates are negative (positive).
however bias results, not only in episodes with a positive estimated coefficient but
also in events where the effect of the reform has the predicted sign.
From here on, I focus on the effects of the DRCM on reported imports by the re-
form country - i.e. on the importer sample. Overall, it appears that a few events might
be influencing the results significantly. There are about 12 events in which the esti-
mated effect of the DRCM on the reporting gaps is negative, of high magnitude and
significant. On the other end of the spectrum, there are 9 events in which βˆv is large
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FIGURE 3.3: CORRELATIONS BETWEEN EVENT-SPECIFIC COEFFICIENTS AND OTHER VARIABLES
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Note: A dot represents an event. The VAT rate is the standard rate. Burden of customs procedure is an index
ranging from 1 (extremely efficient) to 7 (extremely inefficient). Efficiency of customs is and index ranging
from 1 (low) to 5 (high). Corruption is an index ranging from 0 (low corruption) to 6 (high corruption).
and positive — yet significant in fewer cases. There are no clear patterns between the
event-specific βˆv and obvious observables: neither the reform country and dates, the
type of treated products or the number of observations are systematically linked to
the sign or magnitude of βˆv. The reform was announced well in advance (up to 254
days) in some of the events in which βˆv > 0. The average number of days between
announcement and implementation is 61 across events where βˆv < 0 and 86 across
events where the DRCM is associated with an increase in the reporting gaps. If fraud
ceases before the reform takes place, the effect on the reporting gaps is expected to be
less pronounced. Yet this does not justify the positive signs of the estimated coeffi-
cients. Furthermore, a reform does not have symmetrical effects on the reporting gaps
associated with flows where the country is importing or exporting.24
The event-specific coefficients are mildly correlated with other variables of interest
in intuitive ways. As a reminder, the more negative βˆv is, the stronger the reaction of
the reporting gap and the higher the inferred level of fraud pre-reform. As depicted in
figure 3.3, the estimated coefficients are more negative for higher levels of VAT rates
24In other words, there is no correlation between the βˆv estimated off the importer and exporter sam-
ples, apart from the two extremes: EE-07/2014 and IT-05/2016, where the reform is associated with
similar effects when the country is an importer or an exporter.
200
(more details follow in section 3.7.3.4), when customs are of lower quality, for higher
levels of corruption and finally when the VAT gap — a measure of non-compliance
in VAT collection — is higher. There is no apparent link between the level of real
GDP per capita in the importing country and the estimated coefficient.25 Customs
quality and corruption indices are meant to capture overall quality of institutions,
and VAT fraud — as proxied by βˆv — appears larger in countries that score poorly in
these dimensions. Similarly, VAT fraud seems more important in countries with a high
VAT gap — further analysis follows in section 3.7.4. Overall, although the estimated
coefficients correlate intuitively with other observables, positive values of βˆv cannot
be easily justified.
3.7.3.3 Stronger effects when the control group is limited to similar goods
As evident from tables 3.A.2 to 3.A.5, the control groups generally dwarf the treatment
groups as only a small subset of products at the 8-digit level are subject to the DRCM.
One possible concern is that given the volatility in the reporting gaps, having the entire
set of products in the control group introduces additional noise that could mask the
true effect of the DRCM reforms. The set of fixed effects included in regressions largely
absorbs this variation in the data, but even in the specifications with the strictest set of
fixed effects the adjusted R2 hoovers around 0.5, suggesting that significant variation
is left. In order to lower the size of the control group, I restrict it to products from the
same section in the Combined Nomenclature (CN) as the treated units. There are 21
sections grouping products according to the broad industry to which they belong.26
The underlying motivation for this ex-ante restriction is that similar products might be
subject to similar shocks over time, which fixed effects may be better able to absorb
and neutralize in the restricted sample.
The results are displayed in table 3.A.12 and figure 3.B.17, for the static and dy-
namic specifications, respectively. The estimates are similar to those in the baseline,
but of higher magnitude when the DRCM is implemented in the importing country.
Whereas the reporting gaps were found to decrease by between 2.5% and 4.5% upon
implementation of the DRCM in the baseline case, they decrease by 4.5% to 7.7% when
the control group is restricted to products in the same section as the treated units. Re-
25The correlations depicted in figure 3.3 remain similar in sign and magnitude conditioning on the
effect of the DRCM being negative, i.e. dropping all events in which βˆv < 0.
26For instance, section I is “Live animals; animal products”, section II is “Vegetable products”, section
XI is “Textiles and textile articles”, etc.
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TABLE 3.4: STATIC DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE: VALUE GAP — WITH SECTION FIXED EFFECTS
Importer sample
Dependant variable: Value gap, log
(1) (2) (3)
DRCM (Djt) -0.0534*** -0.0497*** -0.0626***
(-3.73) (-2.85) (-2.96)
Adjusted R2 0.474 0.478 0.500
Within R2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 30,876,640 30,710,753 24,709,260
Exporter sample
Dependant variable: Value gap, log
(1) (2) (3)
DRCM (Djt) -0.00598 0.00947 0.00366
(-0.48) (0.51) (0.16)
Adjusted R2 0.483 0.490 0.494
Within R2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 29,358,056 29,182,204 20,524,362
t, j FE X X X
ymp FE X
ymkp FE X
ymcks FE X X X
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. t-stats shown in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the
country pair level. Fixed effects (FE): event time (t), unit (j ≡ iepv) calendar time (ym), product (p),
country in which the reform takes place (c = i in the importer sample, and c = e in the exporting sample),
partner country (k = e in the importer sample, and k = i in the exporting sample), CN product section
(s). The dependent variable is the reporting gap in terms of value, in logs as specified in expression (3.1).
stricting the sample in this fashion also has drawbacks, as (i) information is lost, (ii)
the definition of the control group is arbitrary. Alternatively, I add section (s)-calendar
time (ym)-country pair (ck) fixed effects without restricting the control group to goods
of the same section and find very similar results: a decrease in reporting gaps by 5%
to 6.3% with more pronounced dynamic effects as reported in table 3.4 and figure 3.4.
There are signs that non-parallel pre-trends may be present in panel (A) of figure 3.4
as the point estimates slowly decrease over time and even become significant in one
pre-reform period. This problem is only present when ymkp fixed effects are included,
which limits the number of observations in the sample.
3.7.3.4 The effects of the DRCM does not strongly depend on the VAT rate
The marginal benefit of misreporting one Euro of a transaction for fraud purposes is
directly proportional to the VAT rate. In each fraud scheme detailed in section 3.3.2,
fraudsters illegally gain VAT on the misreported transaction. It is therefore possible
that fraud might be more prevalent in high-VAT countries. To test this hypothesis, I
estimate equation (3.2) interacting the treatment dummy with the rate of VAT. Given
202
FIGURE 3.4: DYNAMIC DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE: VALUE GAP — WITH SECTION FIXED EFFECTS
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Note: Sequences of βˆk from equation (3.3), estimated on the importer and exporter samples with the
following fixed effects: j, t, ymkp, ymcks. The coefficient in the period immediately preceding the imple-
mentation of the DRCM has been normalized to 0. 99%-, 95%- and 90%-confidence intervals are depicted
in different colour shades.
the above reasoning, the coefficient on the interaction should have a negative sign as
the effect of the DRCM is expected to be exacerbated by high VAT rates. Fixed effects
should absorb other country-specific characteristics correlated with the levels of VAT
rates.
The results are in table 3.A.13. Although the coefficient on the interaction has the
expected sign in most specifications in the importer sample, it is only significant in
the first two columns — with less rich fixed effects. The interaction does not have the
expected sign and is never significant in the exporter sample. Overall, the evidence
does not point to a strong impact of the rates of VAT on fraud as measured by the
reaction of the reporting gaps to the reform.
3.7.3.5 The DRCM does not appear to shift fraud to other products
From the reports following the implementation of the DRCM by Member States, it
appears that fraud shifted to other products not subject to the DRCM in some cases.27
Although there is mixed anecdotal evidence for this shift, I check whether I find signs
of it in the data. Equation (3.2) is estimated including a dummy that takes value 1
post-treatment for goods to which fraudsters are likely to turn when the DRCM is
implemented. I consider three classes of such products. First, goods with high unit
value, which are known to be attractive for fraud purposes as they maximize value
for a given traded quantity. Second, other goods to which the DRCM is applicable
27See sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4 of European Commission report COM/2018/0118 final.
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according to the VAT Directive, but to which it was not applied in that specific reform
episode. These goods are in the law precisely because they have been identified as
fraud-prone. Third, goods within the same HS heading (HS 4-digit group) as some
Member States reported a shift of fraud to very similar goods falling just outside of
the scope of the DRCM.
The results are displayed in table 3.A.14, with a focus the importer sample. There is
no evidence of movements in the reporting gaps of goods with high unit value. How-
ever, it appears that the reporting gaps associated with goods to which the DRCM
can be applied (but is not) decrease. Speculatively, this could be consistent with fraud-
sters moving their activities to other goods or another country, lowering fraud levels
even for goods to which the DRCM did not apply. Last, the reporting gaps associ-
ated with products within the same HS heading weakly increase (only significantly
in some specifications), consistent with fraud shifting to these goods at the time of
reform. These mixed results are not conclusive. Furthermore, fraud may have shifted
to other goods not considered here or to other countries.
3.7.4 Levels of fraud
So far, the focus was on the reaction of the reporting gaps to the implementation of
the DRCM, interpreted as evidence of fraudulent activity ceasing. The point estimates
give an idea of the importance of fraud : reported exports decrease by around 3%
relative to reported imports when the DRCM is implemented in the importing coun-
try, consistent with the prediction that the DRCM removes the incentive to engage in
strategies resulting in unreported imports. This section provides tentative estimates
of the monetary amounts of fraud eliminated by the DRCM, or in other words the rev-
enue losses incurred by Member States prior to the implementation of the DRCM. The
analysis focuses on the effects of the reform on reported imports (importer sample).
All monetary amounts are in 2015 real EUR.
3.7.4.1 Revenue losses prevented by the DRCM
The basic idea is to estimate the amount of VAT that was collected and not remitted
by fraudsters pre-reform based on the point estimates indicating how the reporting
gaps change when the DRCM is implemented. For each episode of the reform (v), I
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TABLE 3.5: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF FRAUD AMOUNTS ACROSS EVENTS
N Mean Std Min 25% 50% 75% Max
Trade (m. EUR) 52 1,918.18 3,052.77 6.70 115.99 554.56 1,712.94 15,093.22
VAT rate (%) 52 21.08 2.25 16.00 20.00 21.00 22.25 27.00
Common βˆ 52 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
Event-specific βˆv 32 -0.15 0.15 -0.63 -0.24 -0.09 -0.04 -0.00
Fraud (m. EUR) — βˆv 32 50.41 84.54 0.06 2.68 9.21 59.37 412.40
Fraud (% rev.) — βˆv 32 0.21 0.30 0.00 0.02 0.17 0.26 1.37
Fraud (% VAT gap) — βˆv 31 0.91 1.16 0.01 0.09 0.45 1.29 4.32
Fraud (m. EUR) — βˆ 52 11.72 18.09 0.04 0.74 4.10 11.07 86.03
Fraud (% rev.) — βˆ 52 0.06 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.66
Fraud (% VAT gap) — βˆ 50 0.52 1.66 0.00 0.04 0.11 0.31 11.46
Note: v refers to the event number. Data: importer sample. Amounts of trade and fraud, when not
expressed as fractions, are in 2015 million EUR. (% rev.) means expressed in percentage of VAT revenues
in the year of reform. (% VAT gap) means expressed in percentage of the VAT gap in the year of reform.
All amounts are annual values.
estimate the amount of fraud pre-reform as follows:
Fraud amountprev = trade volume subject to the DRCMv× | βˆv |︸ ︷︷ ︸
tax base associated with fraud
×VAT ratev, (3.5)
where the VAT rate is the standard one.28 The trade volume subject to the DRCM is
measured as 12 times the average monthly reported exports of the treated goods over
the 12 months prior to the reform — i.e. total trade over the year prior to the reform
when no observations are missing.29 Trade flows are measured by reported exports
because both in the case of MTIC and imports disguised as domestic purchases, the
fraud amounts are not reported by the importer and therefore do not appear in re-
ported imports.30 The last element of (3.5) is the estimated effect of the reform, βˆv.
Two options are considered: (i) the value estimated on all events simultaneously from
table 3.3, so βˆv = −0.03, ∀v; (ii) event-specific estimates from panel (A) in figure 3.2,
setting them to zero when positive. Neither solution is completely satisfactory: (i) ignores
the important heterogeneity across events and instead gives an average treatment ef-
fect; (ii) implicitly assumes that an observed increase in the reporting gaps at the time
of reform (βˆv > 0) is tantamount to absence of fraud. I report the results using both
options.
28The list of products to which reduced rates can be applied can be found in Appendix I VAT Directive.
The only possible overlap between these goods and those to which the DRCM is applicable is agricultural
inputs. After further inspection, it appears that in only two instances (events 7 and 8 in CZ) the goods to
which the DRCM applied might have been subject to a reduced rate (of 15% instead of 21%). Switching
one for the other barely changes the results.
29I use 12 times the monthly average in case some observations are missing, i.e. I implicitly impute the
average trade value for missing observations.
30I also recompute calculations using reported imports, or the average of reported imports and exports.
The results do change and the resulting estimated evasion is somewhat smaller.
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The resulting estimated amount of fraud removed by the implementation of the
DRCM for each event separately can be found in table 3.A.15, and summary statistics
across events are in table 3.5. All amounts are expressed annually and levels are in
million 2015 EUR. Several results spring to the eyes: First, whether event-specific or a
common estimated effect of the DRCM is used in (3.5) makes a large difference. This
originates from the fact that βˆv estimated event-by-event are generally larger in mag-
nitude (conditional on being negative) than the common βˆ. Furthermore, the trade
volume subject to the DRCM was important in several events in which βˆv is partic-
ularly negative. To give an idea of how the results differ depending on this choice,
summing fraud in the year leading to the reform across all events amounts to 1.6
billion EUR using event-specific coefficients, whereas it sums up to a mere 610 mil-
lion EUR based on a common coefficient value. However, a striking conclusion arises
no matter which option is chosen: the estimated fraud levels represent only a tiny
fraction of VAT revenues, between 0.06% and 0.2% on average across events. Further-
more, it only represents 0.5%− 0.9% of the VAT gap, which is meant to capture VAT
non-compliance.31 In section 3.7.4.3, I describe more thoroughly the relationship be-
tween the VAT gaps and the DRCM. The instance of the reform that removed the most
fraud (using event-specific estimates βˆv) is in Poland in 2015 (event v = 45) when the
DRCM was applied to a wide range of products including mobile phones, laptops and
supplies of raw and semi-finished metals.
3.7.4.2 Difficulties in extrapolating aggregate fraud levels
The calculations above need to be interpreted with appropriate care. First, the fraud
levels are those in the year prior to the reform in these countries and for the treated
goods only. In other words, it is not implied that fraud levels were the same in every
year before the reform, or that implementing the DRCM to other goods will have a
similar effect. Actually, given the selection bias whereby the DRCM is only applicable
to goods known to be subject to fraud, it is very likely that applying the DRCM else-
where would remove much less fraud. Second, fraud in a country may not decrease
by the full amount removed by the reform if fraudsters shift their activities to other
goods within the same country — although I have found no evidence of this.
31I also computed the fraud levels using a common βˆ = 0.055, averaging coefficients across specifica-
tions in table 3.4 (which includes CN section fixed effects). Total fraud in the year leading to reform is ca.
EUR 1.17 billion. Removed fraud represents 0.1% of VAT revenues and 0.94% of VAT gaps on average
across events.
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To illustrate the selection bias and the dangers of extrapolating fraud levels as-
sociated with transactions that are not subject to the reform, I consider two extreme
hypothetical scenarios: (i) fraud is limited to the products subject to the reform, and
(ii) fraud levels are uniform across all products. The truth lies somewhere in-between.
Under assumption (i), all fraud is removed by the reform and the estimates based on
equation (3.5) capture the total level of fraud (associated with the schemes considered
in this study). Under assumption (ii), I estimate total fraud by replacing the first term
in (3.5) by the total trade volume between the reform country and its partners in the
year prior to the reform - as opposed to the trade volume subject to the DRCM only.32
Across all events, total fraud in the year leading to the reform under (ii) would repre-
sent 145% of VAT revenues and 676% of the VAT gaps on average. These unrealistic
figures confirm that the magnitudes of fraud directly removed by the DRCM cannot
be extrapolated to all other cross-border transactions.
3.7.4.3 VAT Gap and the DRCM
One natural question is whether the VAT gaps computed by tax authorities of the
Member States react to the implementation of the DRCM. Fraud being a component
of the VAT gap, a decrease following the reform is expected. The analysis is limited
by the restricted number of observations available as the VAT gaps are only available
at the yearly frequency. Furthermore, as eluded to in section 3.3, the VAT gaps can be
caused by many factors in addition to fraud, such as non-compliance, legitimate errors
by firms in filling their VAT returns, bankruptcies and insolvencies (Poniatowski et al.,
2019).
Graphical inspection of the time series of the VAT gaps at the times of reform, dis-
played in figures 3.B.18 and 3.B.19, does not suggest a strong incidence of the DRCM.
Out of the 51 events for at which time the VAT gap is available, there are 30 cases in
which the VAT gap decreases in the year of implementation (relative to the previous
year), but in 19 of out of these cases the VAT gap already decreased in the previous
year. Furthermore, there is no systematic relation between either the magnitude of βˆv
or the value of fraud as calculated in (3.5) and changes in the VAT gap (see figure 3.5).
32On average across all events, the trade volume subject to the DRCM represents 0.17% of total trade.
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FIGURE 3.5: CHANGE IN VAT GAPS VERSUS ESTIMATED FRAUD
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Note: A dot represents an event. Scatter plot of the percentage change in the VAT gap between the year
of implementation and the year before (y-axis) versus: (A) event-specific effect of the DRCM; (B) log of
the fraud amounts as calculated in (3.5) in million real EUR, using event-specific βˆv; (C) log of fraud
amounts as calculated in (3.5) in million real EUR, using the common βˆ from table 3.3.
3.7.5 Discussion
Policy focus Although the VAT gaps encompass many factors and are prone to mea-
surement errors, the absence of movement in the VAT gaps at the time of reforms
together with the lack of correlation between the VAT gaps and the estimated magni-
tudes of fraud are puzzling, especially given how important MTIC fraud is believed
to be by tax authorities in the EU. Even if my estimates underestimate fraud (cf. ex-
planations in section 3.6.2), the implementation of the DRCM should be noticeable in
the VAT gaps if MTIC is responsible for large tax revenue losses. Since Member States
that implemented the DRCM generally found the measure to be effective, either the
scale of MTIC fraud is smaller than previously thought or the VAT gaps suffer from
measurement errors precluding quantitative conclusions.33
Cost-benefit analysis of the DRCM From the outset, I would like to emphasize that
precise calculations and interpolations are impossible. The discussion below merely
evokes some elements to fuel the policy debate. The implementation of the DRCM to
selected products comes at a cost both for the regulator and for firms. An attempt at
estimating the costs incurred by firms to comply with the DRCM was made by Eu-
ropean Commission (2014). They estimate that the reverse charge mechanism results
in additional compliance costs amounting to 0.13% of turnover based on a survey of
33The views of Member States on the DRCM and its effectiveness are summarized in European Com-
mission Report COM(2018) 118 final.
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34 businesses across six Member States.34 They estimate that 2.17% of Gross Value
Added was generated from activities subject to the DRCM in 2014, concluding that
the compliance cost amounted to EUR 323 million in that year (European Commis-
sion, 2014, p. 62). On the other hand, my estimates suggest that fraud worth between
EUR 423 million and EUR 739 million (depending on the choice of βˆ) was eliminated
by the DRCM annually as of 2014.35 From this simple comparison, the additional tax
revenues outweigh the compliance costs. There are however other costs to the im-
plementation of the DRCM borne by authorities that are not taken into account here,
and perhaps other benefits than the boost in tax revenues — e.g. the removal of firms
operating in the shadow economy selling at unreasonably low prices. However, this
exercise suggests that costs and benefits might not differ by orders of magnitude.
3.8 Conclusion
The introduction of the Reverse Charge Mechanism to domestic transactions elim-
inates a class of VAT fraud schemes involving cross-border transactions whereby
fraudsters collect VAT without remitting it to the tax authorities. When engaging in
fraud, firms misreport their transactions, which in turn affects the country’s trade
statistics. This paper proposes an estimation of the amount of fraud removed by the
reforms based on the movement of discrepancies between reports by the importing
and exporting countries of the same trade flows around the reform time. I find that
in the months following the reform, the reporting gaps associated with treated goods
imported by the reform country decrease by around 3% on average relative to goods
not subject to the DRCM. This is consistent with the removal of MTIC fraud and of
the fraudulent disguise of imports as domestic purchases. The effects of the reform
vary greatly across episodes. Overall, I estimate that these reforms removed up to
EUR 1.6 billion in fraud annually, a large figure in absolute terms, but tiny compared
to VAT revenues.
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Appendix 3.A Additional tables
TABLE 3.A.1: LIST OF INSTANCES OF APPLICATION OF THE DRCM
N Country Implementation date Goods
1 AT 01/07/2007 199.1(d)
2 AT 01/01/2012 199a(c), 199a(d)
3 AT 01/01/2014 199a(h), 199a(j)
4 BG 01/01/2014 199a(i)
5 CZ 01/04/2011 199.1(d)
6 CZ 01/04/2015 199a(c), 199a(d), 199a(h), 199a(j)
7 CZ 01/07/2015 199a(i)
8 CZ 01/09/2015 199a(i)
9 DE 01/01/2011 199.1(d), 199a(j)
10 DE 01/07/2011 199a(c), 199a(d)
11 DE 01/10/2014 199a(h), 199a(j)
12 DE 01/01/2015 199a(j)
13 DK 01/07/2012 199.1(d)
14 DK 01/07/2014 199a(c), 199a(d), 199a(h)
15 EE 01/01/2011 199.1(d)
16 EE 01/04/2012 199a(j)
17 EE 01/07/2014 199a(j)
18 EE 01/01/2017 199a(j)
19 ES 01/01/2004 199.1(d)
20 ES 01/04/2015 199a(j), 199a(c), 199a(h)
21 FI 01/01/2015 199.1(d)
22 FR 01/01/2008 199.1(d)
23 GB 01/06/2007 199a(c), 199a(d)
24 GR 01/01/2007 199.1(d)
25 GR 01/08/2017 199a(c), 199a(h)
26 HR 01/01/2019 199a(j)
27 HU 01/01/2008 199.1(d)
28 HU 01/07/2012 199a(i)
29 HU 01/01/2015 199a(j)
30 IE 01/05/2011 199.1(d)
31 IT 01/01/2011 199a(c), 199a(d)
32 IT 02/05/2016 199a(h)
33 LT 01/01/2008 199.1(d), EXCEPTION
34 LT 01/08/2019 199a(c), 199a(h), EXCEPTION
35 LV 01/10/2011 199.1(d)
36 LV 01/01/2016 EXCEPTION
37 LV 01/04/2016 199a(c), 199a(d), 199a(h)
38 LV 01/07/2016 199a(i)
39 LV 01/01/2017 199a(j)
40 LV 01/01/2018 199a(h), 199a(j), EXCEPTION
41 NL 01/01/2007 199.1(d)
42 NL 01/04/2013 199a(c), 199a(d), 199a(h)
43 PL 01/07/2011 199.1(d)
44 PL 01/10/2013 199.1(d)
45 PL 01/07/2015 199a(j), 199a(h), 199a(c)
46 PL 01/01/2017 199a(j), 199a(d)
47 PL 01/01/2018 EXCEPTION
48 PT 01/10/2006 199.1(d)
49 RO 31/05/2011 199a(i)
50 RO 01/01/2016 199a(c), 199a(d), 199a(h)
51 SE 01/01/2013 199.1(d)
52 SI 01/01/2010 199.1(d)
53 SK 01/04/2009 199.1(d), 199a(j)
54 SK 01/01/2014 199a(c), 199a(d), 199a(i), 199a(j)
Note: The Goods columns lists the articles on which basis the DRCM was implemented. 199.1(d): waste
and scraps; 199a(c): mobile phones; 199a(d): integrated circuit devices; 199a(h): laptops and game con-
soles; 199a(i): cereals and industrial crops; 199a(j): supplies of raw and semi-finished metals. EXCEP-
TION indicates that the DRCM applies to goods not specified in articles 199 or 199a VAT Directive.
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TABLE 3.A.2: DRCM INSTANCES IN IMPORTING COUNTRIES (CONTINUES IN NEXT TABLE)
Case Grp N # prod Gappre Gappost ∆ Means DiD Mean Freq.
1: AT, 7.2007 0 734438 9329 -0.021 -0.03 0.0092 12
1 3013 50 -0.23 -0.12 -0.11 0.12 12
2: AT, 1.2012 0 813492 8933 -0.048 -0.066 0.018 13
1 3076 17 -0.2 -0.11 -0.091 0.11 16
3: AT, 1.2014 0 836405 7940 -0.051 -0.052 0.0007 14
1 34043 475 -0.059 -0.05 -0.0094 0.01 12
4: BG, 1.2014 0 466654 7079 -0.17 -0.12 -0.053 10
1 484 31 -0.49 -0.18 -0.31 0.26 4.8
5: CZ, 4.2011 0 873891 8790 -0.13 -0.14 0.0091 13
1 2622 61 0.22 -0.0081 0.22 -0.21 10
6: CZ, 4.2015 0 912203 7701 -0.16 -0.14 -0.012 14
1 67024 597 -0.18 -0.19 0.016 -0.028 14
7: CZ, 7.2015 0 989709 8305 -0.16 -0.14 -0.011 14
1 1225 18 -0.18 -0.34 0.16 -0.17 10
8: CZ, 9.2015 0 997909 8325 -0.16 -0.14 -0.012 14
1 17 1 -0.3 -0.024 -0.27 0.26 8.5
9: DE, 1.2011 0 1367204 8749 0.13 0.079 0.047 15
1 10604 64 -0.014 -0.098 0.084 -0.036 14
10: DE, 7.2011 0 1386606 9522 0.1 0.089 0.012 15
1 5425 17 -0.28 -0.25 -0.03 0.043 18
11: DE, 10.2014 0 1524439 8635 0.1 0.094 0.0097 16
1 8992 82 0.2 0.1 0.094 -0.084 13
12: DE, 1.2015 0 1543770 8634 0.096 0.095 0.0014 16
1 2309 30 0.16 0.41 -0.26 0.26 11
13: DK, 7.2012 0 759730 8311 0.12 0.083 0.035 13
1 430 21 0.27 0.54 -0.27 0.3 9.3
14: DK, 7.2014 0 801465 7779 0.08 0.054 0.026 14
1 3274 19 -0.029 -0.062 0.033 -0.0071 15
15: EE, 1.2011 0 479818 6869 0.076 0.089 -0.013 11
1 163 16 0.36 0.62 -0.27 0.25 5.3
16: EE, 4.2012 0 513534 7236 0.09 0.093 -0.0035 11
1 23 4 0.52 -0.28 0.8 -0.81 2.9
17: EE, 7.2014 0 557447 6985 0.092 0.13 -0.037 12
1 511 12 0.41 0.92 -0.51 0.47 9.8
18: EE, 1.2017 0 612671 7130 0.15 0.16 -0.0021 12
1 12152 237 0.18 0.12 0.058 -0.061 10
19: ES, 1.2004 0 775646 9440 0.066 0.11 -0.04 14
1 4443 70 0.16 0.084 0.08 -0.12 12
20: ES, 4.2015 0 1024537 8667 0.067 0.092 -0.025 14
1 1708 11 0.3 0.27 0.036 -0.061 15
21: FI, 1.2015 0 662480 7456 0.084 0.099 -0.016 13
1 133 9 0.0047 -0.054 0.059 -0.074 8.3
22: FR, 1.2008 0 1155608 9170 -0.039 -0.029 -0.011 15
1 2685 41 0.027 -0.0033 0.03 -0.041 12
23: GB, 6.2007 0 933170 9674 0.075 0.11 -0.037 13
1 769 3 -0.051 0.057 -0.11 0.072 13
24: GR, 1.2007 0 500130 8575 0.037 0.04 -0.0026 10
1 366 21 -0.04 -0.012 -0.028 0.025 5.5
25: GR, 8.2017 0 626788 8123 0.1 0.11 -0.0043 11
1 1386 4 0.34 -0.033 0.37 -0.37 16
26: HR, 1.2019 0 736217 7667 -0.15 -0.13 -0.014 13
1 1782 20 -0.19 -0.22 0.029 -0.043 14
27: HU, 1.2008 0 630027 7126 0.086 0.15 -0.066 12
1 557 15 -0.071 0.064 -0.14 0.069 8.7
Note: Grp (0/1) refers to treatment and control groups, i.e. those trade flows subject to the DRCM (1)
or not (0). N is the number of observations in each group, and # prod refers to the number of unique
products. Gappre and Gappost denote the mean reporting gap (in value terms) in each group before and
after the DRCM is implemented, ∆ Means is the difference in means and DiD is the difference in the
mean difference. The last column contains the average number of times an observation in observed over
the 24 months window.
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TABLE 3.A.3: DRCM INSTANCES IN IMPORTING COUNTRIES (CONTINUED)
Case Grp N # prod Gappre Gappost ∆ Means DiD Mean Freq.
28: HU, 7.2012 0 695480 7988 0.12 0.11 0.015 12
1 990 24 0.76 0.11 0.65 -0.63 7
29: HU, 1.2015 0 775653 7502 0.11 0.097 0.017 13
1 16381 178 0.089 0.04 0.048 -0.032 13
30: IE, 5.2011 0 362648 8209 -0.01 0.011 -0.021 11
1 120 8 -0.35 -0.63 0.28 -0.3 12
31: IT, 1.2011 0 1070555 8930 0.037 0.018 0.019 14
1 3986 17 0.33 0.045 0.29 -0.27 16
32: IT, 5.2016 0 1276117 9320 0.032 0.053 -0.02 14
1 838 2 0.71 -0.032 0.75 -0.77 17
33: LT, 1.2008 0 499663 7144 -0.16 -0.051 -0.1 11
1 733 39 -0.024 0.067 -0.092 -0.013 7.1
34: LT, 8.2019 0 501659 7316 -0.15 -0.16 0.011 9.2
1 892 4 -0.051 -0.14 0.086 -0.075 12
35: LV, 10.2011 0 503982 7525 0.0067 -0.02 0.027 11
1 357 16 -0.19 -0.41 0.22 -0.19 8.5
36: LV, 1.2016 0 587466 7043 0.019 -0.026 0.044 12
1 318 7 -0.12 -0.29 0.17 -0.13 8.8
37: LV, 4.2016 0 591595 7387 0.013 -0.026 0.039 12
1 2547 24 -0.51 -0.2 -0.31 0.35 12
38: LV, 7.2016 0 599854 7420 0.00055 -0.028 0.028 12
1 744 23 -0.095 -0.2 0.1 -0.075 7.7
39: LV, 1.2017 0 613128 7458 -0.025 -0.033 0.0082 12
1 574 16 -0.39 0.24 -0.63 0.63 9.3
40: LV, 1.2018 0 604893 6784 -0.034 -0.017 -0.017 12
1 35136 404 -0.021 -0.052 0.031 -0.048 12
41: NL, 1.2007 0 763324 9379 0.42 0.41 0.0069 12
1 2394 40 -0.11 0.046 -0.16 0.16 10
42: NL, 4.2013 0 822139 8344 0.36 0.39 -0.033 13
1 4543 19 0.16 -0.0064 0.17 -0.2 15
43: PL, 7.2011 0 927517 8933 -0.046 0.053 -0.098 13
1 3514 81 0.1 0.21 -0.11 0.0072 9.5
44: PL, 10.2013 0 967363 8108 0.059 0.069 -0.01 14
1 24018 229 -0.0028 -0.048 0.045 -0.055 13
45: PL, 7.2015 0 1042105 8275 0.098 0.15 -0.055 14
1 3811 28 0.54 0.24 0.3 -0.36 13
46: PL, 1.2017 0 1076376 8734 0.17 0.17 -0.0042 14
1 3185 31 0.029 0.0072 0.022 -0.026 12
47: PL, 1.2018 0 1113873 8391 0.17 0.17 0.0035 14
1 552 1 -0.56 -0.26 -0.3 0.31 21
48: PT, 10.2006 0 607266 9839 0.022 -0.042 0.064 12
1 681 28 0.17 0.13 0.035 0.029 11
49: RO, 6.2011 0 777280 8668 -0.12 -0.1 -0.014 12
1 975 22 -0.11 -0.1 -0.0091 -0.0048 7
50: RO, 1.2016 0 909676 8081 -0.073 -0.067 -0.0064 13
1 4155 19 -0.29 -0.26 -0.034 0.028 15
51: SE, 1.2013 0 763087 7802 0.11 0.12 -0.01 14
1 1000 26 -0.33 -0.24 -0.096 0.085 11
52: SI, 1.2010 0 550878 7950 -0.091 -0.06 -0.031 12
1 929 30 -0.1 -0.068 -0.036 0.0052 9
53: SK, 4.2009 0 595701 8015 -0.0061 -0.017 0.011 12
1 573 26 0.029 -0.23 0.26 -0.25 7.1
54: SK, 1.2014 0 647612 7500 0.076 0.1 -0.023 13
1 29232 435 0.046 0.029 0.018 -0.041 12
Note: Grp (0/1) refers to treatment and control groups, i.e. those trade flows subject to the DRCM (1)
or not (0). N is the number of observations in each group, and # prod refers to the number of unique
products. Gappre and Gappost denote the mean reporting gap (in value terms) in each group before and
after the DRCM is implemented, ∆ Means is the difference in means and DiD is the difference in the
mean difference. The last column contains the average number of times an observation in observed over
the 24 months window.
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TABLE 3.A.4: DRCM INSTANCES IN EXPORTING COUNTRIES (CONTINUES IN NEXT TABLE)
Case Grp N # prod Gappre Gappost ∆ Means DiD Mean Freq.
1: AT, 7.2007 0 937679 8175 0.029 0.039 -0.01 11
1 2736 56 -0.0076 -0.15 0.14 -0.15 12
2: AT, 1.2012 0 1007803 7920 0.098 0.081 0.017 13
1 3550 17 -0.18 -0.083 -0.099 0.12 12
3: AT, 1.2014 0 1041732 7111 0.052 0.073 -0.021 13
1 50249 434 -0.063 -0.026 -0.037 0.016 13
4: BG, 1.2014 0 155269 4574 0.32 0.33 -0.011 8.3
1 1287 29 0.22 0.16 0.064 -0.075 9.7
5: CZ, 4.2011 0 773658 7990 0.11 0.14 -0.029 12
1 3188 64 0.045 0.058 -0.013 -0.016 12
6: CZ, 4.2015 0 922503 7151 0.2 0.24 -0.038 13
1 60717 540 0.075 0.08 -0.0056 -0.033 12
7: CZ, 7.2015 0 1008631 7704 0.2 0.24 -0.035 13
1 1142 18 0.0026 0.17 -0.17 0.13 9.3
8: CZ, 9.2015 0 1026165 7717 0.21 0.24 -0.028 13
1 4 1 NA 0.17 NA NA 4
9: DE, 1.2011 0 2731608 8671 -0.036 -0.02 -0.016 17
1 8257 61 0.066 -0.039 0.11 -0.12 14
10: DE, 7.2011 0 2732541 9392 -0.026 -0.028 0.002 16
1 9461 17 0.063 -0.035 0.097 -0.095 22
11: DE, 10.2014 0 2899504 8483 -0.034 7.1e-05 -0.034 18
1 18316 78 0.055 0.16 -0.1 0.068 14
12: DE, 1.2015 0 2922175 8487 -0.028 0.0098 -0.038 18
1 2682 32 -0.13 -0.28 0.15 -0.18 9.2
13: DK, 7.2012 0 729781 6988 0.097 0.15 -0.049 11
1 1220 28 -1.2 -1.2 0.06 -0.11 11
14: DK, 7.2014 0 787052 6566 0.15 0.17 -0.02 12
1 4129 18 -0.0093 0.22 -0.23 0.21 14
15: EE, 1.2011 0 159072 4818 -0.044 0.0046 -0.049 10
1 455 19 0.062 -0.18 0.24 -0.29 8.8
16: EE, 4.2012 0 172455 5059 -0.0047 -0.037 0.033 11
1 57 3 0.68 1.1 -0.39 0.42 8.1
17: EE, 7.2014 0 190361 4818 -0.081 -0.071 -0.01 11
1 170 9 -0.4 0.19 -0.59 0.58 6.3
18: EE, 1.2017 0 212338 5050 -0.071 -0.1 0.03 10
1 4188 154 -0.072 0.023 -0.095 0.12 11
19: ES, 1.2004 0 733124 8780 0.079 0.023 0.056 11
1 2973 64 0.079 0.23 -0.15 0.21 11
20: ES, 4.2015 0 1195640 8230 0.045 0.071 -0.026 13
1 1875 11 0.44 0.18 0.26 -0.29 15
21: FI, 1.2015 0 400925 5111 -0.072 -0.063 -0.0086 11
1 546 21 0.053 0.34 -0.28 0.28 10
22: FR, 1.2008 0 1669931 8737 0.06 0.052 0.0078 14
1 3503 41 0.22 0.23 -0.013 0.021 15
23: GB, 6.2007 0 1326737 9377 -0.036 -0.071 0.035 12
1 1195 3 0.26 0.29 -0.024 0.059 15
24: GR, 1.2007 0 145247 5389 -0.013 -0.082 0.069 6.7
1 302 21 0.16 -0.055 0.22 -0.15 5.9
25: GR, 8.2017 0 253521 5816 0.15 0.2 -0.052 8.4
1 871 4 0.31 0.14 0.18 -0.23 13
26: HR, 1.2019 0 220587 5395 0.23 0.26 -0.022 9.5
1 189 12 0.3 0.31 -0.011 -0.011 7.9
27: HU, 1.2008 0 362446 4923 -0.18 -0.16 -0.024 11
1 1462 35 -0.14 -0.094 -0.043 0.019 9.6
Note: Grp (0/1) refers to treatment and control groups, i.e. those trade flows subject to the DRCM (1)
or not (0). N is the number of observations in each group, and # prod refers to the number of unique
products. Gappre and Gappost denote the mean reporting gap (in value terms) in each group before and
after the DRCM is implemented, ∆ Means is the difference in means and DiD is the difference in the
mean difference. The last column contains the average number of times an observation in observed over
the 24 months window.
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TABLE 3.A.5: DRCM INSTANCES IN EXPORTING COUNTRIES (CONTINUED)
Case Grp N # prod Gappre Gappost ∆ Means DiD Mean Freq.
28: HU, 7.2012 0 481975 6451 -0.062 -0.035 -0.026 11
1 1885 25 -0.14 0.0022 -0.14 0.12 9.2
29: HU, 1.2015 0 596494 6233 0.00019 0.032 -0.032 12
1 9960 152 -0.082 -0.032 -0.05 0.018 11
30: IE, 5.2011 0 180593 5139 -0.0037 -0.042 0.038 10
1 537 21 0.45 0.28 0.17 -0.13 14
31: IT, 1.2011 0 1787212 8512 0.076 0.096 -0.019 14
1 4154 17 -0.068 -0.051 -0.017 -0.0025 13
32: IT, 5.2016 0 2047668 8891 0.15 0.15 -0.0031 14
1 1055 2 0.88 0.51 0.37 -0.37 20
33: LT, 1.2008 0 163573 5419 0.15 0.054 0.097 9.5
1 2092 42 0.18 0.049 0.14 -0.038 9.6
34: LT, 8.2019 0 252007 5774 0.15 0.19 -0.044 8.2
1 607 4 -0.68 -0.17 -0.51 0.47 8.8
35: LV, 10.2011 0 167791 5645 -0.014 -0.0032 -0.01 10
1 396 17 0.36 -0.02 0.38 -0.39 8.1
36: LV, 1.2016 0 206310 5364 0.052 0.058 -0.0062 11
1 771 7 0.19 0.55 -0.35 0.35 13
37: LV, 4.2016 0 210075 5652 0.049 0.051 -0.0019 10
1 972 14 0.82 0.74 0.086 -0.088 12
38: LV, 7.2016 0 215224 5717 0.06 0.045 0.015 10
1 604 17 -0.26 -0.14 -0.12 0.13 7.4
39: LV, 1.2017 0 225231 5818 0.059 0.047 0.012 10
1 156 8 0.69 0.49 0.2 -0.19 8.2
40: LV, 1.2018 0 228664 5320 0.048 0.048 -0.00069 11
1 13271 336 0.035 -0.075 0.11 -0.11 10
41: NL, 1.2007 0 1483943 9269 -0.17 -0.17 -0.0038 13
1 1998 38 -0.27 -0.36 0.093 -0.096 11
42: NL, 4.2013 0 1606328 8290 -0.11 -0.14 0.023 14
1 9269 19 0.34 0.27 0.071 -0.048 19
43: PL, 7.2011 0 882182 7598 0.061 -0.024 0.085 12
1 2692 64 0.11 0.13 -0.021 0.11 8.9
44: PL, 10.2013 0 1021302 6982 0.0033 0.027 -0.024 13
1 22162 207 0.11 0.12 -0.012 -0.012 11
45: PL, 7.2015 0 1280712 7315 0.069 0.072 -0.0027 14
1 5356 29 0.23 0.19 0.036 -0.039 14
46: PL, 1.2017 0 1416733 7740 0.06 0.054 0.0054 14
1 3587 25 0.31 0.36 -0.051 0.056 12
47: PL, 1.2018 0 1477856 7452 0.055 0.097 -0.042 15
1 640 1 0.67 0.51 0.17 -0.21 24
48: PT, 10.2006 0 224743 6312 -0.00055 0.053 -0.053 9.1
1 824 34 0.16 0.31 -0.15 0.096 13
49: RO, 6.2011 0 203048 5387 0.039 0.086 -0.046 8.5
1 968 17 -0.057 0.31 -0.37 0.32 7.2
50: RO, 1.2016 0 324986 5590 0.059 0.11 -0.047 9.7
1 1604 18 0.091 0.021 0.07 -0.12 9.8
51: SE, 1.2013 0 831738 6741 -0.067 -0.086 0.019 13
1 1087 28 0.16 0.036 0.13 -0.11 10
52: SI, 1.2010 0 210777 4666 0.088 0.071 0.017 8.7
1 1217 37 0.23 0.2 0.027 -0.0093 11
53: SK, 4.2009 0 285023 5663 0.058 0.074 -0.016 10
1 1129 30 0.079 -0.015 0.095 -0.11 10
54: SK, 1.2014 0 367479 5546 0.02 0.034 -0.015 12
1 18957 303 0.16 0.17 -0.011 -0.0035 12
Note: Grp (0/1) refers to treatment and control groups, i.e. those trade flows subject to the DRCM (1)
or not (0). N is the number of observations in each group, and # prod refers to the number of unique
products. Gappre and Gappost denote the mean reporting gap (in value terms) in each group before and
after the DRCM is implemented, ∆ Means is the difference in means and DiD is the difference in the
mean difference. The last column contains the average number of times an observation in observed over
the 24 months window.
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TABLE 3.A.6: STATIC DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE: VALUE GAP — BALANCED SAMPLE
Importer sample
Dependant variable: Value gap, log
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DRCM (Djt) -0.0415*** -0.0367*** -0.0388*** -0.0373*** -0.0413***
(-3.89) (-2.70) (-3.63) (-3.52) (-2.92)
Adjusted R2 0.486 0.492 0.487 0.487 0.522
Within R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 24,394,660 24,216,387 24,394,606 24,393,661 19,701,142
Exporter sample
Dependant variable: Value gap, log
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DRCM (Djt) -0.0211** -0.00816 -0.0196* -0.0195* -0.0268
(-2.02) (-0.54) (-1.83) (-1.81) (-1.53)
Adjusted R2 0.493 0.503 0.494 0.494 0.519
Within R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 24,764,482 24,599,503 24,764,466 24,763,918 17,519,337
t, j FE X X X X X
ymp FE X
ymc FE X X
ymk FE X
ymck FE X
ymkp FE X
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. t-stats shown in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the
country pair level. Fixed effects (FE): event time (t), unit (j ≡ iepv) calendar time (ym), product (p),
country in which the reform takes place (c = i in the importer sample, and c = e in the exporting sample),
partner country (k = e in the importer sample, and k = i in the exporting sample). The dependent
variable is the reporting gap in terms of value, in logs as specified in expression (3.1). Sample balanced
such that each unit j appears at least 20 times in the 24-month window.
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TABLE 3.A.7: STATIC DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE: VALUE GAP — NO EVENT OVERLAPS
Importer sample
Dependant variable: Value gap, log
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DRCM (Djt) -0.0481*** -0.0443*** -0.0435*** -0.0420*** -0.0532***
(-3.62) (-2.67) (-3.25) (-3.15) (-2.73)
Adjusted R2 0.471 0.476 0.472 0.472 0.501
Within R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 30,913,101 30,747,517 30,913,082 30,912,835 24,756,295
Exporter sample
Dependant variable: Value gap, log
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DRCM (Djt) -0.00758 0.00349 -0.00795 -0.00817 -0.00514
(-0.70) (0.21) (-0.73) (-0.74) (-0.25)
Adjusted R2 0.480 0.487 0.481 0.482 0.495
Within R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 29395610 29220157 29395610 29395398 20576550
t, j FE X X X X X
ymp FE X
ymc FE X X
ymk FE X
ymck FE X
ymkp FE X
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. t-stats shown in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the
country pair level. Fixed effects (FE): event time (t), unit (j ≡ iepv) calendar time (ym), product (p),
country in which the reform takes place (c = i in the importer sample, and c = e in the exporting sample),
partner country (k = e in the importer sample, and k = i in the exporting sample). The dependent
variable is the reporting gap in terms of value, in logs as specified in expression (3.1). Overlaps in events
are dropped from the sample.
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TABLE 3.A.8: STATIC DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE: VALUE GAP — WITHOUT OUTLIERS
Importer sample
Dependant variable: Value gap, log
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DRCM (Djt) -0.0312*** -0.0182* -0.0281*** -0.0266*** -0.0229**
(-3.68) (-1.77) (-3.25) (-3.09) (-2.10)
Adjusted R2 0.444 0.448 0.445 0.445 0.475
Within R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 35,379,360 35,219,033 35,379,342 35,379,061 29,251,128
Exporter sample
Dependant variable: Value gap, log
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DRCM (Djt) -0.0139* -0.00413 -0.0142* -0.0142* -0.0167
(-1.84) (-0.36) (-1.84) (-1.83) (-1.24)
Adjusted R2 0.448 0.454 0.449 0.449 0.467
Within R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 35,733,394 35,568,587 35,733,394 35,733,154 26,580,851
t, j FE X X X X X
ymp FE X
ymc FE X X
ymk FE X
ymck FE X
ymkp FE X
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. t-stats shown in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the
country pair level. Fixed effects (FE): event time (t), unit (j ≡ iepv) calendar time (ym), product (p),
country in which the reform takes place (c = i in the importer sample, and c = e in the exporting sample),
partner country (k = e in the importer sample, and k = i in the exporting sample). The dependent
variable is the reporting gap in terms of value, in logs as specified in expression (3.1). The top and
bottom percentiles in terms of the reporting gaps are dropped from the sample.
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TABLE 3.A.9: STATIC DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE: VALUE GAP — ADDITIONAL CONTROLS
Importer sample
Dependant variable: Value gap, log
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DRCM (Djt) -0.0323*** -0.0343*** -0.0205* -0.0235*
(-3.20) (-3.42) (-1.68) (-1.95)
Importer VAT main rate 0.00648 0.00686
(1.45) (1.53)
Exporter VAT main rate -0.000690 -0.000396
(-0.25) (-0.14)
Importer Intrastat threshold 0.0426** 0.0385*
(2.00) (1.81)
Exporter Intrastat threshold -0.0564*** -0.0543***
(-4.11) (-3.99)
Adjusted R2 0.480 0.480 0.484 0.484
Within R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 35,413,703 35,413,703 35,269,247 35,269,247
Exporter sample
Dependant variable: Value gap, log
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DRCM (Djt) -0.0104 -0.0111 0.00181 0.00219
(-1.18) (-1.26) (0.14) (0.17)
Importer VAT main rate -0.00185 -0.00156
(-0.85) (-0.71)
Exporter VAT main rate -0.00803* -0.00940**
(-1.71) (-1.97)
Importer Intrastat threshold 0.109*** 0.110***
(4.74) (4.71)
Exporter Intrastat threshold -0.0528 -0.0568
(-1.58) (-1.62)
Adjusted R2 0.484 0.484 0.490 0.490
Within R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 36,192,505 36,192,505 36,045,319 36,045,319
t, j FE X X X X
ymp FE X X
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. t-stats shown in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the
country pair level. Fixed effects (FE): event time (t), unit (j ≡ iepv) calendar time (ym), product (p),
country in which the reform takes place (c = i in the importer sample, and c = e in the exporting sample),
partner country (k = e in the importer sample, and k = i in the exporting sample). The dependent
variable is the reporting gap in terms of value, in logs as specified in expression (3.1).
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TABLE 3.A.10: STATIC DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE: VALUE GAP — REFORMS IN PARTNER COUNTRY
Importer sample
Dependant variable: Value gap, log
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DRCM (Djt) -0.0349*** -0.0245** -0.0314*** -0.0302*** -0.0280**
(-3.51) (-2.04) (-3.15) (-3.04) (-2.22)
DRCM partner 0.0127 0.00525 -0.00611 -0.00738
(0.92) (0.37) (-0.41) (-0.51)
Adjusted R2 0.478 0.483 0.479 0.479 0.508
Within R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 36,115,872 35,957,790 36,115,854 36,115,584 29,952,923
Exporter sample
Dependant variable: Value gap, log
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DRCM (Djt) -0.0101 0.00184 -0.0101 -0.00987 -0.0102
(-1.14) (0.14) (-1.14) (-1.10) (-0.66)
DRCM partner -0.0132 -0.0132 -0.00776 -0.00850
(-1.12) (-1.02) (-0.70) (-0.76)
Adjusted R2 0.484 0.491 0.485 0.485 0.502
Within R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 36,477,528 36,314,706 36,477,528 36,477,290 27,287,522
t, j FE X X X X X
ymp FE X
ymc FE X X
ymk FE X
ymck FE X
ymkp FE X
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. t-stats shown in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the
country pair level. Fixed effects (FE): event time (t), unit (j ≡ iepv) calendar time (ym), product (p),
country in which the reform takes place (c = i in the importer sample, and c = e in the exporting sample),
partner country (k = e in the importer sample, and k = i in the exporting sample). The dependent
variable is the reporting gap in terms of value, in logs as specified in expression (3.1). DRCM partner
cannot be included in the last column, as it would be absorbed by the ymkp fixed effect.
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TABLE 3.A.11: BASELINE STATIC DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE: QUANTITY GAP
Importer sample
Dependant variable: Quantity gap, log
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DRCM (Djt) -0.0341*** -0.0328** -0.0323*** -0.0299*** -0.0376***
(-2.98) (-2.40) (-2.83) (-2.64) (-2.61)
Adjusted R2 0.501 0.503 0.501 0.501 0.524
Within R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 32,137,670 31,960,693 32,137,645 32,137,357 26,617,025
Exporter sample
Dependant variable: Quantity gap, log
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DRCM (Djt) -0.00875 -0.00590 -0.00818 -0.00800 -0.0145
(-0.81) (-0.39) (-0.77) (-0.74) (-0.85)
Adjusted R2 0.504 0.509 0.505 0.505 0.521
Within R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 32,527,622 32,357,298 32,527,622 32,527,363 24,218,138
t, j FE X X X X X
ymp FE X
ymc FE X X
ymk FE X
ymck FE X
ymkp FE X
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. t-stats shown in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the
country pair level. Fixed effects (FE): event time (t), unit (j ≡ iepv) calendar time (ym), product (p),
country in which the reform takes place (c = i in the importer sample, and c = e in the exporting sample),
partner country (k = e in the importer sample, and k = i in the exporting sample). The dependent
variable is the reporting gap in terms of quantities, in logs as specified in expression (3.1).
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TABLE 3.A.12: STATIC DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE: VALUE GAP — RESTRICTED CONTROL GROUP
Importer sample
Dependant variable: Value gap, log
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DRCM (Djt) -0.0509*** -0.0655*** -0.0474*** -0.0454*** -0.0776***
(-3.67) (-2.99) (-3.42) (-3.30) (-2.79)
Adjusted R2 0.472 0.477 0.472 0.473 0.510
Within R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 7,135,345 7,064,311 7,135,291 7,134,556 4,815,918
Exporter sample
Dependant variable: Value gap, log
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DRCM (Djt) -0.00423 0.0232 -0.00379 -0.00199 -0.00257
(-0.38) (0.90) (-0.31) (-0.16) (-0.09)
Adjusted R2 0.474 0.482 0.475 0.476 0.498
Within R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 6,988,820 6,916,054 6,988,806 6,988,055 4,055,657
t, j FE X X X X X
ymp FE X
ymc FE X X
ymk FE X
ymck FE X
ymkp FE X
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. t-stats shown in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the
country pair level. Fixed effects (FE): event time (t), unit (j ≡ iepv) calendar time (ym), product (p),
country in which the reform takes place (c = i in the importer sample, and c = e in the exporting sample),
partner country (k = e in the importer sample, and k = i in the exporting sample). The dependent
variable is the reporting gap in terms of value, in logs as specified in expression (3.1). The sample is
restricted to goods belonging to the same CN section as the treated units.
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TABLE 3.A.13: STATIC DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE: VALUE GAP — INTERACTIONS
Importer sample
Dependant variable: Value gap, log
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DRCM (Djt) 0.176** 0.223** 0.0824 0.0706 -0.0365
(1.96) (2.21) (0.93) (0.80) (-0.36)
Importer VAT main rate 0.00649 0.00686
(1.45) (1.53)
DRCM (Djt) × Imp. VAT rate -0.00990** -0.0114** -0.00538 -0.00475 0.000431
(-2.38) (-2.46) (-1.31) (-1.17) (0.09)
Exporter VAT main rate -0.000693 -0.000400
(-0.25) (-0.14)
Importer Intrastat threshold 0.0429** 0.0389*
(2.02) (1.83)
Exporter Intrastat threshold -0.0564*** -0.0542***
(-4.11) (-3.99)
Adjusted R2 0.480 0.484 0.481 0.481 0.509
Within R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 35,413,703 35,269,247 35,413,692 35,413,430 29,602,215
Exporter sample
Dependant variable: Value gap, log
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DRCM (Djt) -0.154 -0.180 -0.114 -0.141 -0.0576
(-1.64) (-1.49) (-1.22) (-1.49) (-0.38)
Importer VAT main rate -0.00803* -0.00940**
(-1.71) (-1.97)
DRCM (Djt) × Imp. VAT rate 0.00686 0.00854 0.00491 0.00624 0.00221
(1.53) (1.52) (1.10) (1.38) (0.31)
Exporter VAT main rate -0.00185 -0.00156
(-0.85) (-0.71)
Importer Intrastat threshold 0.109*** 0.110***
(4.74) (4.71)
Exporter Intrastat threshold -0.0531 -0.0572
(-1.59) (-1.63)
Adjusted R2 0.484 0.490 0.484 0.484 0.502
Within R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 36,192,505 36,045,319 36,192,505 36,192,288 27,238,333
t, j FE X X X X X
ymp FE X
ymc FE X X
ymk FE X
ymck FE X
ymkp FE X
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. t-stats shown in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the
country pair level. Fixed effects (FE): event time (t), unit (j ≡ iepv) calendar time (ym), product (p),
country in which the reform takes place (c = i in the importer sample, and c = e in the exporting sample),
partner country (k = e in the importer sample, and k = i in the exporting sample). The dependent
variable is the reporting gap in terms of value, in logs as specified in expression (3.1).
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TABLE 3.A.14: STATIC DIFF.-IN-DIFF.: VALUE GAP — FRAUD SHIFTING IN IMPORTER SAMPLE
Unit value
Dependant variable: Value gap, log
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DRCM (Djt) -0.0482*** -0.0410** -0.0436*** -0.0420*** -0.0508***
(-3.63) (-2.47) (-3.26) (-3.16) (-2.62)
High UV × post -0.00281 0.0250*** -0.00231 -0.00251 0.0149
(-0.53) (2.65) (-0.44) (-0.48) (1.40)
Adjusted R2 0.471 0.476 0.472 0.472 0.501
Within R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 30,913,101 30,747,517 30,913,082 30,912,835 24,756,295
Goods subjectable to DRCM
Dependant variable: Value gap, log
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DRCM (Djt) -0.0491*** -0.0452*** -0.0444*** -0.0428*** -0.0504**
(-3.69) (-2.75) (-3.32) (-3.21) (-2.57)
DRCM-good × post -0.0131*** -0.00127 -0.0125*** -0.0125*** 0.00437
(-3.70) (-0.23) (-3.55) (-3.54) (0.69)
Adjusted R2 0.471 0.476 0.472 0.472 0.501
Within R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 30,913,101 30,747,517 30,913,082 30,912,835 24,756,295
Goods within same HS4
Dependant variable: Value gap, log
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DRCM (Djt) -0.0481*** -0.0440*** -0.0434*** -0.0419*** -0.0529***
(-3.62) (-2.65) (-3.25) (-3.14) (-2.71)
Same HS4 × post 0.0199 0.0640*** 0.0217 0.0224 0.0487**
(1.00) (2.62) (1.11) (1.14) (2.08)
Adjusted R2 0.471 0.476 0.472 0.472 0.501
Within R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 30,913,101 30,747,517 30,913,082 30,912,835 24,756,295
t, j FE X X X X X
ymp FE X
ymc FE X X
ymk FE X
ymck FE X
ymkp FE X
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. t-stats shown in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the
country pair level. Fixed effects (FE): event time (t), unit (j ≡ iepv) calendar time (ym), product (p),
country in which the reform takes place (c = i in the importer sample, and c = e in the exporting sample),
partner country (k = e in the importer sample, and k = i in the exporting sample). The dependent
variable is the reporting gap in terms of value, in logs as specified in expression (3.1). DRCM-good × post
is a dummy that takes value 1 post-reform if the good has high unit value (in top 5 percentiles in terms
of unit value over whole sample). DRCM-good × post is a dummy that takes value 1 post reform if the
good can be subject to the DRCM according to the law, but has not been in a specific reform. Same HS4 ×
post is a dummy that takes value 1 post reform if the good is within the same HS heading as the treated
product - but has not been subject to the DRCM.
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TABLE 3.A.15: ESTIMATED AMOUNTS OF FRAUD PRE-REFORM
Event-specific βˆv Common βˆ
Trade VAT Fraud Fraud Fraud (% Fraud Fraud Fraud (%
v (m. EUR) rate βˆ βˆv (m. EUR) (% rev.) VAT gap) (m. EUR) (% rev.) VAT gap)
1 813.10 20.00 -0.03 4.88 0.02 0.14
2 1,169.39 20.00 -0.03 7.02 0.03 0.29
3 6,939.16 20.00 -0.03 41.63 0.16 1.62
4 184.78 20.00 -0.03 1.11 0.03 0.10
5 547.90 20.00 -0.03 -0.28 30.82 0.26 0.70 3.29 0.03 0.07
6 10,616.61 21.00 -0.03 -0.02 39.33 0.32 1.48 66.88 0.55 2.51
7 267.80 21.00 -0.03 1.69 0.01 0.06
8 27.78 21.00 -0.03 0.18 0.00 0.01
9 6,081.43 19.00 -0.03 -0.03 37.80 0.02 0.13 34.66 0.02 0.12
10 9,178.48 19.00 -0.03 52.32 0.03 0.19
11 15,093.22 19.00 -0.03 -0.05 138.99 0.07 0.52 86.03 0.04 0.32
12 1,393.84 19.00 -0.03 7.94 0.00 0.03
13 90.39 25.00 -0.03 -0.09 1.95 0.01 0.06 0.68 0.00 0.02
14 1,861.91 25.00 -0.03 13.96 0.06 0.46
15 14.66 20.00 -0.03 0.09 0.01 0.03
16 7.52 20.00 -0.03 -0.04 0.06 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.02
17 16.03 20.00 -0.03 0.10 0.01 0.05
18 295.94 20.00 -0.03 -0.05 2.93 0.14 2.44 1.78 0.08 1.48
19 1,584.97 16.00 -0.03 -0.03 6.86 0.01 0.21 7.61 0.01 0.23
20 3,697.87 21.00 -0.03 -0.15 116.24 0.17 3.62 23.30 0.03 0.73
21 34.86 24.00 -0.03 -0.05 0.45 0.00 0.04 0.25 0.00 0.02
22 1,663.28 19.60 -0.03 9.78 0.01 0.03
23 3,919.17 17.50 -0.03 20.58 0.01 0.09
24 102.51 19.00 -0.03 -0.22 4.36 0.02 0.05 0.58 0.00 0.01
25 501.44 24.00 -0.03 -0.30 35.99 0.25 0.50 3.61 0.03 0.05
27 54.39 20.00 -0.03 -0.09 0.95 0.01 0.03 0.33 0.00 0.01
28 561.23 27.00 -0.03 -0.45 67.96 0.73 2.59 4.55 0.05 0.17
29 1,248.09 27.00 -0.03 -0.00 0.27 0.00 0.01 10.11 0.09 0.49
30 6.70 21.00 -0.03 0.04 0.00 0.00
31 3,421.78 20.00 -0.03 -0.25 171.50 0.17 0.45 20.53 0.02 0.05
32 1,366.48 22.00 -0.03 -0.63 190.02 0.19 0.51 9.02 0.01 0.02
33 48.68 18.00 -0.03 -0.03 0.31 0.01 0.03 0.26 0.01 0.02
35 87.59 22.00 -0.03 -0.23 4.47 0.31 0.45 0.58 0.04 0.06
36 9.68 21.00 -0.03 -0.16 0.33 0.02 0.11 0.06 0.00 0.02
37 398.69 21.00 -0.03 2.51 0.12 0.81
38 120.48 21.00 -0.03 -0.03 0.80 0.04 0.26 0.76 0.04 0.25
39 25.38 21.00 -0.03 0.16 0.01 0.04
40 784.00 21.00 -0.03 -0.05 7.96 0.34 4.94 0.21
41 1,591.64 19.00 -0.03 9.07 0.02 11.46
42 3,435.34 21.00 -0.03 -0.16 118.07 0.28 2.48 21.64 0.05 0.46
43 529.31 23.00 -0.03 3.65 0.01 0.06
44 4,761.31 23.00 -0.03 -0.05 58.18 0.21 0.57 32.85 0.12 0.32
45 5,027.55 23.00 -0.03 -0.36 412.40 1.37 4.32 34.69 0.12 0.36
46 1,161.34 23.00 -0.03 -0.24 62.94 0.18 1.11 8.01 0.02 0.14
47 267.51 23.00 -0.03 1.85 0.00
48 173.27 21.00 -0.03 -0.09 3.30 0.02 0.34 1.09 0.01 0.11
49 750.71 24.00 -0.03 -0.16 28.35 0.24 0.26 5.41 0.05 0.05
50 1,507.42 20.00 -0.03 -0.02 4.78 0.04 0.08 9.04 0.08 0.15
51 391.12 25.00 -0.03 2.93 0.01 0.21
52 130.19 20.00 -0.03 -0.32 8.30 0.26 2.17 0.78 0.02 0.20
53 224.05 19.00 -0.03 -0.24 10.12 0.22 0.39 1.28 0.03 0.05
54 5,557.51 20.00 -0.03 -0.04 46.33 0.92 2.19 33.35 0.66 1.58
Note: v refers to the event number. Data: importer sample. Amounts of trade and fraud, when not
expressed as fractions, are in 2015 million EUR. (% rev.) means expressed in percentage of VAT revenues
in the year of reform. (% VAT gap) means expressed in percentage of the VAT gap in the year of reform.
All amounts are annual values. Missing values in columns 5 to 8 arise when βˆv > 0.
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Appendix 3.B Additional figures
FIGURE 3.B.1: ILLUSTRATION OF MTIC FRAUD
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FIGURE 3.B.2: ILLUSTRATION OF IMPORTS DISGUISED AS DOMESTIC PURCHASES
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FIGURE 3.B.3: ILLUSTRATION OF DOMESTIC SALES DISGUISED AS EXPORTS
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FIGURE 3.B.4: EVENT WINDOWS OVER TIME
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020
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Reform date and event window
Announcement date
Note: Each line represents an event window of 12 months before and after the date of implementation
of the DRCM, which is depicted as a round dot. The orange star depicts the date at which the reform is
announced.
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FIGURE 3.B.5: HISTOGRAMS AND MONTHLY AVERAGES AND MEDIANS OF THE REPORTING GAPS
5.0 2.5 0.0 2.5 5.0
Value gap, in log
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
D
en
si
ty
(a) Importer sample
5.0 2.5 0.0 2.5 5.0
Quantity gap, in log
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
D
en
si
ty
(c) Importer sample
5.0 2.5 0.0 2.5 5.0
Value gap, in log
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
D
en
si
ty
(e) Exporter sample
5 0 5
Quantity gap, in log
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
D
en
si
ty
(g) Exporter sample
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 101112
Month
0.000
0.025
0.050
0.075
(b) Importer sample
Mean gap
Median gap
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 101112
Month
0.000
0.025
0.050
0.075
0.100
(d) Importer sample
Mean gap
Median gap
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 101112
Month
0.025
0.000
0.025
0.050
0.075
(f) Exporter sample
Mean gap
Median gap
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 101112
Month
0.025
0.000
0.025
0.050
(h) Exporter sample
Mean gap
Median gap
Note: Histograms and monthly averages of the reporting gaps in terms of values and quantities, for the
importer and the exporter samples. The series underlying the figures in each row are the same. The
bottom and top percentiles in terms of the reporting gaps are removed from the sample.
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FIGURE 3.B.6: MEAN GAPS PER GROUP OVER TIME — EVENT IN IMPORTING COUNTRY (CONTINUES IN
NEXT FIGURE)
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Note: Time series of the mean of gaps as calculated in (3.1), for the treatment group (i.e. products to
which the DRCM applies at time 0) and the control group (the remaining products). The solid and
dashed vertical lines indicate the date at which the DRCM starts to apply and the date at which the
reform was announced.
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FIGURE 3.B.7: MEAN GAPS PER GROUP OVER TIME — EVENT IN IMPORTING COUNTRY (CONTINUES IN
NEXT FIGURE)
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Note: Time series of the mean of gaps as calculated in (3.1), for the treatment group (i.e. products to
which the DRCM applies at time 0) and the control group (the remaining products). The solid and
dashed vertical lines indicate the date at which the DRCM starts to apply and the date at which the
reform was announced.
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FIGURE 3.B.8: MEAN GAPS PER GROUP OVER TIME — EVENT IN IMPORTING COUNTRY (CONTINUES IN
NEXT FIGURE)
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Note: Time series of the mean of gaps as calculated in (3.1), for the treatment group (i.e. products to
which the DRCM applies at time 0) and the control group (the remaining products). The solid and
dashed vertical lines indicate the date at which the DRCM starts to apply and the date at which the
reform was announced.
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FIGURE 3.B.9: MEAN GAPS PER GROUP OVER TIME — EVENT IN IMPORTING COUNTRY (CONTINUES IN
NEXT FIGURE)
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Note: Time series of the mean of gaps as calculated in (3.1), for the treatment group (i.e. products to
which the DRCM applies at time 0) and the control group (the remaining products). The solid and
dashed vertical lines indicate the date at which the DRCM starts to apply and the date at which the
reform was announced.
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FIGURE 3.B.10: MEAN GAPS PER GROUP OVER TIME — EVENT IN IMPORTING COUNTRY (CONTINUED
FROM PREVIOUS FIGURE)
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Note: Time series of the mean of gaps as calculated in (3.1), for the treatment group (i.e. products to
which the DRCM applies at time 0) and the control group (the remaining products). The solid and
dashed vertical lines indicate the date at which the DRCM starts to apply and the date at which the
reform was announced.
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FIGURE 3.B.11: MEAN GAPS PER GROUP OVER TIME — EVENT IN EXPORTING COUNTRY (CONTINUES IN
NEXT FIGURE)
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Note: Time series of the mean of gaps as calculated in (3.1), for the treatment group (i.e. products to
which the DRCM applies at time 0) and the control group (the remaining products). The solid and
dashed vertical lines indicate the date at which the DRCM starts to apply and the date at which the
reform was announced.
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FIGURE 3.B.12: MEAN GAPS PER GROUP OVER TIME — EVENT IN EXPORTING COUNTRY (CONTINUES IN
NEXT FIGURE)
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Note: Time series of the mean of gaps as calculated in (3.1), for the treatment group (i.e. products to
which the DRCM applies at time 0) and the control group (the remaining products). The solid and
dashed vertical lines indicate the date at which the DRCM starts to apply and the date at which the
reform was announced.
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FIGURE 3.B.13: MEAN GAPS PER GROUP OVER TIME — EVENT IN EXPORTING COUNTRY (CONTINUES IN
NEXT FIGURE)
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Note: Time series of the mean of gaps as calculated in (3.1), for the treatment group (i.e. products to
which the DRCM applies at time 0) and the control group (the remaining products). The solid and
dashed vertical lines indicate the date at which the DRCM starts to apply and the date at which the
reform was announced.
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FIGURE 3.B.14: MEAN GAPS PER GROUP OVER TIME — EVENT IN EXPORTING COUNTRY (CONTINUES IN
NEXT FIGURE)
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Note: Time series of the mean of gaps as calculated in (3.1), for the treatment group (i.e. products to
which the DRCM applies at time 0) and the control group (the remaining products). The solid and
dashed vertical lines indicate the date at which the DRCM starts to apply and the date at which the
reform was announced.
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FIGURE 3.B.15: MEAN GAPS PER GROUP OVER TIME — EVENT IN EXPORTING COUNTRY (CONTINUED
FROM PREVIOUS FIGURE)
10 5 0 5 10
Time relative to event
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
0.5
M
ea
n 
va
lu
e 
ga
p 
(lo
g)
No: 49, Side: Exporter, Country: RO, Date: 6.2011
Control
Treatment
10 5 0 5 10
Time relative to event
0.50
0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50
M
ea
n 
va
lu
e 
ga
p 
(lo
g)
No: 50, Side: Exporter, Country: RO, Date: 1.2016
Control
Treatment
10 5 0 5 10
Time relative to event
0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50
M
ea
n 
va
lu
e 
ga
p 
(lo
g)
No: 51, Side: Exporter, Country: SE, Date: 1.2013
Control
Treatment
10 5 0 5 10
Time relative to event
0.0
0.2
0.4
M
ea
n 
va
lu
e 
ga
p 
(lo
g)
No: 52, Side: Exporter, Country: SI, Date: 1.2010
Control
Treatment
10 5 0 5 10
Time relative to event
0.4
0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
M
ea
n 
va
lu
e 
ga
p 
(lo
g)
No: 53, Side: Exporter, Country: SK, Date: 4.2009
Control
Treatment
10 5 0 5 10
Time relative to event
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
M
ea
n 
va
lu
e 
ga
p 
(lo
g)
No: 54, Side: Exporter, Country: SK, Date: 1.2014
Control
Treatment
Note: Time series of the mean of gaps as calculated in (3.1), for the treatment group (i.e. products to
which the DRCM applies at time 0) and the control group (the remaining products). The solid and
dashed vertical lines indicate the date at which the DRCM starts to apply and the date at which the
reform was announced.
FIGURE 3.B.16: DYNAMIC DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE: QUANTITY GAP
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Note: Sequences of βˆk from equation (3.3), estimated on the importer and exporter samples with the fol-
lowing fixed effects: j, t, ymc, ymkp. The coefficient in the period immediately preceding the implemen-
tation of the DRCM has been normalized to 0. 99%-, 95%- and 90%-confidence intervals are depicted in
different colour shades.
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FIGURE 3.B.17: DYNAMIC DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE: VALUE GAP — RESTRICTED CONTROL GROUP
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Note: Sequences of βˆk from equation (3.3), estimated on the importer and exporter samples with the fol-
lowing fixed effects: j, t, ymc, ymkp. The coefficient in the period immediately preceding the implemen-
tation of the DRCM has been normalized to 0. 99%-, 95%- and 90%-confidence intervals are depicted in
different colour shades.
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FIGURE 3.B.18: VAT GAPS OVER TIME IN EACH MEMBER STATE (CONTINUES IN NEXT FIGURE)
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Note: VAT gaps expressed in percentage of the theoretical tax liability. The vertical lines denote the times
of implementation of the DRCM.
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FIGURE 3.B.19: VAT GAPS OVER TIME IN EACH MEMBER STATE (CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS FIGURE)
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Note: VAT gaps expressed in percentage of the theoretical tax liability. The vertical lines denote the times
of implementation of the DRCM.
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Appendix 3.C Instances of the application of the DRCM to
goods in EU Member States
The reverse charge mechanism can be applied domestically by EU Member States to
certain categories of goods that are specified in articles 199 and 199a-c of Council Di-
rective 2006/112/EC. There may also be exceptions not based of the aforementioned
articles whereby the DRCM is applied by member states, a list of which can be found
in table 1 of de la Feria (2019). The data collection procedure I followed consists in
checking notifications by Member States informing the European Commission of their
use of the DRCM (an up-to-date list entitled Notifications of the VAT committee can be
found online, last accessed 19.05.2020). Some events were found using other sources,
e.g. European Commission (2014) or de la Feria (2019). Once the list of events was
established, I systematically consulted the national laws to find details of the timing
(implementation and announcement dates) and the coverage (i.e. the CN codes to
which the DRCM applies).
Austria The DRCM has been applied to mobile phones and electronic integrated cir-
cuits since 01.01.2012. Although some sources suggest it may have been implemented
earlier (de la Feria, 2019), documents from news and the official European Commis-
sion documentation suggests the above date is the actual one.36 The DRCM has been
extended to game consoles, laptop computers and selected supplies of raw and semi-
finished metals, of which a list can be found in European Commission (2014, p. 92).
The DRCM is also applied to waste and scraps since 01.07.2007 (list of goods available
in BGBl. II No. 129/2007).
Bulgaria A selection of 41 cereals are subject to the DRCM. It was implemented from
01.12.2013, and the full list of CN codes subject to the DRCM can be found in Part Two
of Annex 2 to Chapter 19(a) (art 163(a)) of the VAT Act (602-01-23 / 12.04.2006).37 The
DRCM also applies to categories of waste as defined in Part One of Annex 2 to Chapter
19(a) of the VAT Act, effective 01.01.2007 (State Gazette, issue 108 of 29.XII).
Croatia In Croatia, the DRCM applied to recyclable waste part processed waste and
other processed industrial materials. However, it applied from the date of its accession
to the EU. Therefore, there is no pre-treatment data available. The DRCM also applies
to certain steel products for concrete reinforcement from 01.01.2019 (art. 10 of OG
106/2018 modifying art. 75 of the Value Added Tax Act).
Czech Republic The first implementation of the DRCM dates from 01.04.2011, as
specified by art 199 of the EU VAT Directive. It applied to scraps and wastes — metal,
paper, etc. (Gra´sgruber et al., 2013). The full list of these products can be found in
Annex 5 of Act No. 235/2004 Coll article 92c, the law on VAT in Czech Republic.
36See the International VAT Monitor July/August 2011, and the annex to COM/2018/0118 final (last
accessed 19.05.2020).
37Which can be accessed here, last accessed 21.02.2020.
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Starting 01.04.2015, the DRCM has been applied to mobile phones, electronic inte-
grated circuits, laptop computers and game consoles, and a variety of crops and sup-
plies of metals. Its scope was extended on two occasions in the following months:
to selected agricultural crops (01.07.2015) and to sugar beets (01.09.2015). A General
Reverse Charge Mechanism (GRCM) is being implemented following EU Council Di-
rective 2018/2057, starting January 2020.
Denmark The DRCM was applied to domestic transactions of mobile phones, elec-
tronic integrated circuits, laptop computers and video consoles from 01.07.2014. It
only applies when the provider’s activity is not primarily selling these goods. The
firm who has the burden of the tax is specified in art 46(1), nos 8-10 of the VAT law.
The DRCM also applies to the supplies of scrap metal from 01.07.2012 (art. 3 of Law
no. 590 of 18/06/2012).
Estonia The first instance of application of the DRCM to goods in Estonia dates from
01.01.2011 when it was applied to metal waste (RT I, 10/12/2010, 3). It was then
applied to gold effective 01.04.2012 (RT I, 27.03.2012, 7, amending art. 41(1) of the VAT
Act RT I 2003, 82, 554). The relevant list of metal waste can be found in art. 104 of
the Waste Act (RT I 2004, 9, 52). It was further extended to precious metals effective
01.07.2014 (RT I, 06.06.2014, 2). Last, the DRCM was then applied to selected metals
on 01.01.2017 (RT I, 08.11.2016, 1) and this selection was later very slightly modified
(RT I, 24.04.2018, 2).
Finland The DRCM applies only to goods from metal waste, effective 01.01.2015
(27/06/2014/507 modifying art 8d of the 30.12.1993/1501 VAT Act).
France The goods subject to the DRCM are given in art. 283 CGI. Since 01/01/2008,
it applies to new industrial waste and recoverable materials (LOI n 2007-1824 du 25
de´cembre 2007 - art. 57).
Germany The DRCM was first introduced on selected used materials (metals, de-
scribed in Annex 3 of the VAT law) and gold on 01.01.2011 (Jahressteuergesetz 2010,
amending article 13b of the VAT law). It was followed by mobile phones and electronic
integrated circuits on 01.07.2014 (Artikel 6 G. v. 16.06.2011 BGBl. I S. 1090), video con-
soles and tablets (excluding computers) on 01.10.2014 (Artikel 8 G. v. 25.07.2014 BGBl.
I S. 1266). On that occasion, a list of metals was also included, presented in Annex 4 of
the law. This list was further amended effective 01.01.2015 (Artikel 11 G. v. 22.12.2014
BGBl. I S. 2417).
Greece The details of which goods are subject to the DRCM are contained in article
39a of Law No. 2859/2000. The DRCM was introduced to mobile phones, video con-
soles and laptop computers effective 01.08.2017 (article 67 of Law 4484/2017). It also
applied to supplies of recyclable waste since 01.01.2007 (paragraph 2 of article 21 of
law 3522/2006).
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Hungary The details are contained in art. 142 of the Act CXXVII of 2007 on Value
Added Tax, and the annexes referred in art. 142 (d), (i) and (j). Chronologically, the
DRCM entered into force as follows. For the sale of waste: 01.01.2008 (original law);
for the sale of selected agricultural commodities: 01/07/2012 (Act XLIX of 2012); for
the sale of selected metals: 01/01/2015 (Act XXXIII of 2014).
Ireland The DRCM applied to scrap metal effective 01.05.2011 (art 16 of Value-
Added Tax Consolidation Act 2010, modified by the Finance Act 2011 (No. 6 of 2011),
ss. 59(1)(a), 59(2)).
Italy The VAT reverse-charge provisions are described in art. 17 of Presidential De-
cree No. 633 of 1972. It applied to computers and video consoles from 02.05.2016
(Legislative Decree No. 24 of 11 February 2016). Before that, it has applied to mo-
bile phones and electronic integrated circuits effective 01.01.2011, as authorized by the
EU Council (2010/710/EU). The DRCM also applies to waste (art. 74) since at least
2003, but these supplies appear not to have been taxed before. Due to the uncertainty
relative to the tax treatment of these supplies, they are excluded from the sample.
Latvia The articles covered by the DRCM are contained in articles 141 to 143 of the
VAT law (2012/197.2). It was applied from 01.04.2016 to mobile phones, electronic
integrated circuits and laptops (2015/248.18), from 01.07.2016 to a selection of cereals
(2016/120.2) and from 01/01/2017 to precious metals (2016/241.48). Effective from
01.01.2018 to video game consoles, metal products and the supply of household elec-
tronic equipment and electrical household appliances (2017/156.11, see annex to the
law for lists of products in 2013/14.3, see versions for relevant dates). The list of metal
products was shortened effective 01.07.2019 and the DRCM on the supply of house-
hold electronic equipment and electrical household appliances was abolished effective
01.01.2020 (2019/133.4). The DRCM also applies to wood timber, effective 01.07.1999
(Latvijas Ve¯stnesis, 133/135, 30.04.1999; adding article 13(2) to the previous VAT law:
Latvijas Ve¯stnesis , 49, 30.03.1995), and to other types of forms of wood products, ef-
fective 01.01.2016 (2015/248.18). Last, it applies to metal waste and scraps, effective
01.10.2011 (Latvijas Ve¯stnesis, 117, 28.07.2011.).
Lithuania The details on which products are subject to the DRCM is not directly
contained in the VAT Act, but in the No. 900 Amendment To The Measures To Ensure Tax
Liability. The DRCM applies to scrap metals as well as selected timber products effec-
tive 01.01.2008 (Resolution No. 1390 of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania
of 19 December 2007). It became mandatory for mobile phones, tablets, and portable
laptop computers as well as hard disks from 01.08.2019 (Resolution No. 6962 of the
Government of the Republic of Lithuania of April 24, 2019).
The Netherlands Details on the application of the DRCM are specified in the Im-
plementation Decree on turnover tax 1968 (Uitv. Besl. OB 1968, articles 24ba and
24bb). The DRCM was first applied to used materials, scrap and waste from 01.01.2007
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(Stb. 2006, 684) and then applied to mobile phones, chips, game consoles, tablet com-
puters and laptops from 01.04.2013 (stb-2012-694). It is worthwhile noting that for
these goods (except computers) the DRCM has been optional since 01.06.2012, and be-
came mandatory as of 01.04.2013. The DRCM has been applied to clothing other than
footwear over the period 1992-2012 (de la Feria (2019) and officially announced in OJ
L 351, 2 December 1992, renewed in OJ L 8, 14.1.1998, p. 16 and 2007/740/EC). The
DRCM on clothing ceased to operate on 01.04.2013 (stb-2012-694).
Poland The DRCM is abolished in Poland from 01.11.2019, date at which it is re-
placed by a “split payment” mechanism. Before that, goods subject to reverse charge
were specified in Annex 11 (but the goods are classified using the Polish classification,
and must be translated into the CN nomenclature manually), as referred in art. 17.1.8
of the VAT Act (Dz. U. z 2004 r. nr 54, poz. 535). This Annex was modified over time
as follows. Effective 01.07.2011, it contained a list of metal scraps (Dz. U. z 2011 r. nr
134, poz. 780); it was then extended to more such products on 01.10.2013 (Dz. U. z
2013 r. poz. 1027); then to more metals as well as laptops, game consoles and mobile
phones on 01.07.2015 (Dz. U. z 2015 r. poz. 605) and finally to computer chips and
other metals from 01.01.2017 (Dz. U. z 2016 r. poz. 2024). The DRCM also applies to
hard disks since 01.01.2018 by derogation allowed by the EC (2017/0205 (NLE)).
Portugal In portugal, Annex E of the VAT Code, referred to in article 2 1(i) of the
Value Added Tax Code, contains the list of supplies (waste and metals) to which
the DRCM applies effective 01.10.2006 (Lei n. 33/2006). The DRCM also applied to
doorsteps as a derogation between 2004 and 2015 (de la Feria, 2019), but I could not
find evidence of it in the laws.
Romania The VAT rules are contained in title VII of law no. 227/2015, and the goods
for which DRCM applies are detailed in art. 331 (and in art. 160 of law 571/2003 before
2015). The DRCM was applied to a selection of cereals effective 31.05.2011, as specified
in EMERGENCY ORDER no. 49 of May 31, 2011. It also applies to mobile phones,
electronic integrated circuits, video console, laptops and tablets effective 01.01.2016
(LAW no.227 of September 8, 2015 on the Fiscal Code). The DRCM also applies to
metal scraps and other waste, as well as to wood. However, the application of the
DRCM pre-dates the joining of Romania to the EU, and I could not find the CN codes
matching these goods (art 331 a and b).
Slovakia The goods to which the DRCM apply are listed in art. 69(12) of the Act No.
222 2004 Coll. This article has been amended over time to include mobile phones and
electronic integrated circuits, selected cereals and articles of iron and steel (360/2013
Coll., effective 01/01/2014). Before that, the DRCM has been applied to metal waste
and scraps as well as gold (83/2009 Coll., effective 01.04.2009).
Slovenia The goods to which DRCM apply are specified in article 76a of the Value
Added Tax Act, and refer to Annex III for a list of goods. The DRCM applies to waste
and scrap since 01.01.2010 ( The Act Amending the Value Added Tax Act - ZDDV-1B
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(Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 85/2009, of 30 October 2009)). The
list was modified on 01.01.2011, restricting the goods to which the DRCM applies.
Spain VAT regulations are specified in Law 37/1992, of December 28, on Value
Added Tax. Article 84 dictates which goods are subject to reverse charge. The DRCM
applies to supplies of mobile phones, video game consoles, laptops and digital tablets,
as well as selected metals since 01.04.2015 (Art. 1.19 of Law 28/2014, a full list of the
goods is available in section 10 of the Annex of Law 37/1992). It also applies to differ-
ent types of industrial waste and metals since 01.01.2004 (Art. 7.3.2 of Law 62/2003,
full list in Annex 7).
Sweden The DRCM applies to metal scrap and waste, as specified in art. 2(6). The
list of CN codes is directly in the law, and it is effective 01.01.2013 (SFS 2012:755 Law
on amendments to the VAT).
United Kingdom Only mobile phones and electronic integrated circuits are subject
to the DRCM in the UK, effective 01.06.2007 (2007 No. 1417).
Other EU countries In Belgium , Malta and Luxembourg, the DRCM only applies
to some services and intangibles (e.g. CO2 emission permits, construction, electricity,
etc.).
Instances of the DRCM not included in the analysis There are several instances
where the DRCM was applied, but the episode is dropped from the sample. Cyprus:
it applies to waste and scraps, but only for firms from a specific industry. Portugal: the
DRCM applied to doorsteps, but no evidence of it could be found in the law. Romania:
the DRCM applied to waste and timber since the time at which the country joined the
EU, eliminating the possibility to observe the treated products prior to the application
of the DRCM. Italy: the DRCM applies to waste, but it appears that these goods were
not subject to VAT prior to the DRCM implementation. Croatia: the DRCM applied
to waste and gold since the time at which the country joined the EU, eliminating the
possibility to observe the treated products prior to the application of the DRCM. Idem
for Bulgaria (01.01.2007), and the Netherlands (01.12.1992) and Latvia (1999, not in the
EU even in the post period).
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